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Abstract 
This thesis studies the systemic risk within the financial sector, and the impact of 
financing sources on default risk in the corporate sector. The first essay models 
systemic risk using a common factor that accounts for market-wide shocks and a tail 
dependence factor that accounts for linkages among extreme stock returns. We show 
that disregarding the effect of the tail dependence factor leads to a downward bias in 
the measurement of systemic risk, especially during weak economic times. The 
second essay explores the mechanism through which a financial crisis affects the 
default risk of real-economy levered firms using the natural experiment of the 
2007−2009 crisis. We find that firms strongly dependent on bank financing suffer 
higher increases in default risk, than otherwise similar firms with no dependence on 
bank financing. The third essay empirically examines the effect of rollover risk on 
default risk. We find that financing sources indeed drive this effect, and in particular 
our results strongly suggest that being bank dependent magnifies this effect.  
iii 
Resumen 
Esta tesis estudia el riesgo sistémico en el sector financiero , y el impacto de las 
fuentes de financiación de riesgo de impago en el sector empresarial . El primer 
ensayo de modelos de riesgo sistémico utilizando un factor común que da cuenta de 
las perturbaciones a nivel de mercado y un factor de dependencia de cola que da 
cuenta de los vínculos entre los rendimientos de las acciones extremas. Se demuestra 
que sin tener en cuenta el efecto del factor de dependencia de cola lleva a un sesgo a 
la baja en la medición del riesgo sistémico , especialmente durante momentos 
económicos débiles . El segundo ensayo explora el mecanismo a través del cual una 
crisis financiera afecta el riesgo de impago de las empresas apalancadas economía real 
utilizando el experimento natural de la crisis de 2007−2009 . Encontramos que las 
empresas que dependen en gran medida de la financiación bancaria sufren mayores 
aumentos en el riesgo de incumplimiento , que las empresas por lo demás similares 
sin dependencia de la financiación bancaria. El tercer ensayo examina empíricamente 
el efecto del riesgo de refinanciamiento en el riesgo de impago. Nos encontramos con 
que las fuentes de financiamiento en coche de hecho este efecto , y en particular, 
nuestros resultados sugieren fuertemente que siendo magnifica dependiente banco este 
efecto.
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
Monitoring the whole financial system is required to guarantee its stability. As the 2007–2012 crises 
highlighted, a key factor that affects the stability of the overall financial system, and the real economy, is the 
level of systemic risk. Given the importance of systemic risk, the second chapter of this thesis is to model 
systemic risk. Furthermore, financial sector is interacted with corporate sectors. The third chapter studies the 
mechanism through which a financial crisis affects the default risk of real-economy levered firms, and how 
financing sources affects firm default risk. The fourth chapter examines whether rollover risk exacerbates 
default risk, and whether financing sources drive this effect. I summarize the three chapters as follows. 
The chapter 2 in the dissertation is entitled “Measuring Systemic Risk: Common Factor Exposures and 
Tail Dependence Effects.” We model systemic risk using a common factor that accounts for market-wide 
shocks and a tail dependence factor that accounts for linkages among extreme stock returns. Specifically, our 
theoretical model allows for firm-specific impacts of infrequent and extreme events. Using data on the four 
sectors of the U.S. financial industry from 1996 to 2011, we uncover two key empirical findings. First, 
disregarding the effect of the tail dependence factor leads to a downward bias in the measurement of 
systemic risk, especially during weak economic times. Second, when these measures serve as leading 
indicators of the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index, measures that include a tail dependence factor offer 
better forecasting ability than measures based on a common factor only.  
The chapter 3 in the dissertation is entitled “Financial Crises, Financing Sources, and Default Risks.” 
We study the mechanism through which a financial crisis affects the default risk of real-economy levered 
firms using the natural experiment of the 2007−2009 crisis. Using an extensive database of listed non-
financial firms in the U.S. market during the period of 2006Q3−2010Q1 and a robust methodology of 
difference-in-differences matching estimator approach, we find that firms strongly dependent on bank 
financing suffer higher increases in default risk, than otherwise similar firms with no dependence on bank 
financing. On the other hand, firms that solely rely on financing from public-debt markets do not experience 
significant increases in their default risk. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that the bank supply 
shock theory is the more relevant mechanism explaining the transmission channel of shocks from the 
financial sector to the real economy which affects to default risk. We also show that bank-dependent firms 
cannot offset adverse impacts stemming from bank lending supply shocks by substituting bank loans with 
publicly traded debts. 
The chapter 4 in the dissertation is entitled “Do Financing Sources Affect Rollover Risk Effect on 
Default Risk?” We study industrial firms in the U.S. market over the period between 1986 and 2011 and 
empirically examine the effect of rollover risk on default risk. We have two main contributions. First, we 
provide the most comprehensive empirical study of supporting rollover risk effect on default risk by 
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including all levered firms whereas previous studies only used restricted sample. Second we are the first 
study providing new empirical evidence on to the extent that financing sources drive the effect of rollover 
risk on default risk. Our results strongly suggest that being bank dependent magnifies the rollover risk effect. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that poor credit quality, small size, and operating during recession are not 
necessary of triggering rollover risk effect, and this effect is solely significant for bank dependent firms 
under these conditions. 
I conclude this thesis in the chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Measuring Systemic Risk: Common Factor Exposures and Tail Dependence Effects 
2.1 Introduction 
Multiple published studies document the importance of a stable financial system for not 
just the financial industry but the real economy as well. Monitoring the whole financial 
system (not just the banking industry) in turn is required, to guarantee its stability. As the 
2007–2012 crises (corporate and sovereign) highlighted, a key factor that affects the stability 
of the overall financial system, and the real economy, is the level of systemic risk. 1 An 
accurate measure of this level should be of crucial importance for regulators and investors 
alike.  
In response, extensive literature explores a variety of systemic risk measures (e.g., Bisias 
et al., 2012). Most measures refer to the aggregate system or individual firm level; in the 
latter case, systemic risk aggregates can be viewed as the aggregation of financial institutions’ 
risks, 2  which are driven by both common factor exposures to market-wide shocks and 
additional exposures to other, observed and unobserved factors. A common factor accounts 
for the systematic component of systemic risk (Das and Uppal, 2004); it cannot capture 
correlation due to large, infrequent changes (e.g., unexpected failure of a major bank). 3 
Therefore, an alternative approach that includes relevant frailty and contagion effects, arising 
from exposure to unobservable covariates (e.g., common latent factors) is outlined both in 
                                                            
1 Rajan (2006) highlights the importance of the exposure of the real economy to shocks stemming from 
the financial sector. 
2 An alternative approximation relies on Lehar’s (2005) and Suh’s (2012) portfolio approach, which 
measures systemic risk in the financial sector according to groups of financial firms’ risks. Altman and 
Rijken (2011) similarly assess sovereign default risk by aggregating the Altman’s z-scores of non-
financial corporations. 
3  Literature on default risks suggests that default times concentrate around periods in which the 
probability of default of all firms increases. However, this increase cannot be totally, or even partially, 
explained by firms’ common dependence on systematic macroeconomic factors (see Giesecke, 2004; 
Giesecke and Goldberg, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
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Das et al. (2007) and Duffie et al. (2009). In a frailty setting, the arrival of (bad) news about 
one firm (extreme negative stock returns) causes a jump in the conditional distribution of 
hidden covariates and therefore a (negative) jump in any firm’s stock returns that depend on 
the same unobservable covariates.  
Unlike previous studies, we use a structural-model approach, rather than a reduced-form 
approach, and do not make assumptions about the nature of these common factors. Instead, 
we direct our attention to tail dependence effects that result from simultaneous, extreme 
equity returns across financial institutions. Furthermore, we focus on the impact of these 
shocks on systemic risk measures. By adding a correlated jumps factor (as a proxy for tail 
dependence effects) to the standard Merton (1974) framework,4 we can address the firm-
specific impact of infrequent and extreme events. When a jump occurs, its impact occurs at 
the same time and in the same direction for all firms (positive or negative), but its size and 
volatility is specific to each firm. We also refine the methodology proposed by Das and Uppal 
(2004) to capture joint tail risk behavior over time. Based on our model, we develop three 
indicators of systemic stress in the financial industry: (1) DD, or the average distance-to-
default in a given sector; (2) NoD, defined as the number of joint defaults in a given sector; 
and (3) PIR, which is the ratio of the price of insurance against financial distress to the 
aggregate asset value in a given sector. Given that systemic risk is a multidimensional concept, 
measures of systemic risk should be based on several relevant characteristics (Bisias et 
al. ,2012) such as size, interconnectedness, substitutability, leverage, herd effects (clone 
property), correlation with other sectors of the of the financial industry and correlation with 
the real economy. Our three measures are attractive because they summarize many of these 
                                                            
4 Adding a correlated jumps factor allows to capture the stylized fact that default correlations may 
increase when an influential event (e.g. a major bankruptcy), affecting many firms simultaneously, 
happens. In this vein, Liu, Qi, Shi, and Xie (2013) link default correlation to equity return correlation in 
the context of the structural framework An alternative view is formulated in Zhou (2001a) which 
develops a model to compute simultaneous defaults for multiple firms extending the traditional first-
passage-time model.. 
5 
 
characteristics, in particular: size, leverage, dependence between firms and the whole stock 
market, and interconnectedness.5 
In an empirical application, we rely on stock market data, which has a leading role in the 
price discovery process.6 Specifically, we focus on the U.S. financial industry and the stock 
returns of ten largest institutions in four major sectors: depositories, broker-dealers, insurance 
companies, and others. This concentration on the biggest firms reflects their crucial 
contribution to systemic risk.7 The sample period runs from January 1996 to December 2011. 
The contribution of this article is threefold. First, our model captures the stylized fact that 
extreme negative co-movements for large financial institutions are stronger and more frequent 
in bear than in bull markets. Second, disregarding the impact of tail dependence effects leads 
to underestimates of the systemic risk level, especially during weak economic times. Third, 
we analyze whether our systemic risk measures offer leading indicators of alternative 
measures, using a comparison with a model that includes only common factor effects and a 
measure based on a public financial stress index, namely, the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress 
Index (STLFSI).8 The results show that our measures provide extra forecasting power.  
This study extends current literature in several ways. First, to compute systemic risk 
measures, Lehar (2005) and Suh (2012) consider asset correlations and grant equal weight to 
                                                            
5 In contrast, measures of systematic risk (e.g. CAPM beta) only take into one of these characteristics, 
namely the correlation between a firm’s stock returns and aggregate market stock returns. 
6 This leading role might entail anticipating trends in subsequent failures (Lehar, 2005) or changes in 
supervisory ratings four quarters in advance (Krainer and Lopez, 2001). Several articles affirm that 
equity market information leads the credit risk price discovery process. Zhang et al. (2009) observe that 
credit default swaps are sensitive to jumps in equity returns. Previous paper document that the equity 
market leads both the CDS and bond market in the price discovery process (see Forte and Peña (2009), 
and Norden and Weber (2009)). 
7 Acharya et al. (2010) show that the top six firms in terms of contributions to systemic risk also rank 
among the top seven in terms of total assets. Patro et al. (2013) reveals that daily stock return 
correlations among large financial institutions track with the level of systemic risk. Pais and Stork 
(2013) suggest that a high stress level in large banks significantly drives systemic instability.  
8 This index is constructed from 18 weekly data series: 7 interest rate series, 6 yield spreads, and 5 
other indicators. We chose the STLFSI for three reasons. It is publicly available, spans the whole 
sample period, and offers the best indicator among U.S. public financial conditional indexes (Aramonte 
et al. 2013). 
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both small and large returns. We argue instead that size matters, such that large negative 
returns must be taken specifically into account to assess the level of systemic risk.9 Second, 
traditional jump-diffusion models only allow for individual firm jumps, in terms of both 
arrival time and size (e.g., Zhou, 2001b), whereas our model assumes a coincident jump 
arrival time across firms. Third, our study extends Duffie et al.’s (2009) approach; both 
studies model a firm’s default risk, considering observed common factors and unobserved 
frailty effects, but we employ a different modeling framework and deal with different research 
goals.10 Fourth, our study extends the results provided by Acharya et al. (2010), who present 
an expected shortfall model, and the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). Fifth and 
finally, we expand on Giesecke and Kim’s (2011) model, which is based on a reduced-form 
framework to consider the influences of market-wide and sector-specific risk factors, as well 
as spillover effects.  
Summing up, our contributions are as follows. First, we propose a new structural-form 
model that includes exposures to both a common factor exposure and a tail dependence effect. 
This model effectively captures realistic, time-varying characteristics in extreme stock return 
correlations, overcoming the limitations of standard models of portfolio credit risk that cannot 
account for the higher default correlations during tough economic times. Second, the set of 
alternative systemic risk indicators we propose reflects different perspectives on system-wide 
stability. Third, our empirical results related to the U.S. market during 1996–2011, we 
establish three key findings: (1) neglecting tail dependence induces a downside bias in 
systemic risk measures; (2) considering tail dependence improves a model’s forecasting 
                                                            
9 Bae et al. (2003) argue that large negative returns are more influential, and extreme dependence is 
hidden in traditional correlation measures by the large number of days that present small shocks. 
10 These authors model the frailty effect by including an unobservable macroeconomic variable to 
determine a firm’s default intensity; we consider the frailty effect that results from simultaneous firm-
specific shocks in equity markets. Their model is a reduced-form, and ours is a structural-form. Finally, 
whereas we measure systemic risk in the financial sector, they focus on default clusters among non-
financial corporations. 
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ability; and (3) systemic risk measures based on broker-dealer and insurance sectors lead the 
public financial stress index on average by a month in advance. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2, we derive our structural-form model, 
with both common factor and tail dependence effects. Section 3 contains the methodology and 
systemic risk measures. After we describe the data in Section 4, we report on the empirical 
analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2.2. The Merton Model with Correlated Jumps 
2.2.1. Asset Returns with a Common Factor and Correlated Jumps 
This article contributes to emerging literature that proposes bottom-up models of default 
correlations by modeling the asset value of an individual financial institution, exposed to an 
observable common factor, tail dependence effects, and an unobservable individual factor. 
Our model relates to Suh’s (2012), which features the common factor with a GARCH process, 
added to the pure diffusion asset return process. However, we extend this specification by 
incorporating correlated jumps across individual stocks, which provides a proxy for tail 
dependence effects. To capture the correlated nature of these jumps, we impose two 
restrictions. First, we assume that the jump occurs at the same time across all firms. Second, 
conditional on the jump moving in a given direction (i.e., positive or negative), we assume its 
size and volatility are firm-specific. With this model, we capture two data features, namely, 
the correlation between stock returns and a common factor and the infrequent but large 
changes in stock returns. 
Let Vj,t and Sj,t be firm j’s asset value and stock price, respectively, at time t. Although Vj,t 
is not observable, it can be inferred from Sj,t on the basis of Merton’s model. Then let Xt be the 
common factor. We consider a discrete-time economy for a period of [0,T], where trading 
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takes place at any of n + 1 trading points 0, Δt, 2Δt, …, nΔt, and t T n∆ = . We denote the 
process of the logarithm of asset return ( ( ), , , 1logj t j t j tv V V −≡ ) as follows: 
( ) ,, j tj t j j tv x r wµ δ ∗= + − + ,                                                (1) 
( ), , ,j t j t j jw w Q N t Q λ∗ = + ∆ −                                                (2) 
( ), ~ 0,j t jw N ξ ,                                                                 (3) 
where jµ  represents the long-run mean of firm j’s log-return, tx  is the log-return of the 
common factor, r is the risk-free interest rate, and ,j tw
∗  indicates exposures to other factors. To 
capture the impact of correlated jumps across firms’ assets, we partition ,j tw
∗  into two 
components in Equation (2): ,j tw is an idiosyncratic factor that follows a multivariate 
distribution without considering extreme dependence,11 and ( )jQ N t∆  and the adjustment 
term jQ λ− , which account for the tail dependence exposure term.
12 With this term, the firm’s 
asset value can jump when its equity price suddenly suffers a large movement, due to the 
arrival of news. For example, extreme stock returns for one firm may cause a jump in the 
conditional distribution of hidden covariates, leading to a jump in the stock returns of other 
firms whose stock returns depend on the same unobservable covariates  
In our effort to model large changes in prices occurring at the same time across firms’ 
asset returns, we assume that the arrival of jumps is coincident across all firms’ asset returns; 
that is, ( ) ( )jN t N t∆ = ∆ , such that ( )N t∆  is the standard Poisson counting process with 
mean and variance ( )( ) ( )( )E N t Var N tλ∆ = = ∆ . We denote jQ  as a random jump 
                                                            
11 The specification of ,j tw  will be described in the following section.  
12 We subtract 
j
Q λ , where [ ]j jQ E Q= , to impose a zero mean Poisson process. 
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amplitude on the log-return if the Poisson event occurs. Furthermore, we let jQ  and ( )N t∆  
be mutually independent; ( )jQ N t∆  is a Poisson random sum of normal random variables. 
Therefore, 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
j
N t
k
j
k
Q N t Q t
∆
=
∆ = ∆∑ ,                                               (4) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )2~ ,
j
k
j jQ t N a b∆  for 1, 2,k =  . In this setting, the distribution of the jump 
size is asset-specific in its mean and volatility, but the jump arrives at the same time for all 
firms. For our model, a realization of one Poisson process triggers simultaneous, large 
movements across multiple companies. 
Noting the dynamics of the common factor, we employ a GARCH-type model.
 
Specifically, we follow Heston and Nandi (2000) and model the common factor, under the 
physical measure P, as  
P
t t t tx r h hλ ε= + + ,                                                   (5) 
( )21 1 1t t t th h hω α ε γ h− − −= + − + ,                               (6) 
where r is the continuously compounded interest rate for the interval between t and t – ∆, tε  
is a standard normal disturbance, and th  is the conditional variance of the log-return between 
t and t – ∆.13 The conditional variance of an asset return is time varying, i.e., 
( ) 2 2 2, 1 , ˆ|j t t j t j t j jVar v h bj σ δ ξ λ− ≡ = + + ,                                       (7) 
where 2 2 2ˆ
j j jb a b= + . We provide the derivation in Appendix A.  
                                                            
13 We make r constant for a certain time, using the mean of the risk-free interest rate, that is, the 1-year 
Treasury constant maturity rate obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve, divided by 252. 
10 
 
2.2.2. Structural-Form Model with a Factor Jump Diffusion Process 
We define equity S under the risk-neutral measure (RN) as a call option with maturity T:  
( ) ( ), , ,max ,0 ,r T t RNj t j T j TS e E V D− −  = −                                  (8) 
such that ,j tS  denotes the equity price of firm j at time t. Following Duan (1995) we assume 
that the RN measure satisfies the locally risk-neutral valuation relationship (LRNVR), in 
which the expected return under the RN measure is the risk-free rate, but the one-period-
ahead conditional variance of the return stays the same under the P and RN measures. 
Adopting the same assumption, Heston and Nandi (2000) show that under the RN measure,  
1
,
2t t t t
x r h h ε= − +                                                        (9) 
2
1 1 1
1
2
P
t t t th h hω α ε γ λ h− − −
  = + − + + +  
  
.                            (10) 
Heston and Nandi (2000) also derive the following conditional generating function of the 
future common factor: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1exp ; , ; ,t T t tf E X X A t T B t T hφ φφ φ φ + ≡ = +  ,                (11) 
where the coefficients are recursively determined as: 
( ); , 0A T T φ = ,                                                         (12) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1; , 1; , 1; , ln 1 2 1; ,
2
A t T A t T r B t T B t Tφ φ φ φ ω α φ= + + + + − − + ,       (13) 
( ); , 0B T T φ = ,                                                          (14) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2
2
1
1 2; , + + +1; , +
2 1-2 +1; ,
PB t T B t T
B t T
φ γ
φ φ λ γ γ h φ
α φ
−
= − .                (15) 
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Accordingly, we can derive the conditional generating function for asset values. We start by 
noting that under the RN measure, 
( )( ) ( ), ,
,
log log ,j T TTj j j j t j
j t t
V X
r r Q T t W Q N T
V X
δ λ δ= − − − + + +             (16)
 
where , , ,
T
j t j t t j t n tW w w+∆ + ∆≡ + +  and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2N T N t N t N n t= ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ .14 Thus 
we know 
( )( ) ( ),
, ,
T
j j j t jj jr r Q T t W Q N T
j T j t t TV V X e X
φ δ λ φ φδ φ δ φφ φ − − − + +−= ,                           (17) 
and we can derive the conditional generating function for asset values: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
, ,
j j jj jr r Q T t T t Q N T
j t j T j t t j tg E V V X e f E e
φ δ λ φ ξδ φ φφ φφ δ φ− − − + −−   ≡ =    ,    (18) 
where ( ) ( ) 2 21exp exp 1
2
jQ N T
t j jE e T t a b
φ λ φ φ
     = − + −        
. Appendix B contains 
further details. With the assumption that equity is valued as a European call option, we 
determine the equity valuation formula: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,
, ,
, ,0 0
max ,0
11 1 1
     Re Re
2 2
r T t RN
j t t j T j T
i ir T t
j T j j T j
j t j t
S e E V D
D g i D g ie
V d D d
i i
φ φφ φ
φ φ
π φ π φ
− −
− ∗ − ∗− −
∞ ∞
 ≡ − 
    +
= + − +            
∫ ∫
, 
(19) 
where ( )jg∗ ⋅  comes from ( )jg ⋅ , by replacing 
Pλ  with –1/2 and γ  with 
( )1 2Pγ γ λ∗ ≡ + + .15 
                                                            
14 Bates (1991) shows that the difference between the risk-neutral and true parameters of 
j
Q  and N  is 
small, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Thus, we assume 
j
Q  obtained under physical probability is 
the same as that obtained under risk-neutral probability.  
15 The debt is assumed to grow at the risk-free interest rate (Lehar, 2005). 
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2.2.3. Dynamics of Individual Factors 
The unobservable individual factors ,j tw  may be correlated across firms and over time. 
In particular, we assume that the vector of individual factors 1, ,t t N tw w
′ ≡  w   follows a 
multivariate normal distribution with a time-varying covariance matrix,  
[ ]~ ,t tMVNw 0 Ω ,                                                        (20) 
where the (j,k) element of tΩ  is ,jk tξ . Then we apply the dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC) model (Engle, 2002) to estimate the time-varying asset return correlations of 
idiosyncratic components for the dynamics of tΩ .
16 
To estimate the time-varying covariance matrix tΩ , we first use the estimates of ˆ jQ  
for institution j to estimate the time series { },j tV  and { },j tv then obtain the residuals ,ˆ j tw , 
defined as: 
( ) ( )( )( ), , ˆˆ ˆj t j t j j t j jw v x r Q N t Qµ δ λ≡ − + − + ∆ − .                        (21) 
2.2.4. Estimation 
The parameter estimation proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate the common factor 
parameters { }, , ,ω α h γ  in the system of Equations (5) and (6), using the maximum 
likelihood method, according to the common factor data series. Second, we identify λ , ja , 
and jb , similar to the way Das and Uppal (2004) do.
17 Third, we make two assumptions 
                                                            
16 In contrast, Suh (2012) features the correlation of individual factors based on diagonal VECH, and 
Lehar (2005) uses an exponentially weighted moving average scheme. We prefer DCC over other types 
of multivariate volatility process models (e.g., Brownlees and Engle, 2011) because they are easier to 
estimate and their parameters have an intuitive interpretation , see Silvennoinen, and Teräsvirta (2009). 
17The correlated jump intensity derives from stock market information. As in Das and Uppal (2004), we 
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regarding the estimation of the parameters related to the asset return process of individual 
institutions. That is, we assume that the maturity of the implied call option is one year, in line 
with previous literature (e.g., Ronn and Verma, 1986; Lehar, 2005; Suh, 2012). Using the sum 
of half of the long-term debt plus the short-term debt, we proxy for the debt amount ,j tD  
within the assumed maturity of one year, in accordance with KMV’s methodology. For 
consistency with prior literature (e.g., Duan, 1994, 2000), 18 we used historical returns to 
estimate the parameters. For one institution at a time, with maximum likelihood methods, we 
estimated the parameters { }, ,j j j jµ δ ξQ =  for an institution j’s asset return. Given 
institution j’s equity price and debt data ,1 ,j j j nS S
′ =  S  , ,1 ,j j j nD D
′ =  D  , and 
common factor data [ ]1 nx x ′=x  , we derive the following log-likelihood function: 
( ) ( )
( )( ){ }
,2
, ,
2 2 2 ,
2
,
2
2 ,
1 1
log | , , log 2 log log log
2 2
1
                                   
2
n n n
j t
j j j j t j t
t t t j t
n
j t j j t j j
t j t
Sn
L V
V
v x r a Q
π σ
µ δ λ λ
σ
= = =
=
 ∂−
Q = − − − −   ∂ 
− + − + −
−
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
S x D
, (22) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
,, ,
0
, , ,
,0
1 11 1
Re
2
            Re .
i
r T tr T t
j t jj t j t
j t j t j t
i
r T t
j t j
D e i g iS De
d
V V i V
D e g i d
φ
φ
φ φ
φ
π φ π
φ φ
−− ∗− −
∞
−∞ − ∗
 + +∂  = + − ∂
  
 ×   
∫
∫
.    (23) 
Here, ,j tV  and ,j tσ  provide the solutions to Equations (19) and (7), and ,j tv  represents the 
log return of ,j tV . 
                                                                                                                                                                          
assume a jump diffusion process for the stock return process, and we estimate the parameters by 
minimizing the root mean square error (RMSE) of two metrics, based on co-skewness and excess 
kurtosis.  
18 We use the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve as the 
risk-free interest rate. 
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2.3. Methodology and Systemic Risk Measures 
In the following section, we use a model that only accounts for exposure to the common 
factor as a benchmark. Our model thus nests the benchmark model when λ = 0. We compute 
risk indicators from both our proposed and the benchmark model, using the following 
methodological procedure.  
2.3.1. Monte Carlo Simulation 
We employ Monte Carlo Simulation because no analytical solution is available for the 
systemic risk measures over a multi-period time horizon. We draw standard normal random 
variables and simulate a hypothetical future common factor realization, according to 
Equations (5) and (6). Next we generate the random variable of correlated jumps by drawing 
from normal random variables, with a pre-specified mean and standard deviation of firms’ 
jump magnitudes, as well as a Poisson random variable with the pre-specified intensity λ. 
Finally, we draw multivariate normal random variables as specified by Equation (20) and 
repeat the process 10,000 times. 
2.3.2. Rolling Windows 
With a rolling window approach, we consider the extent to which systemic risk measures 
vary over time, such that we can avoid look-ahead bias. Our one-year rolling window updates 
every month. Thus, we construct a subsample for month t, using the information from months 
t, t – 1, t – 2, …, t – 11. We repeat this calculation for month t + 1, rolling the sample one 
month forward. For example, the first subsample, corresponding to December 1996, contains 
data from January 1996 to December 1996. The sample gets updated by including the 
following month and discarding the first one, so the second subsample would correspond to 
January 1997 and contain data from February 1996 to January 1997. Monthly updating 
effectively balances accuracy against the computational burden.  
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2.3.3. Systemic Risk Measures 
Extant literature offers a plethora of measures of systemic risks (for a review, see 
Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013). Such measures should detect at least two kinds of 
situations and cover two different dimensions. First, some measures warn of the persistent 
build-up of imbalances within the financial sector (using monthly or quarterly data), whereas 
others capture the abrupt materialization of systemic risk (daily or intraday data). Second, 
there should be measures based on the aggregate market level (e.g., interbank rates, stock 
market, CDS indexes), as well as measures at the individual institution level. No single 
measure is “best,” and alternative measures may be devised according to the objectives of the 
systemic risk analysis. Our model specifies the dynamics pertaining to both individual 
institutions and their tail-risk connection, so it supports the calculation of a wide range of 
systemic risk measures. We develop three alternative indicators.  
(1) DD: the average distance-to-default in a given sector over a fixed time horizon 
The DD has been used as proxy for identifying a financial sector’s stability. For example, 
Jokipii and Monnin (2013) and Carlson et al. (2011) both use DD to signal distress in the 
financial sector; the former finds a positive link between this measure and real output growth, 
especially during periods of instability, and the latter suggests that DD offers a leading 
indicator of real economic activity (e.g., bank lending standards and terms).19 For this study, 
we compute DD using a structural form model, with and without jump effects. In line with the 
Merton’s DD framework, it entails the logarithm of asset value minus the logarithm of debt 
value, divided by the standard deviation of this difference. Formally,  
                                                            
19 We should point out that our paper’s results are based on portfolios of financial institutions. Random 
measurement errors in the degree of indebtedness of individual institutions tend to be compensated for 
with a portfolio approach (Saldias, 2013). Moreover, aggregate DD is a valuable tool for monitoring 
risk profiles in the financial sector, despite the modeling assumptions inherent to a Merton-based model 
(Gropp et al., 2009; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). 
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[ ]
[ ]
ln ln
ln ln
T T
T T
E V D
DD
Std V D
−
≡
−
,                                                 (24) 
where VT and DT are the asset’s market value and the debt’s face value, with maturity T.
20 At 
a given time point t, for every firm j in a given sector, we compute the daily simulated asset 
values for the next six months, generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Then we average the 
difference between the log-asset value and log-debt value and use the result as the numerator; 
the standard deviation of this difference serves as the denominator. Finally, we compute the 
average sector value as the weighted-average of all firms in a given sector, with weights based 
on asset size.21 The lower the DD measure, the higher the level of systemic risk. 
(2) NoD: the number of joint defaults in a given sector over a fixed time horizon. 
If a significant number of financial firms default at the same time, the whole financial 
system (through asset-fire sale or network contagion) might be severely affected (Lehar, 
2005). A financial institution is in default if the market value of its assets falls below of the 
face value of its debt within the next six months. Thus at a given time point t and for every 
firm j in a given sector, we compute daily simulated asset values for the next six months, 
generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Then we compare firm j’s asset value against the face 
value of its debt. If the latter is higher than the former, firm j is in default; we compute the 
number of defaulted firms for each sector. The larger NoD, the higher the level of systemic 
risk. 
                                                            
20 The formula of our DD measure is consistent with the general form in the Merton model. In a 
standard Merton DD, lnVT has a mean of [ ] ( )20ln ln 0.5T V VE V V Tµ σ= + − , a standard deviation of
[ ]ln T VStd V Tσ= , and a normal distribution. The DD in Merton’s model is 
( ) ( )( )20ln 0.5 VT V V TV D T σµ σ+ −   . Because DT is constant, the numerator can be represented as
( ) ( ) [ ]20ln 0.5 ln lnT V T TV D T E V Dµ+ − = − , and the denominator can be rewritten as 
( ) [ ]ln ln lnV T T TT Std V Std V Dσ = = − . 
21 We assume that the largest institutions should contribute strongly to overall systemic risk in the 
financial system. 
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(3) PIR: the ratio of the price of insurance against financial distress to the aggregate asset 
value in a given sector. 
This systemic risk measure, proposed by Huang et al. (2009), is associated with the idea 
of assessing the systemic risk of the financial sector by computing the price of the 
government’s contingent insurance against large default losses in the financial sector. With 
our structural-form model, we consider the amount of financial institution debt that cannot be 
covered by the institutions themselves, as proxy for this insurance, which we refer to the price 
of insurance (PI). The economic intuition backing this measure is that it proxies the 
theoretical premium of a risk-based deposit insurance scheme guaranteed by the government 
(as an insurer of last resort) covering losses exceeding banking sector’s total assets.  
We measure PI by computing a put option value based on the Merton’s framework, as 
Lehar (2005) does. Formally, the price of insurance jtPI  of a firm j at time t for a horizon of T 
is ( ) ( )max ,0r T t j jT Te E D V− −  × −  , where jTD is the face value of the firm’s debt at time T, 
and jTV  is the market value of the firm’s assets at time T. We also consider sector-wide 
distress, equal to the ratio of the sector’s PI values to the sector’s total asset value over the 
next six months. We call this risk measure PIR and compute it using the formula 
j j
t t tj j
PIR PI Asset=∑ ∑ . Intuitively, the higher the PIR, the higher the systemic risk 
level.  
In summary, the indicators rely on intuitive economic interpretations, and we use them to 
illustrate the temporal trend of overall systemic risk levels. In particular, DD, NoD, and PIR 
are attractive because they summarize key determinants of systemic risk (firms’ size, firms’ 
leverage, dependence between firms and the whole market) as suggested by Acharya et al. 
(2010); they also reflect interconnectedness, as suggested by Cummins and Weiss (2010) and 
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Jobst (2012). 22  We repeat the Monte Carlo simulation procedure for each month from 
December 1996 to December 2011, yielding monthly time series for each measure.  
2.4. Data  
2.4.1. Sample Selection 
Our sample comprises large, U.S. financial institutions and spans January 1996 to 
December 2011. We choose firms with available daily equity prices and quarterly balance 
sheet information in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. 23  We lag all accounting 
information by three months to acknowledge reporting delays and substitute for any missing 
accounting data with the most recent prior observation. The quarterly accounting data is 
linearly interpolated between quarterly reporting dates at daily frequency. Firms constitute 
four groups (Acharya et al., 2010; Brownlees and Engle, 2011): depositories, brokers-dealers, 
insurance companies, and others.24 We use daily equity returns given that jumps probably 
appear more clearly in high frequency data.25 We select the biggest firms based on their book 
value of total assets at the starting date of each estimation sample for each sector at a given 
time. Furthermore, the sample only contains firms continuously listed in a prior year, to 
ensure perfect matches in the number of observations at firm-level and system-level. To avoid 
survivorship bias, merged or bankrupt entities are also included in the sample, as long as their 
equity and balance sheet information are available. For each month and in each given sector, 
the sample includes the ten largest firms. Specific names may change over time because of 
                                                            
22  Cummins and Weiss (2010) suggest three primary indicators of systemic risk: (1) size, (2) 
interconnectedness, and (3) lack of substitutability. Also, Jobst (2012) relates short-term liquidity risk 
to size and interconnectedness.  
23 We collect information about daily equity prices and returns, as well as outstanding shares, from 
CRSP. We obtain information about total assets, debt in current liability, long-term debt due in one 
year, and outstanding shares (if missing in CRSP) from COMPUSTAT.  
24 The four groups are depositories (two-digit standard industrial classification [SIC] code 60); brokers-
dealers (four-digit SIC code 6211); insurance companies (two-digit SIC code 63 or 64), and others 
(two-digit SIC codes 61, 62 except 6211, 65, or 67). We assigned Goldman Sachs to the broker-dealers 
group, despite its SIC code of 6282, following Acharya et al. (2010).  
25 Lehar (2005) and Suh (2012) use lower frequency data (monthly and weekly). 
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bankruptcies, mergers, or other reasons. Our sample contains 25 depositories, 24 broker-
dealers, 22 insurance companies, and 31 other firms. For depositories, broker-dealers, and 
others, the average number of changes in the identities of the top ten each month is roughly 
0.2, or 2.5 per year. For insurance companies, the average is 1 firm per year. In addition to 
usual mergers and acquisitions,26 the reasons for these changes relate to financial distress or 
bankruptcy (e.g., filing for Chapters 7 or 11). The numbers of bankrupt firms across sectors 
are as follows: 1 of 25 depositories; 1 of 24 broker-dealers; 0 of 22 insurance companies; and 
4 of 31 others.27 
2.4.2. Monthly-Interval Observations  
By moving the estimation window month by month, we obtain time-varying estimated 
parameters and risk measures at the end of each month, from December 1996 to December 
2011. This sample contains 181 monthly observations for each parameter and measure. 
Appendix C provides descriptions of the firms in the empirical application. We compute SIZE 
and LVG (leverage), both at firm and sector-level, at time t. The former is the logarithm of the 
book value of total assets (firm-level) and the logarithm of the summation of all firms in a 
sector (sector-level); the latter is the quasi-market value of assets, divided by the market value 
of equity (firm-level) and the weighted average leverage (sector-level), with weights based on 
market equity.28 
Figure 1 shows the annual returns across sectors and for the CRSP value-weighted index, 
which we use to capture the common factor. The sector-level annual returns, ending at month 
                                                            
26 For example, Bear Stearns was acquired by JPMorgan Chase in 2008. 
27 Bankrupt firms are Washington Mutual Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Finova Group Inc., MF 
Global Holdings Ltd., New Century Financial Corp., and Thornburg Mortgage Inc.  
28 Following Acharya et al. (2010), LVG is the standard approximation of leverage, where quasi-market 
value of assets is obtained from the book value of assets, minus the book value of equity and plus the 
market value of equity.  
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t for sector k, can be calculated by 
10
, , , , ,1k t j k t j k tj
r w r
=
= ×∑ , where , ,j k tr  is firm j’s annual 
return, and , ,j k tw  is the weight based on market equity for firm j at the end of month t. 
We observe a similar pattern across industries. All sectors show positive performance 
from 1996 until the end of 1998, when the LTCM crisis occurred. Recovery was slow until 
the bursting of the dot.com bubble in March 2000. Then a subperiod, until 2003, featured 
momentum toward recovery. Between mid-2005 and mid-2007, all sectors indicated positive 
performance, until distress symptoms appeared around July 2007, at the start of the subprime 
crisis. The market bottomed around March 2009, with a strong rebound in mid-2009. The 
market plunge around May 2010 led to no clear recovery signals until the end of 2011. Notice 
that the others sector’s stock returns seemed more volatile than the three named sectors, 
though the returns of the various sectors mimic the overall market trend, just with more 
volatility. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics by sector. In terms of size, we find no clear 
differences across sectors. Leverage is highest for the broker-dealers sector (12.26), followed 
by insurance (11.93) and others (11.22); the least leveraged sector by far was depositories 
(7.94). The best return/risk ratio accrues to the brokers-dealers (0.54), followed by insurance 
companies (0.35), depositories (0.34), and then others (0.32). We classify risk measures using 
the subindex “ben” to refer to benchmark-based measures (i.e., accounting for common 
factors only). Measures without this subindex reflect the full model (common factor plus tail 
dependence effects). Because the DD (DDben) indicates the distance to default over the next 
six months, lower value implies higher systemic risk for a sector. In the broker-dealers sector, 
this measure comes closest to default, with an average value of 2.59 (6.01), followed by 
others at 3.45 (5.51), depositories with 6.31 (8.0), and finally insurance companies at 10.99 
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(12.18). Furthermore, NoD (NoDben), or the number of defaults among the 10 biggest financial 
institutions, achieves the highest values in the others sector at 2.38 (1.42), followed by broker-
dealers with 2.26 (0.96). Both depositories with 0.79 (0.26) and insurance companies with 
0.36 (0.23) exhibit fewer defaults. Finally, for PIR (PIRben), the ratio of a sector’s price of 
insurance against financial distress to the sector’s total assets, others sector reveals the largest 
value of 39.90 (15.07), followed by broker-dealers with 22.22 (2.61); depositories and 
insurance companies again indicated lower values, of 4.50 (0.34) and 3.75 (1.42), respectively. 
These measures accordingly indicate that the riskiest sectors are broker-dealers and others, 
followed by depositories and insurance companies. In all cases, the measure from the full 
model indicates more systemic risk than a measure based on the benchmark.  
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
Regarding the correlations across measures, DD reveals negative correlation with NoD 
(–0.69) and PIR (–0.42), whereas NoD and PIR indicate a positive correlation (0.75). We 
estimate correlations across the four sectors for each measure too and find that they vary. For 
example, the highest correlation arises between depositories and broker-dealers for DD and 
PIR, as well as between depositories and insurance companies for NoD. Correlations across 
sectors for PIR generally are greater than those for the other two measures. The correlations 
range from 0.44 to 0.82 for DD, from 0.41 to 0.87 for NoD, and from 0.74 to 0.88 for PIR.29  
2.5. Empirical Analysis 
With our empirical analysis, we explore the effect of combining two factors (common 
factor and tail dependence effects) to measure systemic risk. Therefore, we first document 
estimation results from the correlated jumps and structural-form models. In the next section, 
we present a preliminary comparison between the full model and benchmark-based measures, 
                                                            
29 Detailed information about the correlations for each measure within the four sectors is not reported 
here but is available on request. 
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then test whether our full model systemic risk measures constitute leading indicators of 
benchmark-based ones and of the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI).  
2.5.1. Estimation Results 
2.5.1.1. Tail Dependence Parameters  
To characterize the sector-level behavior of the tail dependence effects, which we proxy 
for with correlated jumps, we average the firm-specific estimates into one single measure for 
the mean and the volatility of the size of the correlated jumps by sector, denoted mu_coj and 
std_coj. With a rolling window approach, we compute the time series for λ, mu_coj, and 
std_coj.30 These estimates describe the properties of simultaneous shocks in the equity market. 
Figure 2 reports three time-varying variables from 1996 to 2011, by sector.31  
For λ, depositories and insurance companies indicated similar, smooth moving behaviors: 
usually below 0.1 before 2006, increasing during 2007, peaking (around 0.3) and staying high 
for a while, dropping to a pre-crisis level in mid-2009, and increasing again in mid-2011. For 
broker-dealers, the parameter moved steadily, with low levels before 2005, slight increases in 
the following two years, and a peak (0.2) near the time of Lehman’s failure. After that event, 
it dropped to a pre-Lehman level, though it appeared more unstable than it is before 2005. 
Finally, the λ of the others sector fluctuated more frequently before 2006, then reached its 
peak in the fourth quarter of 2008 (>0.35) and remained at a relatively high level (>0.15) for a 
longer time during 2008–2009 than the three named sectors. Again we observe a clear 
increase after mid-2011. Overall then, the intensity of correlated jumps across sectors began 
to increase before the subprime loan crisis of 2007, reached its peak around the time Lehman 
                                                            
30 For example, in the case of the parameter λ , we estimate it for a group of the ten largest financial 
institutions in each sector, using data from January 1996 to December 1996, and assign the calculated 
value to December 1996. Then we repeat the procedure using data from February 1996 to January 1997 
and assign this calculated value of λ to January 1997, and so on.  
31  Specific information about the main systemic events from 2007 to 2011 is available at 
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/. 
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failed, decreased, and then increased again in mid-2011, coincident with the Eurozone crisis. 
This evidence suggests that the probability of simultaneous jumps is higher during crises.  
The average jump size mu_coj is close to zero throughout the sample period for 
insurance companies; it was not in the other three sectors. We identified negative jumps 
around the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy for broker-dealers, others, and depositories, with 
average sizes of –0.10, –0.07 and –0.05, respectively. The others sector also suffered negative 
jumps in the first half of 2009, possibly due to events related to the crisis and subsequent 
bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; this sector contains many firms involved in mortgage 
markets.32  
For the jump volatility std_coj, the behavior appeared similar across sectors: constantly 
below 0.05 and very stable until the end of 2007, increasing at the beginning of 2008, 
reaching historically high levels around mid-2009, and dropping to lower levels thereafter.  
This collected evidence matches our intuition regarding the model parameters. In most 
cases, λ and std_coj are higher and mu_coj displays negative values during episodes of 
systemic risk. That is, acute stress situations in the financial industry are coincident with 
higher frequencies of simultaneous, negative, extreme jumps in the stock returns of firms in 
that industry. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
To examine whether the correlated jumps display specific behavior during the 2007–
2009 crisis, we analyze results for 2005–2011 and compare the estimates across three periods: 
pre-crisis (July 2005–June 2007), crisis (July 2007–June 2009), and post-crisis (July 2009–
                                                            
32 On March 11, 2009, Freddie Mac announced net losses of $23.9 billion for the fourth quarter of 2008 
and $50.1 billion for 2008 as a whole. Its conservator submitted a request to the U.S. Treasury 
Department for an additional $30.8 billion in funding, under a Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement. 
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June 2011). The results in Table 2 are specific to depositories, broker-dealers, insurance 
companies, and others (Panels A–D, respectively) and indicate significant differences 
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods for each group. As expected, the intensity and 
volatility of correlated jumps are higher in the crisis period; and the mean of correlated jumps 
is strongly negative in this period.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The others sector always reveals the highest λ. In the crisis period, it also has the highest 
value for std_coj (0.13) and the lowest mu_coj (–0.02), followed by broker-dealers (–0.01). 
Thus, in this others sector, negative shocks are deeper and more frequent, and their size is 
more volatile. We also note significant increases in λ during the crisis period. For example, 
for depositories it increased more than threefold compared with the pre-crisis period (0.13 
versus 0.04), doubled in size (0.06 versus 0.03) for broker-dealers, and increased notably 
(0.19 versus 0.10) in the others sector. The statistical tests thus support our intuition that there 
was a higher probability of simultaneous negative shocks in the equity market during the 
2007–2009 financial crisis, compared with both preceding and posterior periods.  
 2.5.1.2. Common Factor Parameters 
The parameters of the common factor component (benchmark model) are μ, δ, and ξ, 
which capture the long-run mean of asset returns, exposure to the common factor, and 
variance in idiosyncratic factors, respectively. We average firm-level estimates to obtain 
sector-level variables, and to distinguish the estimates of the full model from those of the 
benchmark model, we use notations of μ_ben, δ_ben, and ξ_ben, for the latter. Table 3 contains 
the estimates by sector, along with the results of the mean tests for estimates derived from the 
full model and from the benchmark. First, we observe that both δ and ξ are significantly lower 
than δ_ben, and ξ_ben (see Columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 3). By construction, the term of 
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correlated jumps should capture some contributions of asset returns from the common factor 
and from the idiosyncratic factor. Therefore, the decrease in the magnitudes of δ and ξ 
compared with the benchmark model is likely and expected. Second, insurance companies 
experience the highest exposure to the common factor (0.72), followed by broker-dealers 
(0.59); others has the lowest exposure (0.35).  
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
2.5.2. Systemic Risk Measures: Preliminary Analysis 
In this section we outline the stylized facts for three alternative systemic risk measures, 
based on both our model and the benchmark. The time series of the risk measures from 1996 
to 2011 by sector appear in Panels A–C of Figure 3.  
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
2.5.2.1. DD  
Because the DD indicates how far a firm’s asset value exceeds its default point for a 
given sector, it contrasts with conventional risk measures, such that a lower value of DD 
implies higher systemic risk for the sector. In Panel A of Figure 3, the tail dependence effects 
are of material importance if the red line appears below the blue line—as is the case in all 
sectors. The tail dependence effects reduce the distance to default during and prior to negative 
economic events, so DD is lower than DDben. For example, in the depositories sector, the tail 
dependence effects appeared; 
(1) From the end of 1997 to mid-1999 (1997 Asian Crisis, 1998 LTCM debacle) with DD 
equal to 5.1 and DDben equal to 5.9.
33  
(2) From September 2001 to 2003 (9/11 attack, end of dot.com bubble, credit market 
                                                            
33 We compute average values of DD and DDben and compare them for specific periods; for example, 
the average values from the end of 1997 to mid-1999 were 5.1 and 5.9, respectively. 
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deterioration in 200234) (DD 6.5, DDben 9.9). 
(3) From June 2006 (one year prior to the 2007 subprime loan crisis) to mid-2010 (2007–
2010 financial crisis), with DD (4.5) versus DDben (7.3). 
(4) In the second half of 2011 (European debt crisis), with DD (2.4) and DDben (3.6).  
In the insurance sector, the effect arose in 2005–2009 (2005 automotive-downgrade credit 
crisis, 2007–2010 financial crisis), where DD was 10.7 and DDben equaled 13.2. For others, 
the effect occurred at three moments: (1) from mid-1998 to mid-1999 (LTCM debacle) (DD 
3.9, DDben 5.5); (2) from September 2001 to September 2008 (9/11, end of dot.com bubble, 
credit market deterioration in 2002, low interest rates and high leverage among financial 
institutions during 2002–2004, 2007–2008 financial crisis) (DD 3.6, DDben 7.1); and (3) 
during the second half of 2011 (European debt crisis) (DD 1.7, DDben 3.8). In 2008–2009, the 
measures from both the full and benchmark models signaled that the others sector was very 
close to default.  
2.5.2.2. NoD  
Regarding the number of simultaneous defaults among the ten biggest financial 
institutions for each sector (Panel B, Figure 3), the tail dependence effect is significant for 
managers when the red line is above the blue line, that is, when NoD is larger than NoDben, 
which is mostly the case in our findings. That is, tail dependence effect increased significantly 
during the 2007–2010 financial crises across all four sectors. Before 2007, this effect was less 
noticeable than the DD measures were. For example, for depositories, we find this effect only 
in 1998 (NoD 0.35, NoDben 0.04) and 2002 (NoD 0.29, NoDben 0.02); for broker-dealers, it 
arose only between 1996 and 2003 (NoD 2.71, NoDben 0.86). During the 2007-2010 crisis, 
NoD peaked, and the others sector emerged as the most risky, such that 9 of the 10 largest 
                                                            
34 Huang et al. (2009) document that systemic risk exhibits substantial increases during 2002, due to 
the credit market deterioration.  
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firms were expected to default. Depositories (8 of 10) and insurance companies (5 of 10) also 
exhibited substantial risk of default. Thus, risks in the financial industry increases through the 
channel of tail dependence in equity markets, especially in tough times.  
2.5.2.3. PIR  
Panel C of Figure 3 contains the time variation of PIR, or the ratio of the sector’s price of 
insurance against financial distress to its aggregate asset value. The tail dependence effects 
are materially important for virtually all sectors, and the measure display especially strong 
effects of tail dependence during the financial crisis. Among broker-dealers for example, the 
NoD measure suggests similar levels of systemic risk for both the LTCM debacle and 
Lehman’s bankruptcy (6 of 10 defaulting firms), but PIR signals greater systemic risk for the 
latter event (200) than the former (50). Empirical evidence also suggests that including tail 
dependence improves the model’s ability to anticipate stressful periods. For example, in the 
others sector, PIR increased noticeably by October 2007, when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
signaled their troubles due to the subprime crisis. In the broker-dealers and depositories 
sectors, PIR increased by March 2008, around the time of Bear Sterns’s failure. However 
PIRben did not show a clear upward trend until September 2008.  
2.5.3. Predictability 
A key criterion of the quality of a systemic risk indicator is its forecasting power. 
Therefore, we examine the lead-lag relationship between the full model–based measures and 
the benchmark-based ones. We use Granger causality whether our measures could forecast an 
index of financial distress. In particular, we used the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index 
(STLFSI), as proposed by Kliesen and Smith (2010).35 This index is publicly available and 
                                                            
35 The STLFSI is constructed by using 18 data series for different financial variables, including interest 
rates (effective federal funds rate, 2-year Treasury, 10-year Treasury, 30-year Treasury, Baa-rated 
corporate, Merrill Lynch High-Yield Corporate Master II Index, and Merrill Lynch Asset-Backed 
Master BBB-rated), yield spreads (yield curve: 10-year Treasury minus 3-month Treasury, corporate 
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based on a principal component analysis of a broad range of financial prices and rates from 
different financial markets. Figure 4 shows the monthly time series of STLFSI from 
December 1996 to December 2011.36 We find a local peak near the 1998 LTCM debacle, 
smooth increases between 2001 and 2002, increases after September 2007 (subprime crisis), a 
maximum level in September 2008 (Lehman bankruptcy), and two local peaks in mid-2010 
and mid-2011 (acute stress periods in the Eurozone debt crisis).  
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 2.5.3.1. Granger Causality Test 
Because unit roots test offer conflicting results,37 we rely on Granger causality (GC) tests 
in Table 4 for both levels (Panel A) and first differences (Panel B). For these tests, we use 
optimally chosen lags, corrected after controlling for heteroskedastic and correlated errors.38  
Regarding the GC results for series in levels between the full model and benchmark 
measures, the full model measures lead (usually by one or two months) benchmark-based 
ones in 10 of 12 cases; the remaining 2 cases exhibit bidirectional causality. That is, including 
the correlated jump factor improves the model’s forecasting power in most cases over the 
benchmark. 
The GC results for the comparison of the full model with the STLFSI in turn show that 
in 4 of 12 cases, the full model measures lead the STLFSI; in 2 cases, the STLFSI lead the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Baa-rated bond minus 10-year Treasury, Merrill Lynch High-Yield Corporate Master II Index minus 
10-year Treasury, 3-month London Interbank Offering Rate–Overnight Index Swap [LIBOR-OIS] 
spread, 3-month Treasury-Eurodollar [TED] spread, and 3-month commercial paper minus 3-month 
Treasury bill.), and other indicators (J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus, Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index [VIX], Merrill Lynch Bond Market Volatility Index [1-
month], 10-year nominal Treasury yield minus 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security yield, and 
Vanguard Financials Exchange-Traded Fund). Furthermore, the index is built by using principal 
component analysis to extract the factors responsible for the co-movement of a group of variables.  
36 We use monthly STLFSI, though the highest frequency is weekly, to match our data intervals. 
37 We also employed several unit root tests, including Augmented Dickey-Fuller, GLS Dickey-Fuller, 
and Perron (1997) with structural breaks in the mean, for the trends and both elements simultaneously. 
The detailed results are available on request. 
38 The optimal number of lags was chosen on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion. 
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full model; and 3 cases indicate bidirectional causality. Two broker-dealer sector measures 
(DD, NoD) and all the insurance sector systemic risk measures lead the STLFSI, by an 
average period of one month. Therefore, the measures in these two sectors are the most 
informative leading indicators. If DD and NoD measures increase in both sectors in a given 
month, a subsequent increase in the STLFSI index seems very likely indeed.  
Using first difference data series (Panel B, Table 4), the full model–based measures lead 
(usually by one or two months) the benchmark-based ones in 8 of 12 cases; the reverse is true 
in 2 cases. These results generally agree with those we gathered from the series in levels. In 
the comparison of the full model measures and the STLFSI index, we find that the full model 
lead the STLFI in five cases, whereas the reverse occurs in 2 cases. That is, in agreement with 
series in levels, two broker-dealer systemic risk measures (DD, NoD) lead the STLFSI, as 
does one measure from the insurance sector (PIR). 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Thus, the measures based on the full model contain more updated information than 
benchmark-based ones. Two measures related to broker-dealers (DD and NoD) and one 
measure in the insurance sector (PIR) provide leading information about the STLFSI index 
across all cases.39  
                                                            
39 In addition to testing forecasting power over the whole sample period, we explore the full model 
measures could identify early warning signs of the 2007–2010 financial crisis better than the 
benchmark-based measures. We apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test to date structural changes 
or break dates, identified by testing for structural changes in the coefficient of the autoregressive model 
with an order of 1 for the persistence test and of the constant term in the regressions for the level test. 
The changes should be primarily manifest in the leading indicators, then later in other variables. For the 
persistence test, the break dates identified by the full model measures across sectors all occur before 
July 2007 (the conventional crisis’s starting point), and always lead the benchmark. The earliest two 
turning points happen for depositories and broker-dealers, in February 2006 and March 2006, 
respectively—that is, more than a year before July 2007. The full model measures also lead (coincide 
with) benchmark-based measures in 9 (1) of 12 cases. For the level test, the full model measures lead 
(coincide with) benchmark ones in 8 (2) cases. Overall the evidence supports the notion that 
considering tail dependence effects besides a common factor does provide more timely warning 
signals. 
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2.5.3.2. Predictive Power 
To further compare the predictive ability of both models (benchmark and FM) in 
predicting STLFSI, we first run a predictive regression, including as explanatory variables the 
lagged terms of STLFSI and of the benchmark (pure common component model): 
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 21 1
.
k k
t s t s s t s t
s s
STLFSI c STLFSI Benchmarkα β ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑  (25) 
Next we include the lagged terms of the FM factor (common plus extreme movement 
model) to determine the incremental predictive ability it may provide, using the following 
regression: 
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where k1, k2, and k3 are optimal lags selected according to the Bayesian information criterion.  
We use an F-test to determine if the difference in forecasting ability, as measured by R2 
values on the restricted model of Equation (25) and the unrestricted model of Equation (26), 
differs significantly from zero. Formally, the F-statistic is computed as 
F-statistic = [(R2_eq.(2) – R
2_eq.(1)) / (k1+k2+k3 – (k1+k2)) ] / [ (1- R
2
_eq.(2)) / (N – (k1+k2+k3) - 1) ], 
(27) 
where N is the sample size, and the degrees of freedom are computed as v1= (k1+k2+k3 – 
(k1+k2)) and v2= (N – (k1+k2+k3) - 1). Table 5 reports results and reveals cases where R
2 is 
higher in Equation (26) than in Equation (25), using bold font. 
For the data series in levels (Panel A of Table 5), in 8 of 12 cases the FM models offer 
additional explanatory power, as indicated by the higher R2 for Equation (26) than Equation 
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(25). This additional explanatory power is particularly significant in five cases: DD on 
depositories, DD on insurance companies, NoD on others, PIR on broker-dealers, and PIR on 
insurance companies. For data series in first differences (Panel B of Table 5), in 10 of 12 
cases, FM models have some additional explanatory power, especially notable in five cases: 
DD on insurance companies, NoD on depositories, NoD and PIR on broker-dealers, and PIR 
on insurance companies. The evidence thus suggests that FM-based measures have extra 
predictive power in comparison with the benchmark model, especially in the case of DD on 
insurance companies and PIR on broker-dealers and insurance companies. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
2.6. Conclusion 
Growing evidence suggests that systemic risk results from at least two driving forces: the 
common factor exposure to market-wide shocks and the tail dependence effects that arise 
from links among extreme stock returns. Modeling the relative importance of these two 
factors is critical; we seek to contribute to this literature stream by proposing a new structural-
form model that includes both factors. For our framework, the common factor component is 
based on correlations of a financial institution’s individual stock returns with an aggregate 
common factor, and we proxy for tail dependence effects with a correlated jumps factor. The 
empirical implications of our model tests are consistent with extant evidence; in particular, 
they suggest that simultaneous extreme negative movements across large financial institutions 
are stronger in bear markets than in bull markets. 
With an empirical application based on stock market data for four sectors of the U.S. 
financial industry during 1996–2011, we demonstrate that ignoring the effect of tail 
dependence will lead to underestimates of the level of systemic risk. By accounting for tail 
dependence effects, we gain extra forecasting power, compared with a benchmark model. Not 
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all sectors provide equally valuable systemic risk indicators though. Rather, two measures 
(DD, NoD) in the broker-dealer sector and one measure (PIR) from the insurance sector 
systematically lead the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI).  
Looking forward, a comparison of our measures with other measures based on 
alternative asset markets would offer an interesting topic for further investigation. The 
application of our measures for asset pricing, hedging strategies, portfolio diversification, and 
risk management purposes represent other natural directions for further research. 
Appendices 
Appendix A  
We apply the theorem of the law of total variance, 
( ) ( ) ( )| |X XVar Y E Var Y X Var E Y X= +       . (A.1) 
In our case, we have, 
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. (A.3) 
Finally, we assume that all random variables appear in the asset–log return process described 
by Equation (1) are independent and derive the variance of asset returns as follows: 
( ) 2 2 2, 1 , ˆ|j t t j t j t j jVar v h bj σ δ ξ λ− ≡ = + + , (A.4) 
where 2 2 2ˆ
j j jb a b= + . 
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Appendix B  
Because kQ  are normally i.i.d. random variables, distributed independently of ( )N T , by 
iterated expectations, we know 
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Appendix C 
Type Company Name  Start Date End Date Number of Observations Size (millions) LVG 
Depositories 'BANK OF AMERICA CORP' 199601 201112 181 13.556 9.194 
Depositories 'BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP' 200310 201112 55 12.037 5.709 
Depositories 'BANK ONE CORP' 199601 200406 91 12.101 5.949 
Depositories 'BANKAMERICA CORP-OLD' 199601 199809 22 12.391 7.568 
Depositories 'BANKERS TRUST CORP' 199601 199905 30 11.693 16.393 
Depositories 'BB&T CORP' 200401 201112 72 11.745 7.345 
Depositories 'CITICORP' 199601 199809 22 12.510 6.568 
Depositories 'FIFTH THIRD BANCORP' 200308 200708 20 11.473 4.391 
Depositories 'FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORP' 199601 199809 22 11.639 7.736 
Depositories 'FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP' 199604 200403 69 11.846 5.777 
Depositories 'GOLDEN WEST FINANCIAL CORP' 200501 200609 10 11.585 6.224 
Depositories 'JPMORGAN CHASE & CO' 199601 201112 181 13.565 10.194 
Depositories 'KEYCORP' 199712 200408 27 11.294 7.799 
Depositories 'MORGAN (J P) & CO' 199601 200012 49 12.383 12.952 
Depositories 'NATIONAL CITY CORP' 199807 200812 109 11.614 6.439 
Depositories 'PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC' 199711 201112 47 12.049 8.966 
Depositories 'REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP' 200704 201112 46 11.856 17.872 
Depositories 'STATE STREET CORP' 200305 201112 50 11.875 8.214 
Depositories 'SUNTRUST BANKS INC' 199904 201112 142 11.829 9.124 
Depositories 'U S BANCORP' 200107 201112 115 12.260 5.103 
Depositories 'U S BANCORP/DE-OLD' 200010 200205 9 11.369 4.466 
Depositories 'WACHOVIA CORP' 199601 200812 145 12.586 6.926 
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Depositories 'WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC' 199801 200808 117 12.334 8.449 
Depositories 'WELLS FARGO & CO -OLD' 199610 199810 14 11.572 4.678 
Depositories 'WELLS FARGO & CO' 199601 201112 165 12.771 5.456 
Broker-Dealers 'AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC' 200604 201112 58 11.560 11.357 
Broker-Dealers 'AXA FINANCIAL INC' 199601 200012 49 11.872 18.052 
Broker-Dealers 'BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC' 199601 200805 138 12.091 27.973 
Broker-Dealers 'BLACKROCK INC' 200701 201112 49 10.378 3.734 
Broker-Dealers 'CITIGROUP GLOBAL MKTS HLDGS' 199601 199710 11 12.095 41.126 
Broker-Dealers 'CREDIT SUISSE USA INC' 199604 200010 44 11.085 18.551 
Broker-Dealers 'DAIN RAUSCHER CORP' 199601 199702 3 7.725 8.450 
Broker-Dealers 'E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP' 200002 201112 132 10.338 14.236 
Broker-Dealers 'EDWARDS (A G) INC' 199601 200207 49 8.304 1.880 
Broker-Dealers 'FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC' 199601 200702 56 8.805 1.194 
Broker-Dealers 'GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC' 199909 201112 137 13.195 11.249 
Broker-Dealers 'INTERACTIVE BROKERS GROUP' 200710 201112 40 10.300 36.641 
Broker-Dealers 'JEFFERIES GROUP INC' 200107 201112 97 9.717 7.315 
Broker-Dealers 'LEGG MASON INC' 200104 200311 19 8.614 2.492 
Broker-Dealers 'LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC' 199601 200808 141 12.393 22.165 
Broker-Dealers 'MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC' 199601 200812 145 12.947 12.367 
Broker-Dealers 'MORGAN STANLEY' 199601 201112 181 13.173 14.750 
Broker-Dealers 'PAINE WEBBER GROUP' 199601 200010 47 10.921 16.013 
Broker-Dealers 'QUICK & REILLY GROUP INC' 199603 199801 12 8.117 5.102 
Broker-Dealers 'RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP' 199703 201112 102 8.975 5.428 
Broker-Dealers 'SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP' 199604 201112 178 10.452 3.052 
Broker-Dealers 'SWS GROUP INC' 199707 200202 15 8.316 14.279 
Broker-Dealers 'TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP' 200301 201112 94 9.667 2.903 
Broker-Dealers 'TD WATERHOUSE GROUP INC' 199911 200110 13 9.238 2.259 
Insurance Companies 'AETNA INC' 199601 200011 48 11.476 9.204 
Insurance Companies 'AFLAC INC' 200904 201112 22 11.314 4.714 
Insurance Companies 'ALLSTATE CORP' 199607 201112 175 11.666 5.097 
Insurance Companies 'AMERICAN GENERAL CORP' 199601 200107 56 11.336 7.109 
Insurance Companies 'AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP' 199601 201112 181 13.028 36.671 
Insurance Companies 'CIGNA CORP' 199601 200508 105 11.479 9.051 
Insurance Companies 'CNA FINANCIAL CORP' 199601 200302 63 11.049 9.223 
Insurance Companies 'CNO FINANCIAL GROUP INC' 200001 200108 7 10.826 15.516 
Insurance Companies 'GENERAL RE CORP' 199601 199705 6 10.476 3.369 
Insurance Companies 'GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC' 200410 201112 76 11.587 23.942 
Insurance Companies 'HANCOCK JOHN FINL SVCS INC' 200007 200403 34 11.399 9.408 
Insurance Companies 'HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES' 199604 201112 178 12.231 19.248 
Insurance Companies 'HARTFORD LIFE INC -CL A' 199710 200005 21 11.566 83.438 
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Insurance Companies 'LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP' 199601 201112 181 11.627 15.279 
Insurance Companies 'LOEWS CORP' 199601 201002 106 11.185 7.264 
Insurance Companies 'METLIFE INC' 200010 201112 124 12.878 13.855 
Insurance Companies 'NATIONWIDE FINL SVCS -CL A' 199807 200812 115 11.490 68.231 
Insurance Companies 'PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GRP INC' 200204 201112 106 11.706 13.231 
Insurance Companies 'PROVIDIAN CORP' 199601 199702 3 10.179 6.585 
Insurance Companies 'PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC' 200204 201112 106 12.903 17.108 
Insurance Companies 'TRANSAMERICA CORP' 199601 199805 12 10.782 9.311 
Insurance Companies 'TRAVELERS COS INC' 199610 201112 85 11.542 5.642 
others 'AMERICAN EXPRESS CO' 199601 201112 181 11.817 3.668 
others 'ANNALY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT' 200207 201112 55 10.721 7.537 
others 'APARTMENT INVST & MGMT CO' 200204 200308 6 9.102 2.843 
others 'ASSOCIATES FIRST CAP -CL A' 199610 200011 39 10.991 6.809 
others 'BENEFICIAL CORP' 199601 199806 19 9.670 5.548 
others 'CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP' 200007 201112 127 11.083 5.916 
others 'CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORP' 199601 200205 40 9.256 18.884 
others 'CIT GROUP INC' 200301 201112 81 10.998 10.818 
others 'CIT GROUP INC-OLD' 199804 200105 27 10.143 11.133 
others 'CITIGROUP INC' 199601 201112 181 13.683 13.404 
others 'CME GROUP INC' 200901 201112 25 10.546 1.644 
others 'COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP' 199601 200806 139 10.463 5.476 
others 'DEAN WITTER DISCOVER & CO' 199601 199705 6 10.476 4.333 
others 'DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVCS INC' 200712 201112 38 10.677 6.766 
others 'FANNIE MAE' 199601 201006 163 13.400 84.908 
others 'FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTG CORP' 199604 201006 160 13.097 125.524 
others 'FINOVA GROUP INC' 199601 200201 44 9.147 23.722 
others 'FIRST USA INC' 199601 199705 6 8.864 3.004 
others 'GENERAL GROWTH PPTYS INC' 200504 201111 11 10.223 5.368 
others 'HELLER FINANCIAL INC' 199810 200109 25 9.679 15.190 
others 'HOST HOTELS & RESORTS INC' 200107 200305 12 9.025 3.650 
others 'HSBC FINANCE CORP' 199601 200302 75 10.739 3.684 
others 'IMPAC MORTGAGE HOLDINGS INC' 200603 200705 4 10.231 37.595 
others 'INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC' 201101 201112 1 10.248 3.902 
others 'MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS LTD' 200801 201109 34 10.828 65.259 
others 'NELNET INC' 200708 201112 17 10.246 43.709 
others 'NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL CORP' 200601 200701 2 10.278 13.369 
others 'SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC' 199901 201102 58 9.564 3.249 
others 'SLM CORP' 200210 201112 100 11.578 16.639 
others 'STUDENT LOAN CORP' 199607 201012 83 9.841 11.464 
others 'THORNBURG MORTGAGE INC' 200310 200811 51 10.414 15.003 
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CHAPTER 3 
Financial Crises, Financing Sources, and Default Risks  
3.1. Introduction 
As the 2007−2009 episodes clearly illustrate, banking and financial markets crises 
negatively impact real economy corporate sectors, leading to lower stock market valuations, 
lower investments, reductions in hiring, and a subsequent decrease in aggregate economic 
activity (see Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Duchin Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), Lemmon 
and Roberts (2010), among others). However, there is not an agreement about the mechanism 
through which these crises (originated in the financial sector) impact the default risk of real-
economy firms.40  
Extant literature provides three alternative views on this mechanism. The first one is the 
Bank Supply Shock Theory (BSST henceforth). It states that, as a response to shocks in the 
financial system, banks do not renew loans, increase borrowing costs and refrain from issuing 
new loans (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)), and consequently the impaired bank financing 
channel generates stronger adverse impacts (e.g. decreases in asset value, increases in asset 
volatility) on bank-dependent firms (Chava and Purnanandam (2011)). Empirical evidence 
does suggest that many bank-dependent firms present higher default probabilities in times of 
credit crunch; Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), and Schnabl (2012) document this 
effect in emerging markets. However in the case of developed economies the evidence is not 
particularly conclusive. 41  The second view is the Credit Supply Shock Theory (CSST 
henceforth) which asserts that credit-dependent (not just bank-dependent) firms should face 
                                                            
40  Beyond firm-level risk characteristics, theoretical and empirical studies both indicate that 
macroeconomic shocks increase firms’ default probabilities (e.g., Bonfim (2009), Chen (2010), 
Jacobson, Lind´e, and Roszbach (2013)). Abundant evidence suggests that financial crises are likely 
sources of macroeconomic shocks. 
41 Some argue that this channel has strong real effects (Bernanke (1983), Peek and Rosengren (2000)), 
but others find the economic impact to be insignificant ( Ashcraft (2006)). 
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trouble because the crisis affects all credit channels (Gorton (2010)). In this vein, recent 
theoretical models of He and Xiong (2012b) and Chen et al. (2013) imply that default risks 
should increase due to debt market frictions when firms rollover their debts. 42  A third 
explanation is the Demand Shock Theory (DST henceforth) which suggests that firms react to 
decreases in the demand for firms’ products by cutting borrowing and investments, leading to 
the reduction on growth and profitability in a similar way, irrespective of their financing 
structures (Kahle and Stulz (2013)).  
However, the question of to what extent the source of debt financing (bank loans and/or 
public debts) affects default risks could be considered as an empirical question, since all 
channels of debt financing are likely to be affected during a crisis (Adrian, Colla, and Shin 
(2012)).43 In this paper we address this question using an extensive database and, as far as we 
know, this is the first study providing direct empirical evidence on this issue. 
Furthermore, we examine whether bank-dependent firms can substitute bank loans by 
issuing publicly traded debts, to mitigate the increase of default risks due to bank lending 
supply shocks. We name this notion as the “substitution effect”. 44  We posit that, if the 
substitution effect applies, the increase of default risks is expected to be lower for bank-
dependent firms having ready access to public debt markets than for otherwise similar firms 
lacking this access. Adrian et al. (2012) show that credit spreads significantly increased in 
both new issuances of banks loans and corporate bonds during the 2007−2010 crises. Since 
                                                            
42 Their models assume that debt market illiquidity arises in corporate bond markets, and thus firms that 
mainly rely on financing from public debt markets are expected to experience larger increases in 
default risks. This implication can also be applied to the case of bank lending shocks, since debt 
financing costs also increase in bank loan markets during financial crises, which is consistent with the 
setting of models capturing debt market frictions. Thus, we may also observe greater credit risks for 
firms that rely on bank loans, and thus more generally, we should expect increases in default risk to all 
credit-dependent firms. 
43 Adrian et al. (2012) find that during the 2007−2010 financial crises credit spreads significantly 
increased in both new issuance of banks loans and corporate bonds in the U.S. market, implying that 
the firms’ main financing sources (bank lending and corporate debt markets) were more expensive. 
44 Previous empirical results on testing the substitution effect are mixed (see Bernanke (2007), Chava 
and Purnanandam (2011)), Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Carvalho et al. (2012)). 
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higher credit spreads imply higher default risks, this may be considered indirect evidence 
against the substitution effect. In this paper, we directly test the substitution effect on default 
risks. 
We develop a novel empirical methodology to address the question at hand. First, we 
propose a new identification strategy by looking at firms’ ex-ante reliance of various 
financing sources. A firm is classified as credit-dependent when there are records of its bank 
borrowing over the past five years prior the onset of financial crises, or there is evidence of 
the firm’s access to public debt markets. Otherwise we classify it as non-credit-dependent 
firm. Once defined the set of credit-dependent firms, we further divide this group into five 
categories based on their dependence of bank loans, public debts, or both. 45  We use 
difference-in-differences estimations by examining cross-sectional heterogeneity of time-
series changes in Distance-to-Default (DD) across firms.46 Our methodology also controls for 
many relevant firm risk characteristics: size, leverage, volatility, equity return, ratio of cash to 
assets, ratio of net income to assets, and industry effect.47  
The empirical application is based on an appropriate selection from all listed non-
financial firms in the U.S. market during the period of 2006Q3−2010Q1 totalizing 113,409 
firm-month observations. We analyze the change of DD (relative to DD during the pre-crisis 
period) over four time stages: first-year crisis (2007Q2− 2008Q2); pre−Lehman (2008Q2); 
post−Lehman (2008Q3−2009Q1); and last-year crisis (2009Q2−2010Q1). Using the full 
sample, we find that default risks significantly increased about 50% on average across all 
                                                            
45 We consider a firm of having strong bank dependence when it borrows two or more than two loans 
from the same lead bank over the past five years before the end of June 2006. On the other hand, we 
consider a firm of having weak bank dependence when it has records of bank loans, but not enough to 
qualify as strong bank-dependent firm. We rely on credit ratings as indicators of public-debt 
dependence. The detailed information on these issues is in Section 3. 
46 DD is a well-known market-based forward-looking default risk measure based on Merton (1974). 
47 These variables are motivated by the hazard model literature, and are among the most important 
determinants to default risks (etc., Shumway (2001); Chava and Jarrow (2004); and Campbell, 
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)).  
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firms (irrespective of their financing dependence) from the pre-crisis period to the last-year 
crisis period. However, in the first year of the crisis, this increase varies from a strongly 
significant 22.8% (in the case of unrated firms strongly dependent on bank financing) to an 
insignificant 5.2% (in the case of rated firms without banking dependence). Our findings 
using the matched sample (after accounting for other observed risk characteristics) give a 
more nuanced picture.48 We find that, during the first-year crisis period, default risks increase 
more for firms that rely on banks for financing than for other types of credit-dependent firms 
and non-credit-dependent firms. This evidence is not inconsistent with the BSST, but it is 
inconsistent with CSST and DST. Furthermore, our evidence is not consistent with the 
substitution effect because we find that there is no evidence of economically or statistically 
important differences across bank-dependent firms, irrespective of their capabilities of 
accessing public-debt markets.  
We contribute to literature on several dimensions. First, we add to the literature on real-
economy impacts of financial crises,49 by providing evidence of the effect of these crises on 
firm’s default risks. In spite of the large volume of existing studies on the 2007−2009 crises, 
our study is one of few that empirically links shocks in the financial system to corporate 
default risks. 50 Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the mechanism linking 
financial shocks and real economic activities. 51 In a nutshell, our results suggest that the 
                                                            
48 Note that heterogeneity of default risks across firms might be related to other factors (e.g. leverage) 
besides the impact of financing sources. The matched sample that balances these fundamental 
differences, gives more reliable results because it excludes other factors that are also related to a firm’s 
default. Also, the first-year period has been viewed in the literature as the one particularly well-suited 
to distinguish among competing explanations (BSST, CSST, DST). The rationale is that firms’ default 
probabilities are less affected by demand side effect at the early stage of crisis period, whereas in 
subsequent periods, this distinction is much more difficult to address due the heightened overall 
uncertainty (e.g., Duchin et al. (2010), Kahle and Stulz (2013)). Thus, evidence based on the matched 
sample during the first-year crisis (in our case, 2007Q3−2008Q2) should be the more informative. 
49 See Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008), Kahle and Stulz (2013) and others. 
50 Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), and Schnabl (2012) also study how financial crises 
affect borrowers’ default probabilities. Different from our study, they concentrate on emerging markets, 
but our paper deals with the U.S. market . Furthermore, they focus only on firms that obtain financing 
from banks. But our paper is more general because we focus on all firms.  
51  See Duchin et al. (2010), Gorton (2010), Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010), Chava and 
Purnanandam (2011), Kahle and Stulz (2013), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). 
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BSST receives more support from the empirical evidence than alternative explanations. Third, 
we make a contribution to the  literature of the substitution effect (e.g., Carvalho et al. (2012), 
Chava and Purnanandam (2011)), Lemmon and Roberts (2010)) by, for the first time as far as 
we know, examining whether accessing public-debt market helps bank-dependent firms 
mitigate their default risks during weak economic times. Our result does not support the 
substitution effect because we find there is no significant difference of changes in DD for 
bank-dependent firms, irrespective of their capabilities of accessing public debt markets 
during the 2007−2010 financial crises. 
Fourth, our study adds to the literature establishing the linkage between debt structures 
and credit risks, where it indicate that rollover risks driven by debt maturity should be viewed 
as an additional source of credit risks (e.g., Chen et al. (2012), He and Xiong (2012a), He and 
Xiong (2012b), and Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli (2013)). Our paper is different from other 
studies because we pay attention to an element of the debt structure hitherto neglected, 
namely the source of financing. Our findings suggest that it plays a significant role as a 
determinant of default risks. 
Fifth, extant literature suggests that firms’ credit quality influences their financing 
choices.52 However, the reverse question, i.e. whether and how financing decisions affect 
firms’ credit risks has not been satisfactorily addressed in our view. Ours is one of few papers 
providing empirical evidence on this issue by shedding light on the link between financing 
sources prior to the a financial crisis and the behavior of firms’ default risks during the 
financial crisis. 
Information related to borrowers’ credit quality is a fundamental determinant of debt 
contracting and of credit spreads. Our work provides useful information for policy makers 
                                                            
52 For example, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that firms with the highest credit quality borrow from 
public sources, firms with average credit quality borrow from banks, and firms with lowest credit 
quality borrow from non-bank private lenders. 
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interested in understanding to what extent impairments in the bank lending channel 
contributes to an increase in the probability of bankruptcies thus deepening recessions. 
Monetary policy can work through its impact on the bond-market rate of interest or on the 
supply of intermediated loans. Our key result (firms dependent on bank loans suffer stronger 
increases in default probabilities than firms dependent on bond markets ) suggests that 
regulators should put high in their agendas timely actuations to fix the banking lending 
channel when a financial crisis materializes  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the research 
question. Section 3 describes the identification strategy and empirical methodology. Section 4 
illustrates the data. Section 5 provides empirical results. Section 6 presents some robustness 
tests. We conclude in Section 7 with a summary of our results. 
3.2. Motivation and Literature Review  
In this section we motivate the research question and review relevant literature.  
3.2.1. Does Distance-to-Default Change during Financial Crises? 
To address this point we rely on Merton’s (1974) basic framework. We define firm value 
at time t as V(t). By definition, V(t) = E(t) + D(t), where E(t) and D(t) are equity market value 
and debt market value at time t, respectively. To clarify the analysis, we consider only three 
time periods t, t+1, t+2. We define the default barrier as F(t) which is the face value of a 
firm’s at time t . Given asset return volatility σV(t), at time t, distance-to-default (DD(t)) can be 
computed at time t as  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )1
1
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                                             (1) 
where Et(V(t+1)) is the expected asset value at time t+1, when debt matures, as seen at time t. 
We assume that Et(V(t+1)) = V(t)(1+R) where R is the expected asset growth rate. If 
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Et(V(t+1)) < F(t) then we set DD(t)=0. To clarify the exposition and without loss of 
generality53 we assume R = 0 and then equation (1) simplifies to  
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Suppose that a financial crisis happens at t+1, and a partial impairment in the banking 
channel materializes. Banks do not give new loans but refinance a proportion k, of the 
existing debt until period t+2 ( 0 ≤ k ≤1), so the firm only has to pay back (1-k)F(t) at t+1 and 
keeps kF(t) in its books until t+2. We assume that V(t+1) > (1-k)F(t) (otherwise the firm 
defaults) then, 
V(t+1) = V(t) – (1-k)F(t)                                               (3) 
Distance to default at t+1 is defined similarly as: 
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Substituting equation (3) into (4) gives 
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The factor multiplying the inverse of the volatility in equation (5) is higher or equal than 
it in equation (2) and lower or equal than one. Therefore if asset volatility does not change 
from t to t+1, then we should observe DD(t) ≤ DD(t+1). Given that the numerators in 
equation (2) and (5) are the same, DD(t+1) will be lower than DD(t) if  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )tFktV
tV
tt VV −−
>+
1
1 σσ                                    (6) 
If there is a full refinancing, this condition simplifies to  
                                                            
53 The results of this section are essentially the same if we allow for R≠0.  
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( ) ( )tt VV σσ >+1                                                           (7) 
Or in other words, in order to observe a decrease in distance-to-default in the crisis 
period (in comparison with the pre-crisis period), asset volatilities in the crisis period should 
be higher than in pre-crisis period, and the increase being dependent on the degree of 
refinancing. The higher the refinanced proportion k the lower the difference between asset 
volatilities should be, in order to ensure that DD(t+1) is lower than DD(t). The question to 
what extent the price volatility of real assets increases during a financial crisis is an open 
empirical question. There is abundant evidence of increases in the volatility of stock prices 
during financial crises, but the volatility of equity prices may change (e.g. as a consequence of 
changes in leverage) although real asset volatility remains unchanged. 
3.2.2. The Real Effect of Financial Crises  
Financial crises usually impair the functioning of debt markets and may affect the 
willingness of financial intermediaries to supply credit. A number of studies present evidence 
supporting the view that credit shocks that emerge in the financial sector adversely affect the 
real economy on both the aggregate- and firm-level perspectives.54 The existing evidence at 
the firm level mainly focuses on how distressed financial sectors affect firm capital 
investment and equity valuation, and such influence is different to firms that rely on various 
financing sources. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) document that bank-dependent firms’ 
equity valuation are significantly reduced than others with similar firm characteristics due to 
unanticipated shocks experienced on suppliers’ capital. This is consistent with the BSST, 
which suggests that firms that rely on a bank lending for their borrowing find it difficult 
and/or expensive to replace that source of borrowing during the financial crisis, and especially 
                                                            
54 At the aggregate-level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) shows how the dependency on external financing 
has different impact on sectors’ growth. Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) provides evidence 
that a sector more reliant on external funds would experience a greater contraction of value added 
during a banking crisis.  
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costly to bank-dependent firms (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). More generally, Duchin et 
al. (2010) find that the decrease of investments is more acute for firms reliant on external 
financing (not just on bank loans) during the first year of the crisis. This is consistent with the 
CSST, which suggests that all credit-dependent firms (not just bank-dependent firms) are 
expected to be more adversely affected. On the contrary, Kahle and Stulz (2013) document 
that firm capital expenditures are very similar during the crisis irrespective of their funding 
strategy, which supports the DST. 
Overall, the literature so far has no conclusive argument on which view is the most 
relevant explanation to the 2007−2009 crisis affecting real outcomes on firm equity valuation 
or investment. Our study is related to the above literature, but our distinctive contribution is to 
examine the impact of financial crises on corporate default risks. In this paper, we use cross-
sectional variation of changes in a forward-looking measure of default risks, the Distance-to-
Default (DD) before and during the crisis as a way to shed light on the alternative explanatory 
power of the above three theories. 
Based on these facts, we hypothesize that during financial crises : (i) if BSST holds, 
bank-dependent firms experience a greater increase in default risk (decrease in DD) than 
otherwise equivalent firms with no bank dependence, (ii) if CSST holds, all credit-dependent 
firms experience a greater decrease in DD than otherwise equivalent firms with no credit 
dependence and, (iii) if DST holds, all firms, irrespective of their financing structures, 
experience a similar proportional increase in their default risks. 
3.2.3. Default Risks and Financial Crises 
To study the extent to which distress in the financial sector spills over to default risk 
increases in the real economy, and how alternative debt financing sources affect this risk 
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spillover remains largely unanswered.55 Recent papers examine how debt market frictions 
affect firm default risks both in theoretical and empirical perspectives. He and Xiong (2012b) 
develop a theoretical model implying that debt market frictions, raising debt financing costs, 
would lead to greater credit risks, even in the absence of any constraint on the firm’s ability to 
raise more equity. Chen et al. (2012) propose a theoretical model that captures higher default 
risks in bad times (debt market illiquidity) than good times. This implies that firms using debt 
as main financing tools (i.e., credit-dependent firms) are expected to suffer more default risks 
as compared with non-credit-dependent firms. The above literature addresses debt market 
frictions arising from illiquidity of corporate bond markets;56 thus, it may indicate that firms 
that mainly finance from public debt markets are expected have greater default risks during 
financial crises. We consider that the implication of such theoretical models can be applied in 
the case of bank lending frictions, since debt financing costs also increase in bank loan 
markets, which is consistent with setting of models on capturing debt market frictions. Thus, 
we may also observe greater credit risks for firms that rely on bank loans. Impaired credit 
supply increases firms’ default risks, while the level of such increase might be different 
depending funding sources (bank credit and on public debt markets). We empirically test this 
theory.  
To our knowledge, only few papers empirically examine this issue, and their results 
suggest that bank lending shocks increase default probabilities in non-financial corporate 
sectors. For example, Khwaja and Mian (2008) state that banks pass their liquidity shocks on 
small firms therefore increasing default probabilities for such firms, because small firms are 
unable to compensate their loss by additional borrowing through the credit market, and face 
                                                            
55 Some recent studies underline the importance of this spillover channel. Chiu, Peña, and Wang (2014) 
document significant tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to the corporate sector, especially for 
firms highly dependent on external debt financing. 
56 In particular, extant literature suggests that rollover risk exacerbates the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders, and then increases the possibility of a run on a firm (Morris and Shin 
(2009), He and Xiong (2012a), and He and Xiong (2012b)).  
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large drops in overall borrowing. 57  Schnabl (2012) find that the liquidity shock in bank 
lending affects the allocation of credit across firms therefore affecting firm outcomes by 
increasing loan default and decreasing firm survival on Peruvian firms. Thus, not only does a 
liquidity crunch reduce overall lending to firms, but it also makes it more likely for the 
affected firms to enter into financial distress. The above empirical evidence indicates that 
liquidity shocks tend to make bank-dependent firms closer to their default barriers. Our study 
also identifies the bank lending shocks on default risks in the corporate sector, but we extend 
this research strand in two ways. First, the above literature only investigates the bank lending 
supply effect on firm default probabilities in emerging markets. We, instead, focus on the U.S. 
market. Second, we consider not just firms that borrow from banks, but all non-financial firms. 
3.2.4. Substitution Effect 
Evidence suggests that bank-dependent firms suffer higher default risks because of cuts 
in bank lending, provided they cannot find other financing sources to substitute this financing 
gap. On the other hand, if bank-dependent firms can easily move from private to public-debt 
markets, the bank supply shocks may not necessarily increase default risks. We define this 
flexibility in accessing financing sources the “substitution effect.” The empirical results to 
this effect are mixed. Some studies support that public-debt markets can reduce firms’ 
exposure to drops in the supply of bank lending (e.g., Bernanke (2007), Chava and 
Purnanandam (2011)), 58 whereas some others highlight the important role of bank credit 
supply by showing that even large firms with access to the public credit market are still 
                                                            
57 Large firms are not affected by these shocks because they have alternative financing mechanisms. 
Notice however that in our paper, we examine whether this effect is stronger for bank-dependent firms 
after controlling for firm size. Also, they use loan defaults as a proxy for financial distress, while we 
consider default risk at firm level. Nevertheless, loan defaults should be alike to firm default since the 
cross-default clauses make it unlikely that a firm can default on one bank but not on another. 
58 Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that firms able to access public debt markets were not affected 
by 1998 LTCM crisis. During the crisis period (from August 14, 1998 to September 3, 1998) banks 
suffered huge losses, but the public-debt market was functioning steadily as suggested by the modest 
levels of the commercial paper-Tbill-spread.  
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vulnerable to shocks in bank credit supply by reducing net investments, net debt issuances, 
and equity valuation losses (e.g., Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Carvalho et al. (2012)).59  
As far as we know, there is only one study that examines the impact of substitution effect 
on default risk. Adrian et al. (2012) present a theoretical model and empirical evidence 
suggesting that the transmission mechanism of financial sector distress to real activity comes 
from the spike in debt financing premiums, rather than contraction in the total quantity of 
bank lending.60 Therefore, even if a firm can access public debt markets to partially offset its 
financing gap (resulting from cuts in bank lending), spreads (financing costs) on both 
financing sources both increase at the same time. Increased spreads imply higher default 
probabilities (Fiore and Tristani (2012)). In summary, previous literature does not support the 
substitution effect, given the behavior of credit spreads. However our distinctive contribution 
is provide direct evidence on this issue based on the distance-to-default measure. 
3.3. Identification Strategy and Empirical Methodology 
The goal of our empirical analysis is to test whether the variation of financing source 
influences default risks in corporate sectors by examining firms’ distance-to-default (DD) 
during 2007−2010 crisis, and at the same time examine which transmission channels (bank 
supply shock theory, credit supply shock theory, and demand shock theory) is more relevant 
to explain the impact of financial crises on the real economy. To do so, we outline our 
empirical strategy as follows. 
3.3.1. Identification Strategy 
We examine the time-series and cross-sectional heterogeneity of DD across firms. 
                                                            
59 The reason is that when several firms want to access public-debt markets at the same time, in 
response to a reduction in bank financing, the supply of new funds will not be able to accommodate 
this demand and the cost of raising funds in public markets would increase accordingly. 
60 Their paper shows that during 2007−2009, there was a 75% decrease in loans but a two-fold increase 
in bonds. However, the costs of both financing channels show a steep increase by four-fold increase for 
new loans, and three-fold increase for bonds.  
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Specifically we propose a strategy to classify a firm based on its dependence of 
accessing bank and/or public-debt market and the strength of its bank relationships 
prior to the onset of the crisis. 
3.3.1.1. Cross-Sectional Classification: Source of Debt Financing 
There are two main debt financing sources, from banks or from public-debt markets 
(such as, corporate bonds, commercial paper, etc.). A firm may rely on one borrowing 
channel, both, or none. We define firms as “Credit-Dependent Firms” (henceforth called 
CDF), when there is evidence that they obtain funds from banks and/or public debt markets. 
We denote firms as “Non-Credit-Dependent Firms” (henceforth called NCDF) when there is 
no such evidence. This identification strategy is designed to test the credit supply shock 
theory (CST). If increases in default risks are significantly higher for CDF than for NCDF, 
then the evidence is not inconsistent with CST. 
Furthermore, we examine the bank supply shock theory (BSST). In doing that, we 
partition CDF firms into three subgroups based on their dependence on bank loans: (1) firms 
with strong dependence on bank loans (named “strong-bank-dependent firms” henceforth), (2) 
firms with weak dependence on bank loans (named “weak-bank-dependent firms” henceforth), 
and (3) firms with no bank dependence but with public debt dependence (henceforth called 
PDD). The rationale is that if changes in default risks across all CDF firms are not 
significantly different, this fact supports the CSST; on the other hand, if default risk increases 
more in the case of bank-dependent firms, this fact supports BSST.  
In order to test the substitution effect, we divide the bank-dependent firms into two 
subgroups: one has only bank relationship and the other has bank relationship and also access 
to public debt market. Therefore strong-bank-dependent firms (weak-bank-dependent firms) 
are partitioned into two subgroups as (1) SB (WB): only has access to bank loans and (2) 
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SBPD (WBPD): has both access to bank loans and public debt market. The rationale is that if 
the substitution effect holds, then the increase of default risks for SBPD is expected to be less 
than SB, because firms included in the former group can access public debt markets to 
mitigate the adverse impact of banking lending contraction. In summary we classify firms into 
six mutually exclusive subgroups:  
(1) NCDF: Non-credit-dependent firms (neither bank nor public-debt dependence); 
(2) SBPD: Strong-bank-dependent and public-debt-dependent firms; 
(3) SB: Strong-bank-dependent but without public-debt dependent firms; 
(4) WBPD: Weak-bank-dependent and public-debt-dependent firms; 
(5) WB: Weak-bank-dependent but without public-debt-dependent firms; 
(6) PDD: Public-debt dependent but without bank-dependent firms. 
By construction, CDF includes subgroups of 2 to 6.61 
This identification strategy has four features. First, firms included in SBPD and WBPD 
have a wider choice of financing options available. Second, firms included in SBPD and SB 
are more sensitive to banks’ lending decisions because they have the strongest bank 
relationship. Third, firms included in PDD have exposure to credit markets but no bank 
relationship, making it possible to examine the theory of credit supply shock.62 Fourth, firms 
included in NCDF are assumed to finance by themselves through internal funds or equity 
markets.63  
                                                            
61 Previous papers identify bank-dependent firms when they do not have credit ratings. We argue that 
this identification rule is too crude and our strategy reflects a more sophisticated approach. We rely on 
actual syndicated loan data (provided by banks) to identify bank-dependent firms.  
62 As far as we know, there is not an experimental design in the extant literature that could discriminate 
the credit supply shock from bank supply shock as our design does.  
63 No doubt, a firm’s issuance of additional equity, when other financing sources are barely available, 
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We evaluate a firm’s dependence on banks by examining their repeated contracting 
between firms and banks which correlates with a strong bank-borrower relationship. In 
particular, we consider a firm of having strong relationship with banks when the firm borrows 
two or more than two loans with the same U.S. lead bank in the five years before the end of 
the second quarter of 2006 in line with Duchin et al. (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). We 
consider a firm as having weak bank relationship when it borrows from banks but does not 
qualify as a strong-bank relationship.64 Furthermore we use the credit rating as an indicator of 
public-debt dependence (see Chava and Purnanandam (2011)).  
3.3.1.2. Time-Series Classification: Five Time Phases between 2006Q2 and 
2010Q1 
We are interested in examining the time-series changes in default risks. Specifically we 
focus on the period between 2006Q2 and 2010Q1 since it covers the 2007-2010 financial 
crisis as well as one year before this crisis. We follow Kahle and Stulz (2013) and divide this 
period into five phases: (1) pre-crisis (2006Q3−2007Q2); (2) first-year crisis 
(2007Q3−2008Q2); (3) pre-Lehman (2008Q3); (4) post-Lehman (2008Q4−2009Q1); (5) last-
year crisis (2009Q2−2010Q1).The first phase (pre-crisis) includes one year before the 
beginning of subprime crisis (usually dated around July, 2007). The second phase (first-year 
crisis) covers several extreme economic events, such as the starting period of the subprime 
crisis and the Bear Stearns bankruptcy. Our empirical analysis will focus on the first year of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
impacts its default risk, since it can replace debt with equity. Our sample only includes publicly traded 
firms, which all have access to equity markets. To take into account how equity finance affects our 
conclusions, we examine time-series changes in net equity issuance (defined as aggregate equity 
issuance minus aggregate equity repurchase dividend by lagged assets) across groups based on our 
matched sample. The results (not presented here but available under request) show no material 
differences between NCDF and any subgroup of CDF in terms of their time-series changes (crisis 
periods versus pre-crisis) in the net equity issuance, except for a few cases in the last-year crisis period. 
Therefore, the use of equity financing does not seem to be relevant to our study before Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. We leave for future research, though, the analysis of the impact on default probabilities of 
the variation of external equity dependence. 
64 To establish bank-firm relationships, we employ the LPC Dealscan database, which has been used in 
related studies (e.g., Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 
(2011), Kahle and Stulze (2013), and Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2014)). 
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the crisis because it is more plausible that the shock to credit during that year is not caused by 
demand shocks in the corporate sector (see Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), and Kahle and 
Stulz (2013)). The third phase (pre-Lehman) contains the events surrounding Lehman’s 
bankruptcy (September 15, 2008). The fourth phase (post-Lehman) covers two quarters after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy. The fifth phase (last-year crisis) is the final stage of the acute phase of 
the crisis and goes from April 2009 to March 2010. By this time, the panic subsided, the stock 
market rebounded from its lowest level, and credit spreads declined from their peaks. 
3.3.2. Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we present our choice for the measurement of default risks. Next, we 
show how to apply the “difference-in-differences” method in testing whether and how costly 
financing frictions are for borrowers’ default risk by exploiting the differences of changes in 
default risk indicators. Subsequently, we present the propensity score matching mechanism in 
selecting the control group to be used in difference-in-differences method. 
3.3.2.1. Measuring Default Risk: Distance-to-Default 
There are many possible measures of default risk available in the literature based on 
different firm’s characteristics such as size, leverage, stock market performance, stock 
volatility and other risk-related variables. We choose to measure default risk by using 
distance-to-default since it is widely used as an indicator of default risk for non-financial 
corporations in the literature (see Goyal and Wang (2013), Bharath and Shumway (2008), 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010)) and also because its non-linear functional form which might 
contain additional information on the interaction of the different risk-related variables. The 
Distance-to-Default (DD) is the number of standard deviations that a firm’s asset value is 
away from its default threshold at the forecasting horizon. Therefore it is inversely related to 
default risk. This default risk measure is based on Merton (1974), and there are several 
52 
 
alternative approaches for estimating the relevant parameters (asset value and asset volatility). 
We compute DD following the well known Moody’s KMV approach as: 
 
( ) ( )2log 2
DD
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≡                                              (8) 
where V is a firm’s total asset value, B is a firm’s face value of debt, σV is the volatility of a 
firm’s asset return, μ is an estimate of the expected long-run return of a firm’s asset return, 
and T is the maturity of a firm’s debt. The details of the estimation procedure are explained in 
Appendix A. We calculate DD at monthly frequency by implementing one-year window 
rolling and updating it month-by-month. 
3.3.2.2. Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
The Difference-in-Differences (Henceforth, called DID) measure is defined as the 
difference between changes in our key variable, which is DD,65 across groups and over time. 
This method allows us to compare the changes in DD with respect to a reference period (in 
our case the pre-crisis period) across groups and over time rather than compare the levels of 
the variable across the treatment and control groups. In doing so, we control for the fact that 
the levels of DD in the treated and control groups could be different because of fundamental 
differences between them. We define the DID(g,k)t measure for groups g and k in period t as 
follows: 
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65 Several recent studies also use difference-in-differences method and claim that the DID method is 
preferable to multivariate regression approach. The reason is that it is hard to avoid endogeneity 
problems when using regressions (see Chava and Purnanandam (2011), and Kahle and Stulz (2013)). 
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where ,
t
i gX  is the average DD for firm i in group g which contains I firms, over the period 
t=1,2,3,4, where t=1 corresponds to the first-year of the crisis, t=2 to the pre-Lehman period, 
t=3 to the post-Lehman period and t=4 corresponds to the last year of the crisis; ,
t
j kX  is the 
average DD for firm j in group k which contains J firms. The DID(g,k)t  refers to the 
difference of the average value of the time-series changes of DD between group g and k in 
period t. Therefore, by construction, this is a cross-sectional measure. We use the one-sided 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test in assessing the statistical significance of DID. This test is a 
nonparametric alternative to the standard two sample t-test, and is more appropriate than the 
standard test because the distribution of changes in DD is not normally distributed. 
3.3.2.3. Propensity Score Matching 
In DID estimators, we need to obtain similar groups of treatment (e.g. CDF) and control 
(e.g. NCDF) subjects by matching observable firms’ risk characteristics on their propensity 
scores. Pairs of matched firms are similar along meaningful dimensions such as size or 
leverage. However, for obvious reasons, we do not include the DD into these dimensions.66 
We use the Propensity Score Matching (Henceforth, called PSM) method for the 
matching exercise (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In doing so, we adjust for selection bias. 
The propensity score is the probability of belonging to the treatment group (in our case CDF) 
given a vector of observed variables. This propensity score is estimated from a probit 
regression. If we take firms with the same propensity score and divide them into two groups, 
the groups will be approximately balanced on the variables used to predict the propensity 
score. There are many matching algorithms available: Nearest Neighbor (NN), Caliper 
Matching (CM), Stratification and Interval (S&I), Kernel and Local Linear (K&LL) among 
                                                            
66 We do not match on DD (the variable to be examined in difference-in-differences estimations) since 
that would bias us against finding any differences.  
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others. The basic method is the NN in which a case in the control group is matched to a 
treated case based on the closest propensity score. We choose the improved CM method 
where a case in the control group is matched to a treated case based on a tolerance level on 
the maximum propensity score distance (caliper), to avoid the risk of bad matches. The 
selection process could be done without replacement, (subjects are not returned to the sample 
after being pair-matched) or with replacement (one identical control firm could be matched 
into multiple treated firms). Our baseline analysis is based on PSM without replacement, but 
we also provide the results of PSM with replacement in the robustness test section.67 We set 
the difference between propensity scores of the treated unit and the control unit to be within 
the caliper ±2.5%.68 
In PSM, we construct two subsamples in a similar dimension on a set of firms’ 
characteristics. The control variables are associated with firms’ default risk. Specifically, we 
choose:  
(1) Size: the logarithm of book value of assets; 
(2) Leverage: the ratio of debt to assets;  
(3) Volatility: the annualized standard deviation of daily equity returns for a year; 
(4) Past-Ret: the annual stock return over the past one year; 
(5) Cash/Asset: the ratio of cash to assets; 
(6) NI/Asset: the ratio of net income to assets; 
(7) Industry effect (Fama-French 38 industry dummies) 
                                                            
67 One problem of “without replacement” is that many of the subjects in the dataset are discarded, 
reducing power and generalization. Thus we implement PSM “with replacement” by setting maximum 
number of multiple matches are up to two, three, or four. The details are provided in robustness section. 
68 Our results are robust to changing the caliper into ±5% and ±10% as shown in the robustness test 
section. 
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These variables are motivated by the hazard model literature, and are among the most 
important determinants to default risks (etc., Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and 
Campbell et al. (2008)). We control for firm size because larger firms are more diversified, 
which reduces operating risks, and so they face lower default risk than smaller firms. 
Leverage is included since the higher the debt (high leverage) the higher the chances of 
default. Volatility implies the probability of a firm’s asset value being below the default 
boundary, so the higher volatility the higher the uncertainty and therefore the higher the 
default probability. Low past equity returns should be related with increases in default risk. 
We include the ratio of cash to assets because this variable reflects a firm’s ability to pay its 
financial debt obligations. Profitability (proxy of the ratio of net income to assets) is 
considered because a profitable firm should be less likely to default. Finally, we allow for 
industry effects by means of dummy variables. 
3.4. Data 
We study all publicly listed non-financial firms in the U.S. market during the period of 
2006Q3−2010Q1. We perform a set of data sample selection rules. First only non-zero 
leverage firms are chosen for two reasons: (1) default risks (proxied by distance-to-default in 
this study) can only be measured when leverage is not zero, and (2) only leveraged firms have 
obligations to pay for debts, thus causing uncertainty of defaults. We remove from our sample 
firms with zero debt in the second quarter of 2006. Second, we exclude financial firms (SIC 
6000-6999), utility companies (SIC 4910 and 4940) and firms in the public sector (SIC 9000-
9999). Third, we choose firms with available daily equity prices and quarterly balance sheet 
information in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT database.69 We lag all accounting information by 
3 months because of reporting delay and substitute missing accounting data with the most 
                                                            
69  We obtain information of daily equity prices and outstanding shares from CRSP, and select 
information of total assets, debt in current liability, long-term debt, and outstanding shares (if missing 
in CRSP) from COMPUSTAT at quarterly frequency.  
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recent observation prior to it. The final number of firms chosen is 3,158. We identify firms as 
public-debt dependent firms when they have credit ratings at the end of June 2006. The 
information of firms’ rating is collected from Compustat S&P 500 long-term ratings. 
3.4.1. Bank Loans 
We collect bank loans data beginning at the year of 1986 from DealScan Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC) database. The LPC provides detail information for the syndicated loan 
market. Given that our attention is on public firms, we merge DealScan and Compustat by 
using the Compustat-LPC link file provided by Michael Robert (Chava and Roberts (2008)), 
to distinguish public firms from private ones.  
The data shows that there was a remarkable decline in bank lending during 2007−2010. 
Figure 5 (Panel A, public firms), shows that newly issued syndicated lending within U.S. 
market started to fall since June, 2007, and went down to its lowest level on January, 2009. 
Over this period, on a monthly basis, it dropped by 77% (from 178 to 40) in terms of the 
number of deals, and decreased by 96% (from $162 to $6 billion) in the average amount. 
Since then, a slight increase appeared, but the average level was much lower than the pre-
crisis level. For example, the number (amount) of the issuance of new loans on average was 
148 ($103 billion) per month over the year before June 2007, while it was only 58 ($29 billion) 
in year 2009. This decrease of bank lending is observed not only in the case of public firms, 
but also for all firms (both private and public firms) as shown in Panel B of Figure 5.70  
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
     To evaluate the extent of reliance on bank financing, we use bank loan data at facility-level. 
We consider a firm to have a strong-bank relationship when it has two or more than two loans 
                                                            
70 Our result is consistent with the finding in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) that syndicated lending, 
as measured by agreements reported to Dealscan, started to fall in mid−2007 and dropped dramatically 
in the last quarter of 2008. 
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with the same lead bank71 over the five years before the second quarter of 2006 (Kahle and 
Stulz (2013)) .72  
3.5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we examine whether the variation of financial sources influences default 
risks during 2007−2010 financial crisis, and which view is more relevant to explain 
transmission channel from distressed financial sector to real economy sectors: bank supply 
shock theory, credit supply shock theory, or demand shock theory. Furthermore, we examine 
the substitution effect on default risks. 
3.5.1. DD: Summary Statistics and Preliminary Tests 
We compute DD between 2006Q3 and 2010Q1. We use daily equity data and quarterly 
accounting data to measure DD at the end of each month and update it one month forward.73 
Figure 6 shows the time series of DD for CDF and NCDF firms. The DD for CDF firms was 
above DD for NCDF firms on average until October 2008 (the first month after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy). Between October 2008 and August 2009, the situation reversed. After that it 
went back to the initial situation. This result implies that although CDF firms are usually 
financially healthier than NCDF in normal times, the former tend to suffer higher default risk 
than the later, during extreme crisis periods. 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
                                                            
71 The lead bank is often the administrative agent that has duty to other syndicate members to provide 
information about borrowers’ default situation. As a consequence, observing the connection between 
lead banks and borrowers gives us useful information to assess the strength of a borrower’s bank 
relationship. We treat loans granted by a parent bank or its subsidiary or branch as loans originating 
from the same lead arranger (see Ferreira and Matos (2012)). 
72 We also account for activities of merges and acquisitions when identifying loans granted from an 
identical lead arranger. It is better to provide an example to illustrate this point. For instance, BANC 
ONE CORP merged with JPMORGAN CHASE & CO in 2004. If a firm has a lead bank BANC ONE 
CORP before 2004 and has a lead bank JPMORGAN CHASE & CO between 2004 and 2006Q2, we 
consider the firm as having as a lead bank JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 
73 The quarterly time series data is linearly interpolated between quarterly reporting dates and turns out 
to be at daily frequency. 
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Table 6 contains the basic statistics of DD and some preliminary tests over the four time 
periods: (1) pre-crisis (2006Q3−2007Q2); (2) first-year crisis (2007Q3−2008Q2); (3) pre-
Lehman (2008Q3); (4) post-Lehman (2008Q4−2009Q1); and (5) last-year crisis 
(2009Q2−2010Q1) and across the two main groups (NCDF and CDF) as well as the five 
CDF-based subgroups (SPBD, SB, WBPD, WB, and PDD). Our tests are conducted on a 
panel where the risk measures are computed for each firm and through five time periods. In 
the following we aggregate our firm-month sample into firm-period sample by averaging all 
monthly DD for each time period.  
We observe a significant decrease in DD (increase in default risk) in the first year of the 
crisis in comparison with the pre-crisis period in all cases, excepting the PDD group. 
Therefore all NCDF firms and most CDF firms (excepting rated firms without bank 
dependence) become closer to default. The decrease in DD was slightly higher in the case of 
CDF firms than in the case of NCDF firms, 16.5% versus 14.4%. However the differences 
across CDF subgroups are more marked, from 22.8% in the case of unrated firms strongly 
dependent on bank financing (SB) to 5.2% (and not statistically significant) in the case of 
PDD.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The preliminary evidence during the first year of the crisis seems to be more supportive 
of the impaired access to banking financing theories than alternative theories based on a 
demand shock. Theories based on a an overall credit crunch are not so clearly supported by 
the data because rated firms without banking connections did not become closer to default 
during this period.74  
                                                            
74 In agreement with the discussion in section 2.1, the data indicates that the reason of the decrease in 
DD is because there is an increase in asset volatilities in most cases during the first year and in 
subsequent periods in comparison with the pre-crisis period. In the first year the stronger increase was 
59 
 
If we compare the changes in DD from the pre-crisis to the last-year of the crisis, we 
observe a strong decrease in DD across the board ranging from 56% (SBPD) to 41% (PDD) 
all of them statistically significant. Again the CDF group experiences a slightly bigger 
decrease (52%) than the NCDF group (49%) although much more marked differences appear 
across CDF subgroups. The evidence here is less clear cut than before. 
Finally we discuss briefly the most acute crisis period, the Post-Lehman versus Pre-
Lehman (2008Q3). In this period the decrease in DD is stronger and very significant in all 
cases both for CDF firms (67%) and for NCDF firms (57%). Specially marked is the increase 
in default risks for PDD (71%) and also for rated firms with strong (69%) or weak (73%) 
bank dependence. An overall credit crunch should perhaps be more consistent with these facts. 
3.5.2. Full Sample Analysis 
Based on the full sample, Table 7 reports results of time-series changes in DD by 
subtracting from any crisis period its value at the pre-crisis level. Thus, negative differences 
indicate that the default risk during crisis period increased as compared to its pre-crisis level. 
The results are reported in Panel A for first-year crisis, in Panel B for pre-Lehman, in Panel C 
for post-Lehman, and in Panel D for last-year crisis. For a given time period, we present a 
cross-sectional analysis. Model 1 to 7 refers to results based on subsamples of NCDF, CDF, 
SBPD, SB, WBPD, WB, and PDD respectively. The cross-sectional differences of time-series 
changes are denoted as DID in the table, which is computed by subtracting the average value 
of time-series change of NCDF from the value of CDF (or any subgroup of CDF). As a result, 
a negative DID implies that the default risk of CDF (or any subgroup of CDF) is larger than it 
of NCDF at a given time period. We use the Wilcoxon two-sample test to evaluate the 
statistical significance of DID measure as mentioned in the section 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
for the SBPD and SB groups. Detailed results are available on request. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
To highlight the economic impact of changes in DD, we map them to changes in default 
rates through an empirical default distribution.75 We describe how to generate the empirical 
default distribution in Appendix B.76 For example, in the period of 2007Q3-2009Q1, the DD 
decreased by 6.72 and 5.56 for CDF and NCDF respectively. This translates into default 
probabilities by the increase of 104 basis points for CDF firms and 80 basis points for NCDF 
firms. 
It is worth noting that for CDF firms (Model 2), the DID is negative and significant at 
1% level through the whole crisis period, indicating that CDF firms had higher default risks 
than NCDF firms. This result is consistent with the preliminary analysis in Table 6 in the 
sense that firms that primarily rely on debt financing are more likely to default in times of 
credit supply contraction.  
We now examine the cross-sectional variation of changes in default risk across 
subgroups within CDF. Focusing on the first-year of the crisis, SB experienced the largest 
decrease in DD (-1.89). This translates into an increased default likelihood of about 7 basis 
points, which is larger than the mapped default rate at the pre-crisis period which was 1 basis 
point. On the other hand, the decrease in DD for NCDF firms is -0.82, roughly equivalent to 
an increase in default risk of 3 basis points. This implies that SB firms are more likely to go 
bankrupt than NCDF firms by a two-fold of the increased default probability. The DID 
                                                            
75 By construction, the Merton model applies the Normal distribution to calibrate default probabilities. 
We do not use the Normal distribution to transform DD into default rate, due to the fact that the 
empirical distribution of defaults has a fatter tail than the Normal distribution (see Crosbie and Bohn 
(2003)). 
76 For example with DD about 7, the observed default rate over the next year is roughly 7.2 basis 
points. Goyal and Wang (2013) performs a similar method to calibrate the empirical default probability 
based on the sample from 1985 to 2006, and show that with an average distance-to-default of about 7, 
the observed default probability over the next year is approximately 5.9 basis points, which is a little bit 
lower than our estimation. This difference may be due to the different sample periods (1985-2006 
versus 2006-2010 in our case). 
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measures are significantly negative at 1% level for SB, SBPD, and WBPD, and at 5% level 
for WB. Thus our results indicate, at the initial stage of crisis, bank-dependent firms suffer 
more default risks as compared to NCDF firms, and this adverse effect is even higher for 
firms with strong bank dependence. The evidence of DID on PDD is less clear cut. There is a 
small positive effect (see Model 7) suggesting that rated firms without bank loan dependence 
fared better than NCDF firms in terms of default risk during the first-year of the crisis. 
However the statistical significance is borderline and the economic effect is small. We should 
stress again that the analysis of the first of year of the crisis is particularly important, because 
previous literature considers this period as specially well-suited one to examine the impact of 
financial shocks, because firms’ policies are less affected by demand effects at the initial 
stage of recession (e.g., Duchin et al. (2010), Kahle and Stulz (2013)).  
From pre-Lehman to last-year crisis, the SBPD group always experienced the largest 
decreases in DD, followed by the WBPD group, and then SB group. DID measures for both 
groups are all negative and significant at 1% significance level.  DID measures in the case of 
PDD are consistently positive over the entire crisis period and significant in three over four 
periods suggesting that rated firms without banking relationships fared relatively well during 
the crisis in terms of default risks in comparison with NCDF and other CDF firms. 
Overall, we find that default risks increased more for firms that primarily rely on credit 
financing in comparison with non-credit-dependent firms. However there is an exception in 
the case of rated firms without bank dependence. In particular, bank-dependent firms (rated or 
unrated) generally suffer more default risks than other firms. This adverse effect is especially 
more noticeable for firms with strong bank-borrower relationships. Therefore, the full sample 
results tend to support bank supply shock theory. Note that the full sample result might not be 
entirely reliable because of fundamental differences between groups, e.g., leverage. The post-
matched sample excludes other factors that are also related to firm’s default, and thus 
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provides more reliable evidence. Therefore, we re-examine the analysis based on the matched 
sample, which balances observable firms’ risks characteristics between treatments and 
controls.  
3.5.3. Matched Sample Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the results from the matching procedure and DID tests based 
on the matched sample. 
3.5.3.1. Propensity Score Matching 
The goal of this exercise is to create matched samples, where two subsamples have 
similar firms’ characteristics that could distinguish high default risk firms from low ones. All 
accounting and market variables are obtained as of the last quarter accounting information or 
one year equity market information before the June 2006. To prevent outliers from affecting 
our results, we winsorize data at 1% and 99% in all analyses. 
The summary statistics of control variables are provided in Table 8. We may observe 
that four variables present remarkable differences of CDF (Panel B) or any subset of CDF 
(Panel C) against NCDF (Panel A). The CDF firms on average have larger size and leverage, 
while have lower volatility and cash-to-asset ratio compared to NCDF firms, across statistics 
of mean and quantiles (25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile).  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the full sample in Panel A and of the matched 
sample in Panel B respectively. Model 1 of Panel A shows that differences of CDF firms (in 
comparison with NCDF firms) are positively associated with firm size, leverage, and net 
income-to-asset ratio; and negatively associated with equity return volatility and cash-to-asset 
ratio. The signs of the coefficient estimates on the control variables are as expected. That is, 
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by construction, the magnitude of a firm’s external debt financing is positively related to 
leverage, but negatively related to needs of internal funds (cash); large firms require a larger 
amount of operating funds, and they probably resort to external sources, and big firms usually 
have lower equity return volatility.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
We also implement alternative probit regressions by substituting one of the subgroups 
within CDF (SBPD, SB, WBPD, WB, and PDD) for the entire group of CDF, one-by-one, 
and report estimation results in Model 2 to 7 of Panel A. The signs of coefficients are 
consistent with Model 1, although magnitudes are not necessary the same. The values of 
pseudo-R-square are larger for subgroups having rating, but smaller for those without rating. 
For example the value on SBPD is of 61%, followed by PDD of 56%, then by WBPD of 46%, 
while it is 36% for SB and 12% for WB. It indicates that those firms’ characteristics are able 
to distinguish CDF firms from NCDF firms especially for CDF firms with ratings.   
After PSM, and as expected, estimated coefficients are not significant anymore and 
values of pseudo-R-square drop to 5.2% or lower across all specifications of probit 
regressions (see Panel B of Table 9). This evidence confirms that, the matched sample is 
equally balanced on the observable dimensions that might influence default occurrence before 
the second quarter of 2006. 
The Figure 7 shows the distribution of four key firms’ characteristics. The left-hand 
diagrams are distributions of the full sample, and the right-hand diagrams are those of the 
matched sample. The red line represents the CDF group, and the blue line represents the 
NCDF group. As expected, in terms of the entire sample, distributions on the variables of size 
and leverage for the CDF group are located to the right of the NCDF group (see Panel A and 
B of Figure 7), while distributions on variables of volatility and cash-to-asset ratio are clearly 
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located to the left for the CDF group compared with the NCDF group. After mapping, 
distributions are now similar for both groups as shown in diagrams on the right-hand side of 
Figure 7. 
[Insert Figure 7 Here] 
3.5.3.2. Results of Matched Sample 
Table 10 presents the results based on the matched sample. Our focus is the DID 
estimators for the three crisis periods: first-year (2007Q3−2008Q2), post-Lehman 
(2008Q4−2009Q1), and last-year (2009Q2−2010Q1).  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
During the first-year of the crisis, DID is negative and statistically significant only for 
strong-bank-dependent firms (Model 2), after controlling a set of variables that are related to 
firms’ defaults. This evidence is consistent with the findings in the full sample, and supports 
the bank supply shock theory. However, we observe that the DID becomes non-significant for 
weak-bank-dependent firms (Model 3); and the DID of CDF (Model 1) turns into positive and 
non-significant. The result of non-significant difference between NCDF and CDF might not 
be unexpected. In the 2007 credit crisis, the flight to quality might affect equity markets as 
well and hence hinder equity issuance and make it too costly. This post-matched result further 
supports the idea that only firms having strong bank dependence experience a significant 
increase in default risks against their matched firms having no credit dependence. Also, DID 
of PDD is insignificantly positive (Model 4). This result suggests that rated firms without 
banking dependence behave pretty much the same as NCDF firms at the initial stage of crisis 
as far as their default risk is concerned. Therefore, this evidence is inconsistent with the idea 
of an overall credit crunch being the main channel of transmission of the effects of the 
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financial crisis from the financial sector to the real economy. Furthermore the DID of SBPD 
and SB (see Model 5 and 6) are both negatively significant at 5% level. This finding 
highlights that even firms with access to public credit markets are still susceptible to 
fluctuations in the supply of capital, which is inconsistent with the substitution effect. We 
should stress again that the first-year result offers more reliable evidence in testing the 
implications of the theories of impaired access to capital. 
Second, at the post-Lehman stage (two quarters after the bankruptcy of Lehman), we 
observe that DID for the CDF group and for a majority of CDF subgroups is negatively 
significant at 5% level (Model 1), except for WB at 10% level and for PDD with no 
significant sign. Thus, this result is consistent with the bank supply shock theory, but does not 
support the credit supply shock theory. Two largest negative values of DID appear in SBPD (-
1.75) and WBPD (-1.73), followed by SBR (-0.96) and they are all negatively significant.  
Focusing on last-year of the crisis, as compared to the full sample analysis, of which 
DID for the CDF group remains negatively significant at 5% level. Across CDF subgroups, 
we observe DID are only negatively significant for SBPD and WBPD at 1% level. Last-year 
result indicates that NCDF firms recover more quickly towards their pre-crisis levels of DD.  
Furthermore, although we observe that DID estimators are negative across all types of 
credit-dependent subgroups, the absolute values of DID are systematically larger for strong-
bank-dependent firms (Model 2), followed by weak-bank-dependent firms (Model 3), and 
finally PDD (Model 4), through the whole sample period. 
In sum, the results based on the matched sample suggest that, regarding the effect on 
default risks, the banking supply shock theory is not inconsistent with the data. However the 
overall credit crunch theory and the demand shock theory are not supported by the empirical 
evidence.  
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3.5.4. Substitution Effect 
This section provide a test of the substitution effect, which asserts that a firm’s 
availability of switching financing resources between banks and public-debt markets reduces 
the negative effects of bank lending shocks. We accomplish this by constructing a matched 
sample of two groups, where both rely on bank loans but only one of them has access to 
public-debt markets. For example, in terms of strong-bank-dependent firms, we consider 
SBPD as a treated unit against its control unit of SB. This logic is also applied to the weak-
bank-dependent groups. In addition, since we draw inferences based on the strong (or weak) 
bank dependent subsamples only, this analysis is probably more accurate because it is less 
exposed to biases created by observable or unobservable differences across firms than the 
analysis provided in the previous section. Table 11 presents results based on the full sample in 
Panel A, and based on matched sample in Panel B.  
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Regarding to the full sample analysis DID for SBPD is significantly negative since pre-
Lehman crisis. This result suggests default risk is material for bank-dependent firms that are 
capable of issuing public debts in substituting for bank loans. The situation is similar to the 
case of WBPD, with the measure of DID significantly negative even earlier back to first-year 
crisis.  
The post-matched analysis shows that there is no evidence of economically or 
statistically important differences to strong bank-dependent firms, irrespective of their 
capabilities of accessing to public-debt markets. In the case of weak bank dependent firms, 
DID are even negatively significant at 10% level after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
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Overall this finding does not support the substitution effect. In other words, the data 
supports the notion that the public-debt market plays a limited role in offsetting the cost of 
large funding aggregate shocks over the period 2007−2010. 
3.6. Robustness Tests 
It is possible that the post-matched analysis results would be different if we use different 
settings in the Propensity Score Matching. For robustness, we implement PSM with 
replacements and PSM under alternative settings of the nearest neighbor caliper. Because of 
some concerns (described in more detail later), we also re-examine our baseline analysis by 
using three adjusted samples: (1) we exclude speculative-grade firms from our entire sample; 
(2) we exclude small-size firms from NCDF subsample; (3) we use the whole sample (instead 
of NCDF) as control groups in the matched sample analysis. The detailed results for the 
robustness tests are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
3.6.1. PSM with Replacement 
In the baseline analysis, we implement PSM “without replacement”, referring that one 
treated firm is matched by one control firm. The disadvantage of this technique is that the 
sample size could be very small, losing statistical power and generalization. In PSM “with 
replacement”, multiple treated firms are matched to one identical control firm, and thus we 
have a larger sample. 
We use several alternative matched samples, which are built under replacement with 
maximum numbers of treated firms to one control firm by up to 2, 3, and 4.77 We find that 
these supplemental analysis (PSM with replacement) also supports the role of the stronger 
bank relationship (SPBD and SB) resulting in higher default risk at the initial stage of crisis. 
The group WBPD seems to behave slightly different during the first-year crisis as compared 
                                                            
77 In the baseline analysis, the maximum number of treated firms to one control firm is 1.  
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with our main analysis. The result shows that even the groups with weak bank dependence 
also suffers more default risk. For the extended analysis on the substitution effect, we find 
that results are not materially changed in comparison with the baseline analysis by showing 
that DID is not significant in most of cases for the strong bank relationship group. 
3.6.2. PSM on Alternative Calipers 
We redo the matched analysis by changing the parameter of nearest neighbor caliper in 
exercising PSM to ±5% and ±10%. Overall there are no material differences in comparison 
with the baseline specification.    
3.6.3. Excluding Speculative-Grade Firms 
In a time of crisis, speculative-graded rated firms have a hard time accessing alternative 
sources of capital in public-debt markets. The result of the limited role of public-debt markets 
to offset the adverse outcome during financial crisis can be affected by the inclusion in our 
sample of a number of firms with speculative-grades. This might bias the analysis. To 
improve the robustness, we discard firms with speculated-grade ratings (lower than a BBB-
rating as rated by Standard & Poor), and re-examine all tests based on the new matched 
sample. We find that the result is similar to previous results, and in some tests, with a stronger 
negative DID measure, which gives additional support to our point about public-debt markets 
during financial crisis.  
3.6.4. DealScan LPC Bias 
It has been pointed out by some authors that DealScan LPC only reports bank loan deals 
for large firms. It is possible that small firms are also bank-dependent firms, but are not 
properly represented in our sample. We deal with this issue in two ways. First, we control for 
firms’ size in the baseline analysis. Second, we exclude small firms from NCDF group (less 
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than the median of firms’ sizes within NCDF group). The result still favors the bank supply 
shock theory in the first-year crisis period, given that the DID measure remains negatively 
significant. 
3.6.5. Using the Whole Sample as the Control Group 
In the baseline matched sample analysis, we consider NCDF firms as control units. One 
concern is that the result might be biased because we do not account for some other 
unobservable variables that may cause increases in default risk for bank-dependent firms 
(SBPD and SB) and decreases in default risks for PDD. To address this concern, we use the 
whole sample (excluding treated firms) as the control group. We find that DID remain 
negatively significant for strong bank-dependent firms at 5% level. This result further 
supports the bank supply shock theory. 
3.7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the alternative financing sources (banks, debt markets) 
on the default risks of non-financial firms listed in the U.S. stock market during the crisis of 
2007−2010. We compare empirically the relative merits of the three most popular 
explanations of the transmission channel of shocks originated in the financial sector, in 
explaining changes in the default risk of real-economy firms. These explanations are the bank 
supply shock theory, the credit supply shock theory and the demand shock theory. We show 
that, during the 2007−2010 financial crisis, firms closely linked to banks suffered increases in 
default risks significantly higher than similar firms which are not dependent on bank 
financing. These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. We also show 
that rated firms unrelated to banks behaved very similarly to unrated firms with no banking 
relationships as far as their default risk is concerned. 
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Overall our results tend to support the bank supply shock theory as the one more 
consistent with our data. Therefore policy measures such as the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), which are designed to alleviate problems in the banking lending channel, 
may also have a positive effect on the default risk of non-financial firms that are especially 
dependent on bank financing. However we do not find evidence supporting the credit supply 
shock theory because in our sample rated firms without bank dependence behave pretty much 
the same as firms having no debt financing sources. A word of caution is in order. We use 
data reflecting the impact of many policy actions during the crisis and therefore we cannot say 
what the effect on default risk of banking dependence would have been without these policy 
actions.  
Our results may have potential policy implications. Since the default risk of non-
financial firms is related with their degree of funding dependence from banks, instability in 
the banking sector and a subsequent impairment in the lending channel might have a sizable 
impact in the credit quality of many corporate sectors. As a result, regulators should take into 
account this aspect of the transmission of the risk of default, from the banking sector to the 
real economy, when designing policies to stabilize the banking sector.  
Appendixes 
Appendix A. Estimating Distance-to-Default  
The Moody’s KMV model is closely related to the method proposed in Black and 
Scholes (1973) model. The basic idea is to consider the fact that equity can be viewed as a 
call option for which the underlying asset is a firm’s asset value and the strike price is equal to 
the face value of a firm’s debt. A firm’s market value of asset is assumed to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion of the form: 
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,VdV Vdt VdZµ σ= +                                                        (A1) 
where V is the total value of a firm, μ is the expected continuously compounded return of V, σV 
is the volatility of a firm’s value, and dZ is a standard Brownian motion. With these 
assumptions and under the Black and Scholes (1973) model, a firm’s market value of equity, 
VE, can be expressed as a function of a firm’s total value as: 
( ) ( )1 2rTEV VN d Be N d−= − ,                                            (A2) 
where,  
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B is the face value of a firm’s debt, r is the risk-free rate, T is the forecast horizon, and N(.) is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution.  
In our exercise, we compute VE as the product of a firm’s outstanding shares and its 
current stock price, consider T as one year, and treat B as the debt in current liabilities plus 
one-half of long-term debt. This is consistent with the usual way that has been applied by 
many literatures. The two remaining variables in the Black-Scholes equation – the total asset 
value of the firm, V, and the volatility of the firm value, σV – are estimated through an iterative 
procedure following the method proposed in Vassalou and Xing (2004). At the beginning, σV 
is estimated as the annualized standard deviation of a firm’s asset returns, using daily data of 
the summation of the market value of equity and the face value of debt over the past one year. 
This serves as an initial estimate of σV, and together with the market value of equity and other 
inputs, equation (A2) is used to find daily values of V. With the estimated values of V, we 
generate new estimated of σV by using the implied log-returns on assets. The new estimate of 
σV  is put into the next iteration until the difference of values of σV from two consecutive 
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iterations is less than 10-3. Then we take the final estimated σV and its implied V. We compute 
the drift μ by calculating the mean value of log-returns of V. With these estimated values, the 
distance-to-default can be calculated based on equation (1).  
Appendix B. Empirical Mapping between Distance-to-Default and Default Probability 
We map distance-to-default into empirical default probability similar to the mapping 
technique used in Goyal and Wang (2013). For each firm at the end of a given month, we 
compute the DD over the past one year. Then we sort firms into ten bins based on DD. We 
consider a firm’s default over the next year if it is bankrupt or liquidated (delisting codes: 400, 
572, 574 in CRSP) (see Dichev (1998)). The empirical default rate is estimated as the ratio of 
the number of defaults to the number of firms in a given distance-to-default category. This 
results in an empirical mapping between distance-to-default and annual default frequency. We 
re-estimate this distribution every month forward over July 2006 and March 2010. Finally we 
average default probabilities over this period, and it gives us the distribution of default rates 
as a function of DD. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Do Financing Sources Affect Rollover Risk Effect on Default Risk? 
4.1. Introduction 
Rollover risk arises from firms may face difficulty in rolling over maturing short-term 
debt or have to refinance maturing debt at high credit risk (Diamond 1991) or high liquidity 
premium (He and Xiong 2012).78 Default risk represents the likelihood of firms’ insolvency. 
Rollover risk is interacted with default risk, as witnessed in the financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
which demonstrates that deterioration in debt market liquidity caused severe financing 
difficulties for many firms, in turn exacerbating their default risk. 
Recent theoretical literature argues that rollover risk could serve as an additional source 
of credit risk, because it increases the possibility of a run on the firm (see Morris and Shin, 
2009), and exacerbates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt-holders (He 
and Xiong, 2012), which in turn forces equity holders default at a higher fundamental firm 
asset value. The key implication of these theoretical models highlights the notion that rollover 
risk exacerbates default risk. We called this rollover risk effect in this study.  
The empirical evidence on testing rollover risk effect is at its early stage. As far as we 
know, only one published paper by Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli (2013) offers strong 
support that firms that experience a large increase in rollover risks are likely to experience a 
more severe deterioration in credit quality. There are some other working papers engage in 
empirically testing such effect as well.79 However, the extant studies only unveil some parts 
of the rollover risk effect due to limitation of the sample they used. Their samples are 
restricted to firms that have credit ratings, bond spreads, or credit default swap spreads. We 
                                                            
78 Diamond (1991) show that firms face difficulty in rolling over maturing short-term debt, especially 
at the time that refinancing coincides with a deterioration in either firm fundamentals or credit market 
conditions. 
79 See Chen et al. (2012), Hu (2010), and Valenzuela (2011). 
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argue that it is important to study to firms that have not been contained so far, and this is 
especially for unrated firms, which is usually considered as bank dependent firms, because 
they are represent of almost two-third of firms in the U.S. context.80 We aim to provide the 
most comprehensive empirical study of understanding rollover risk on default risk.  
This paper studies the impact of rollover risk on default risk by answering two main 
questions. (1) Do firms with higher rollover risk experience a larger increase in firms’ overall 
default probability? (2) Do financing sources affect the effect of rollover risk on default risk? 
Although financing sources, debt maturity, and default risk are mutually correlated as 
highlighted in literature, extant studies only focus on the relationship on any two of them,81 
but not on all of them in the unified notion. To our best understanding, we are the first study 
providing new empirical evidence on to what extent that financing sources drive the effect of 
rollover risk on default risk.  
In particular, we ask whether being bank dependent firm has larger rollover risk effect 
than non bank dependent firms (i.e., public debt dependent firms). The reason we focus on the 
two types of firms is because they are essentially different in many ways, which may 
disproportionally drive rollover risk effect on credit risk. 
Bank dependent firms find more difficult to borrow long-term debt financing, have low 
debt capacity, facing greater liquidity risk that they cannot refinance at reasonable costs (see 
Carey et al. (1993), Lemmon and Zender (2007), Diamond (1991), and Mian and Santos 
(2011)). All these attributes make such type of firms have higher rollover risk. For a firm with 
high level of rollover risk, it is likely we can find rollover risk effect on default risk for that 
                                                            
80 As shown in Section, our sample contains approximate 60% of firm-year observations on bank 
dependent firms, and 40% firm-year observations on non bank dependent firms (i.e., public debt 
dependent firms). 
81 For example, Chiu, Pena, and Wang (2014) provide empirical evidence showing that financing 
sources have differential impacts on default risk by documenting that firms that depend on bank loans 
as main financing sources tend to suffer more default risk than firms that use public debts as main 
financing sources in the 2007-2010 crisis. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that overall a firm’s debt 
maturity is positively correlated with credit risk for rated firms, whereas the evidence for 
nonmonotonicity is driven solely by the unrated firms in the sample. 
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firm if this effect indeed exists. In contrast, if a firm’s rollover risk is slim, there is no way we 
can find rollover risk on default risk for that firm. As a result, we hypothesize that the rollover 
risk effect is stronger for bank dependent firms compared with public debt dependent firms. 
We investigate industrial firms in the U.S. market over the period between 1986 and 
2011. We follow Gopalan et al. (2013) by using first difference regression, to eliminate that 
the firm-specific fixed effects, of which the dependent variable is the change in default risk, 
and the main independent variable is the rollover risk variable. We also control many relevant 
default risk factors besides rollover risk variable.82  
We proxy for default risk with the expected default frequency (EDF) based on Merton’s 
model as the main default risk measure because of a number of advantages. EDF is a 
continuous, “absolute” measure of default risk that changes over the course of the credit cycle, 
reflecting the changes in the level of default risk, which is exactly we want to capture in this 
study.83 Furthermore, computing EDF only requires stock price and accounting information, 
where both are commonly available, and thus it allows us to measure default risks for many 
firms, rather than restrict to a certain group of firms. We also compute the distance-to-default 
(DD) and use credit ratings provided by rating agency as alternative default risk measures, 
and the results are consistent with our main results. 
We measure rollover risk variable by computing the amount of the firm’s long-term debt 
outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due for repayment in year t. The variable is very 
suitable in studying the rollover risk effect as suggested in Gopalan et al. (2013) and Almeida, 
Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012); in that, the variable only depends on the past 
long-term debt maturity decisions made by the firm, and hence, is less likely to be correlated 
                                                            
82 They are: (1) Size using Log(Total assets), (2) Leverage using Total debt/Total assets, (3) Interest 
coverage, (4) Profitability using Operating income/Sales, (5) Tax, (6) Market to book representing 
growth opportunities, (7) R&D, (8) Idiosyncratic volatility (denoted as Idiovol) representing operating 
risk, (9) Tangibility, and (10) Cash. Detailed definitions of all these variables and economic rationales 
are provided in Section 3. 
83 On the contrary, credit ratings reflect “relative” rankings of credit risk across firms at each time, 
which is able to capture the nature of changes in default risk ((see the detail discussion in Hovakimian, 
Kayhan, and Titman (2012)). 
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with the firm's current risk characteristics or credit quality. 
Our empirical evidence strongly supports the rollover risk effect that rollover risk indeed 
exacerbates default risk, which is consistent with our prediction. In particular we show that 
one-standard-deviation increase in the change in rollover risk variable lead to a 5.9% increase 
in default rates. Furthermore, we examine whether being bank dependent magnifies the 
rollover risk effect. Our results show that the rollover risk effect is more pronounced for bank 
dependent firms than for public debt dependent firms, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis.  
Next, we consider rollover risk effect could be conditional on credit quality, size, and 
market economic situation (i.e., during recession or not). We find that rollover risk effect only 
exist for firms that have poorer credit quality, but not for firms that have good credit quality; 
size and market economic situation seem not to influence the rollover risk effect in a very 
different way, of which all firms suffer rollover risk effect. Furthermore, we examine whether 
being bank dependent magnifies the rollover risk effect across a set of groups as identified by 
credit quality, size, and recession. We find that the rollover risk effect is significant solely for 
bank dependent firms, but not for public debt dependent firms in many cases. Our results 
suggest that poor credit quality, small size, and operating during recession are not necessary 
of triggering rollover risk effect, and this effect is solely significant for bank dependent firms 
under these conditions. 
This study complements previous literature in several strands. First, our paper 
contributes to both the literature on debt maturity and the literature on credit risk by providing 
empirical validation to the theoretical predictions that rollover risk, arising from a firm’s debt 
maturity structure, increases the firm’s overall credit risk (e.g., He and Xiong (2012), and 
Morris and Shin (2009)). Unlike most of previous papers which study the rollover risk effect 
on restricted samples (see e.g., Gopalan et al. (2013)), we provide the most comprehensive 
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empirical evidence on understanding this effect by including all levered firms in the U.S. 
market. 
Second, our paper also complements several recent studies that exploit the global crisis 
of 2007-2009 to highlight the adverse real impact to firms of not being able to roll over their 
maturing debt. Almeida et al. (2012) show that firms with a larger proportion of their long-
term debt maturing right after August 2007 experienced larger drops in their real investment 
rates. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that the decline in corporate investment 
following the global crisis was more pronounced among firms that had more net short-term 
debt. Our paper differs from these papers in that, whereas these papers examine the effect of 
rollover risk on firm investments, we examine this effect on firm default risk, and show that 
rollover risk exacerbates default risk.  
Third, Chiu, Peña, and Wang (2014) study the mechanism through which a financial 
crisis affects the default risk of real-economy levered firms using the natural experiment of 
the 2007−2009 crisis, and find that firms strongly dependent on bank financing suffer higher 
increases in default risk, than otherwise similar firms with no dependence on bank financing. 
Their paper does not explain why bank dependent firm suffer higher default risk during crisis. 
We provide new evidence showing that rollover risk could be one of explanation to explain 
why bank dependent higher default risks than public debt dependent firms. 
The results presented in this study have important implications for academics and policy 
makers alike. For academics, the results point out the potential way to improve the current 
credit risk models is through a better understanding of the interaction between default risk and 
liquidity risk. Furthermore, it is important to take into account financing sources when 
assessing the rollover risk and default risk because our results suggest that firm borrowing 
channel should serve as the critical factor in determining how the rollover risk 
disproportionally affects the default risk. Finally, the work is important to policy makers, 
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whose objective is to stabilize economic situation, because our results suggests a way to 
reduce default risk of industrial firms is through regulating firms debt maturity structure. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The related literature and hypotheses are 
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 addresses main variables used in this study and data. Section 
4 discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of limitations and 
suggestion for further research. 
4.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we outline both the theoretical and empirical literature on rollover risk 
effect on default risk, and discuss how the reliance on bank borrowing affects such effect.  
4.2.1. Rollover Risk Effect on Default Risk 
This section reviews literatures that theoretically and empirically study rollover risk 
effect on default risk. 
4.2.1.1 Theoretical Background 
Recent papers propose theoretical models showing that rollover risk exacerbates default 
risk. Morris and Shin (2009) incorporate the insights from the bank-run literature84 into a 
stylized model to examine the interaction between rollover risk and default risk. They show 
that a negative fundamental shock can increase the probability of short-term debt holders not 
rolling over their debt, and thus increase the default probability of a bank. He and Xiong 
(2012) embed the spirit of Myers (1977) into the Leland and Toft (1996) model, and they 
show when debt market liquidity deteriorates, firms face rollover losses from issuing new 
bonds to replace maturing bonds. To avoid default, equity holders need to bear the rollover 
losses. This intrinsic conflict of interest between debt and equity holders may force equity 
holders choosing to default at a higher fundamental firm value that the firm would otherwise 
                                                            
84 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
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have survived in the absence of rollover risk arising from short-term debt. 
The key implication of these theoretical papers is that the amount of a firm’s debt 
maturing in the short term leads to an increase in a firm’s overall default probability, aside 
from traditional default risk factors (such as operating risk and leverage ratio). We regard this 
increasing causality as the rollover risk effect in this study. 
Although the above models are built to study default risk due to rollover risk for banks, 
or for firms that issue corporate bonds, the same logic can be applied to any levered firm. The 
reason is that once firms have debts, they face refinancing risk.   
4.2.1.2. Empirical Evidence 
We find some recent empirical evidence in favoring the rollover risk effect. However, 
empirically examining this effect is still at a very early stage. The only published paper we 
can find so far is written by Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli (2013). They find that firms with 
greater exposure to rollover risk have lower credit quality, where they use the rating 
information to proxy for default risk. Also, the rollover risk effect is stronger among firms 
that have speculative grade ratings, declining profitability, and during recessions.  
Some unpublished papers also empirically study the rollover risk effect, and they support 
it. For example, Chen et al. (2012) show that a bigger drop in debt maturity leads to larger 
increases in credit spreads in the crisis. This maturity effect on credit spreads is more 
pronounced for firms with high leverage or high systematic risk. Valenzuela (2011) finds an 
interaction between liquidity and default premiums whereby the debt market illiquidity 
increases the firms’ corporate bond spreads through rollover risk. 
Our first hypothesis follows directly from theoretical predictions and empirical evidence 
that greater exposure to rollover risk increases a firm’s overall default probability, and it is, 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher exposure to rollover risk should have higher default risk. 
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We realized that extant empirical studies only use some particular proxies for default 
risk, and it make them use the restricted sample that cannot cover all firms. For example, they 
use credit rating from rating agency, corporate bond spreads, or credit default swap spreads, 
and their testing samples are limited to large or less-risky firms. We argue that it is important 
to study to firms that have not been contained so far, and this is especially for unrated firms, 
which is usually considered as bank dependent firms, because they are represent of almost 
two-third of firms in the U.S. context. Thus, this paper is to fill this up. 
4.2.2. The Impact of Financing Sources on Rollover Risk Effect   
This paper aims to fill this up in a way that studying how debt sources drive the effect of 
rollover risk on default risk.  
In this paper, we particularly consider two main debt sources, bank loans and public 
debts. Based on the degree of relying on either one of debt sources, we discriminate bank 
dependent (named BD henceforth) firms from public debt dependent (named PDD henceforth) 
firms. The reason that we focus on the two types of firms is because they are essentially 
different in many ways, which may disproportionally drive rollover risk effect on credit risk. 
In particular, as we will illustrate in the below, we expect that BD firms tend to experience 
higher rollover risk effect than PDD firms. 
Carey et al. (1993) show that BD firms are more likely find difficult to borrow long-term 
debt financing because bank debts have shorter average maturities than public debts. Lemmon 
and Zender (2007) show that unrated firms tend to have lower debt capacity because they 
have more volatile cash flows, lower collateral value of assets, and to be more informationally 
opaque to allow access to arms-length debt. Unrated firms also tend to have higher costs of 
financial distress. All the above attributes make unrated firms (also known as bank dependent 
firms) to be potentially more exposed to rollover risk.85  
                                                            
85 Unrated firms tend to borrow from banks, and make them prone to be bank dependent firms, whereas 
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Furthermore, Diamond (1991) argues that low credit quality firms that face greater 
liquidity risk may demand longer-term debt to reduce this risk, but find no lenders willing to 
supply it at reasonable cost.86 Mian and Santos (2011) show that only credit-worthy firms are 
able to choose to refinance at a lower rate when cost of capital rises, whereas credit-poor 
firms hardly access to new capital at a reasonable cost which incurs substantial rollover 
losses. In sum, the literature suggests that rollover risk is higher for firm that have lower 
credit quality firms, and thus for bank dependent firms because they are prone to have lower 
credit quality compared with public debt dependent firms.  
For a firm with high level of rollover risk, it is likely we can find rollover risk effect on 
default risk for that firm if this effect indeed exists. In contrast, if a firm’s rollover risk is slim, 
there is no way we can find rollover risk on default risk for that firm. So, we expect that BD 
firms experience larger effect of rollover risk on default risk. 
Furthermore, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that overall a firm’s debt maturity is 
negatively correlated with credit risk for unrated firms (i.e., BD firms), while is positively 
correlated for rated firm (i.e., PDD firms). It indicates that higher short-term debt (i.e., higher 
rollover risk) could only lead to a higher credit risk specifically for BD firms. Given that BD 
firms happen to be the firms that with more short-term debts, we expect that BD firm 
experiences a stronger rollover risk effect on default risk compared with public debt 
dependent firms. In turn, we hypothesize, 
 
Hypothesis 2: Rollover risk effect is stronger for bank dependent firms than for public debt 
dependent firm. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
firms that have credit rating are often viewed as ones who have access to public debt markets, and thus 
make them prone to be public debt dependent firms. Many existed literature also use rating information 
to discriminate bank dependent firms from public debt dependent firms (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam 
(2011)). 
86 In contrast, higher credit quality firms likely face lower liquidity risk, and can also borrow longer 
term if liquidity risk concerns do arise. 
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4.3. Variables and Data 
4.3.1. Key Variables 
This subsection illustrates the measures we use to proxy for default risk and rollover risk. 
In our empirical methodology (as shown in the next section), we control for many default risk 
factors. We also discuss this factor in this section.  
4.3.1.1 Measuring Default Risk 
The distinctive contribution of this study is to examine rollover risk effects on all levered 
firms (including rated and unrated firms). Thus, we have limit in using some specific proxies 
for default risk,87 and it is necessary to employ default risk measures that are flexible enough 
to quantify default risk for firms in the entire market. 
In this paper, we compute the expected default frequency (EDF) based on Merton model, 
as the main proxy of default risk, and use Distance-to-Default (DD) as an alternative proxy of 
default risk for robust.88 The EDF is widely used as an indicator of default risk for non-
financial corporations in the literature (see Bharath and Shumway (2008), Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010), and Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2012)). 
We compute the EDF and DD measure following well known Moody’s KMV approach 
as: 
( ) ( )2log 2V
V
V B T
DD
T
µ σ
σ
+ −
=                                         (1) 
where V is a firm’s total asset value, B is a firm’s face value of debt, σV is the volatility of 
a firm’s asset return, μ is an estimate of the expected long-run return of a firm’s asset return, 
and T is the maturity of a firm’s debt. The corresponding implied probability of default, called 
                                                            
87 For example, we cannot use credit ratings, corporate bond spreads, and credit default swap spreads 
because they are only applicable for rated firms, for firms that have outstanding issuance of corporate 
bonds, and for firms issuing credit default swap, respectively. 
88 The analysis on using distance-to-default is provided in Section 4.4.   
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the expected default frequency (EDF),  
( ) ( )
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                        (2) 
where N(.) is the cumulative distribution function for standard normal distribution. EDF 
measures are statistical predictions of default over some specified time horizon. Here, we 
calculate one-year default probability. Also we implement one-year window rolling and 
update it month-by-month, which gives us time-series data of EDF and DD at monthly 
frequency. The details of the estimation procedure are explained in Appendix A of Chapter 3.  
As a measure of default risk, EDF has a number of advantages. Unlike credit ratings, 
which measure the “relative probability of default” at a fixed number of discrete levels, EDF 
is a continuous, “absolute” measure of default risk that changes over the course of the credit 
cycle, reflecting the changes in the level of default risk (see the detail discussion in 
Hovakimian et al. (2012)).89 Therefore, when the aim is to capture changes in default risk, 
EDF become as a more suitable measure of default risk at hand, than ratings used in Gopalan 
et al. (2013).  
Furthermore, computing EDF only requires stock price and accounting information, 
where both are commonly available, and thus it allows us to measure default risks for many 
firms, rather than a certain group of firms. Thus using EDF leads us to avoid the same sample 
selection issues. 
4.3.1.2. Rollover Risk Variable 
In this paper, we follow Gopalan et al. (2013), to exploit ex-ante heterogeneity in firms’ 
long-term debt maturity, and look at the proportion of long-term debt that matures right next 
year to gauge the impact of the rollover risk. This approach is similar to the one employed in 
                                                            
89 Hovakimian et al. (2012) mention that ratings reflect “relative” rankings of credit risk at each point 
in time without reference to an explicit time horizon, which means that although credit ratings provide 
an ordinal ranking of default risk across firms, depending on the business cycle, the mapping between 
ratings and short-run default probabilities may change. 
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Almeida et al. (2012), based on the idea that long-term debt payable during the year depends 
on the past long-term debt maturity decisions made by the firm, and hence, is less likely to be 
correlated with the firm's current risk characteristics or credit quality. The rollover risk 
variable is,  
2,1,1, 111 −−− −−− −≡∆ tititi LTLTLT ,                                    (3)  
where LT-1,i,t-1 is defined as the amount of the firm i’s long-term debt outstanding at the end 
of year t-1 that is due for repayment in year t (i.e., COMPUSTAT item dd1 in year t-1) scaled 
by the current book value of total assets. The ∆LT-1,i,t-1 is the year-on-year change in LT-1,i,t-1. 
A positive value of ∆LT-1,i,t-1 implies that firm i’s exposure to rollover risk has increased in 
year t.  
4.3.1.3. Control Variables 
We aim to investigate whether rollover risk serves as an additional default risk factor. In 
doing so, we control for many relevant firm characteristics that may affect the change in a 
firm’s default risk. They are: (1) Size using Log(Total assets), (2) Leverage using Total 
debt/Total assets, (3) Interest coverage, (4) Profitability using Operating income/Sales, (5) 
Tax, (6) Market to book representing growth opportunities, (7) R&D expense, (8) 
Idiosyncratic volatility (denoted as Idiovol) representing operating risk, (9) Tangibility, and 
(10) Cash. Detailed definitions of all these variables are provided in the Appendix.  
The economic rationale behind these variables is presented as follows. (1) Size is 
relevant because larger firms are more diversified, which reduces operating risks, and so they 
face lower default risk than smaller firms. (2) Leverage is included because the higher the 
leverage, the higher the chance a firm filings for bankruptcy. (3) Interest coverage is the ratio 
used to assess how easily a firm can pay interest on outstanding debt. The lower the ratio, the 
more the firm is burdened by debt expense, and thus the higher chance the firm cannot 
survive. (4) Profitability is considered because a profitable firm should be less likely to 
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default. (5) Tax is negatively associated with default probability as suggested in Hovakimian 
et el. (2012) that firms with higher tax rates tend to choose capital structures with lower 
exposure to bankruptcy risk. (6) Market to book reflects grow opportunity could have a 
negative effect on default probability if it represents additional value (over and above book 
value) that debt holders can in part access in the event of default. (7) R&D expenses, which 
proxy for the firm’s brand equity and intellectual capital, respectively, are intangible, and so 
we also expect them to have a positive effect on default probability. (8) Idiovol (i.e., 
idiosyncratic volatility) implies the probability of a firm’s asset value being below the default 
boundary, so the higher volatility the higher the uncertainty and therefore the higher the 
default probability. (9) Tangibility is expected to have negative effect on default probability 
because tangible assets lose less of their value in default than do intangible assets. (10) Cash 
reflects a firm’s ability to pay its financial debt obligations, so we expect this variable to have 
negative effect on default probability. 
4.3.2. Databases and Descriptive Statistics 
We investigate industrial firms in the U.S. market over the period between 1986 and 
2011.90 The financial statement data are from COMPUSTAT, and the stock return data are 
from the Center for Research Security Prices (CRSP). We lag all accounting information by 6 
months because of reporting delay and substitute missing accounting data with the most 
recent observation prior to it. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities 
(SIC codes 4900-4999), and quasi-public firms (SIC codes greater than 8999), whose capital 
structure decisions can be subject to regulation. In addition, we only select firms with total 
debt that represents at least 5% of their assets by following Chen et al. (2012). The reason is 
to avoid contrasting firms that can issue long-term debt versus ones that cannot.  
To minimize the effect of these outliers on the results, all variables are winsorized at 1st 
                                                            
90 We choose 1986 as the initial year is because COMPUSTAT starts to cover credit ratings in 1986. 
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and 99th percentiles (e.g., values exceeding the 99th percentile are set equal to the 99th 
percentile). The final sample size is 45,565 firm-year observations, representing 7,272 firms. 
To investigate whether bank dependent firms experience more rollover risk effect 
compared with public debt dependent firms, we first need to identify those borrowers that are 
likely dependent on their lenders. We use the S&P long-term issuer level rating, extracted 
from Compustat,91 to identify a firm as either being bank dependent (i.e., unrated firms) or 
public debt dependent (i.e. rated firms).  
Our sample contains bank dependent firms (in our case, unrated firms) with 27,122 firm-
year observations (approximately 60% of the full sample), and public debt dependent firms 
(in our case, rated firms) with 18,443 firm-year observations (approximately 40% of the full 
sample).  
In Table 12, we present the summary statistics of our main interested variable, LT-1t-1 
(the ratio of long-term debt maturing in one year), our proxies of default risk: the expected 
default frequency and distance-to-default, and many relevant firm characteristics that are 
conventionally viewed as important default factors as we illustrate in the previous section. 
The mean value of EDF are about 0.1, and its median value is 0.001, indicating that the 
distribution of EDF is highly right-skewed. It also implies almost a half of firms are less 
likely to default since the median value is very low. The mean (median) for LT-1t-1 is 0.028 
(0.011); an interquartile range of 0.026 implies that there is also wide variation in this short 
debt maturity measure across firms. In consistent with Gopalan et al. (2013), we focus on 
∆LT-1t-1 in order to take advantage of the sharp variations in LT-1t-1 over time and across 
firms. 
In Table 12, we also present the firm characteristics that are important for our subsequent 
analysis. We compare the characteristics of firms that have access to the public debt market 
                                                            
91 The Compustat data item for credit rating is SPLTICRM, which is defined as the S&P’s current 
opinion of an issuer’s overall creditworthiness, apart from its ability to repay individual obligations, 
and it focuses on the obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet its long-term financial commitments. 
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with the ones that do not have it, by statistically testing the differences of those firm 
characteristics across BD firms and PDD firms.  
Regarding to our main interested variable, LT-1t-1, the average level of this variable is 
0.035 for BD firms and is only a half of its level with 0.018 for PDD firms. The median value 
shows a similar pattern whereby it is of 0.018 for BD firms and 0.007 for PDD firms. It 
indicates that BD firms have more short-term debt, consistent with the finding in Barclay and 
Smith (1995). 
We also find that BD firms tend to be smaller, less profitable, and have lower asset 
tangibility and lower tax, lower book debt ratios, lower interest coverage, whereas they have 
higher default risk, higher long-term debts that mature within one year, higher cash holdings, 
higher market-to-book ratios, higher idiosyncratic volatility, and R&D expenditure. These 
differences are all statistically significant at 1% level, and generally consistent with 
expectations (see Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Hovakimian et al., 2012).92 The average 
one-year default probability is about 11% for BD firms and 7% for PDD firms.93  
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
4.3.3. Correlation Matrix 
Table 13 contains matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients among the used variables in 
this paper. These correlations reveal some simple relations among the variables before moving 
to the regression results. We find that the correlation between LT-1t-1 and EDF (DD) is 0.19 
                                                            
92  Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that BD firms have lower leverage, lower profitability, 
whereas they have default risk, market to book, equity volatility. Hovakimian et al. (2012) find a similar result 
as theirs, and additionally they show that BD firms have lower tangibility and size, whereas they have 
higher R&D expense. The only difference between our results and theirs is on tax, where they find that 
tax is lower for BD firms. 
93 Hovakimian et al. (2012) find that the average one-year default probability is about 5% for unrated 
firms and 1.6% for rated firms. These default probabilities are lower than ours. We consider several 
reasons. First, our EDF measure is from Merton model, which is the risk neutral default probability, 
and, this is usually higher than real world default probability. Second, we did not eliminate firms with 
less than US 1$ million asset or sale. Small firms usually have higher EDF. Third, their sample is 
between 1985 and 2008, while our sample covers the period of 1986-2011. The last three years in our 
sample that their sample did not include were rather unstable, so it leads to a larger default probability. 
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(-0.15) at significance level of 1%. This is consistent with our prediction that the higher the 
rollover risk the higher the default risk. The correlation between EDF and DD is -0.61. This 
negative correlation is consistent with notions of both variables to default risk; that is, the 
higher the EDF the higher the default risk, whereas the lower the DD the higher the default 
risk. It is worthy to note that the two proxies of default risk are not perfectly correlated, and 
the correlation is not very high, implying that both proxies are not complemented each other, 
it is important using both of them in order to provide a more robust analysis. 
The correlations between EDF and other default risk factors are also consistent with 
conventional expectations. That is, Cash, Market to book, Tangibility, Size, Tax, Profitability, 
and Interest coverage are negatively related to default; in contrast, Idiovol and Leverage are 
positively related to default. The correlations are totally opposite in the case of DD (expect for 
R&D), which is again consistent with expectations.  
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
4.4. Empirical Results 
The results are presented in five subsections: the first subsections focus on baseline 
results of testing rollover risk effect on default risk; the second contains the results on testing 
our hypothesis that whether being bank dependent drives rollover risk effect; the third shows 
the results on rollover risk effect is conditional on credit quality, size, recession; the fourth 
presents the results on using distance-to-default as measure of default risk, and the fifth 
contains the results of various robustness checks. 
4.4.1. Baseline Results 
We follow Gopalan et al. (2013) by using first difference regression, which can eliminate 
the firm-specific fixed effects. 
FEYear ,1,1 +∆×+∆×+=∆ −− titii,t XLTskDefault Ri γβα                      (4) 
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The dependent variable, i,tskDefault Ri∆ , represents the change in firm i’s default risk in year 
t against year t-1. In this study, the default risk is proxied by the expected default frequency as 
we have introduced in the previous section. We control the regression for changes (during 
year t) in many relevant firm characteristics ( )1,,, −−≡∆ tititi XXX  that may affect the change 
in the firm’s default risk. They are: (1) Size using Log(Total assets), (2) Leverage using Total 
debt/Total assets, (3) Interest coverage, (4) Profitability using Operating income/Sales, (5) 
Tax, (6) Market to book representing growth opportunities, (7) R&D, (8) Idiosyncratic 
volatility (denoted as Idiovol) representing operating risk, (9) Tangibility, and (10) Cash. 
Detailed definitions of all these variables and economic rationales are provided in Section 3. 
We estimate this regression (Eq. (4)) on a panel that has one observation for each firm-
year combination, spans the time period 1986-2011. In all the specifications, we also include 
year fixed effects to control for any macroeconomic variables that may affect changes in firm 
default risk. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the 
industry level, where we define industry at the level of Fama-French 48 industry category. 
The baseline results of the estimated default risk equation are reported in Table 14. The 
variable of particular interest to our study is ∆LT-1,i,t-1, the change in long-term debt that 
matures in a year. Column 1 reports the estimators without including control variables. In the 
case of using EDF as dependent variable, the results show that the estimated coefficient of 
∆LT-1,i,t-1 is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis 1. The estimated coefficient along with ∆LTi,t-1 is 0.067, which implies 
that a one-standard-deviation increase in the ∆LTi,t-1 will lead to a 0.0062 increase in EDF.94 
Given a mean EDF of 0.105, the result indicates a 5.9% increase in default rates. Thus, the 
                                                            
94  Using the full sample, the mean and the standard deviation of ∆LTi,t-1 are 0.002 and 0.09 
respectively. We rely on this information to quantify the economic impact of rollover risk effect. We 
sum the mean value of ∆LTi,t-1 and the standard deviation of ∆LTi,t-1 to represent a one-standard 
deviation increase in ∆LTi,t-1. Then, the economic impact is computed as follows. We multiply the 
above summation and the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1, and then divide it by the unconditional 
mean value of EDF or DD. 
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effect of rollover risk on default risk is not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant.  
After controlling for other default risk factors (see Column 2), we find that the estimated 
coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 remains its statistical significance at 1% level. As for influence of 
control variables on EDF, the results are basically consistent with conventional expectations. 
In that, we find Cash, Market to book, Tax, Profitability, and Interest coverage are 
significantly negatively related to EDF, whereas Idiosyncratic risk and leverage are 
significantly positively related to EDF. However, some variables do not seem to be strong 
default risk factors in our case; they are Tangibility, Size, and R&D. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
4.4.2. Rollover Risk Effect Dependent on Financing Sources 
We hypothesize that bank dependent firms likely experience larger effect of rollover risk 
on default risk (see Hypothesis 2). This paper aims to provide empirical evidence in 
supportive of this hypothesis. 
In doing so, we create zero-one dummy variable, where it equals to one if the firm is 
identified as a BD firm, otherwise 0. We call it BD_dummy. Furthermore, we create two 
separate interaction terms, where one of them is between a measure of rollover risk factor (i.e., 
∆LTi,t-1) and dummy variable of being BD firms, and the other one is between a measure of 
rollover risk factor (i.e., ∆LTi,t-1) and dummy variable of not being BD firms, which is (1- 
BD_dummy) because non-BD firms are identified as PDD in this study. The two interactions 
make the effect of rollover risk on default risk conditional on the dependence of firm’s 
financing source, and thus allow a test of the hypothesis that bank dependence strengthens the 
effect of rollover risk on default risk. The testing methodology used for this issue is based on 
our Equation (4) by replacing of ∆LT-1,i,t-1 with the two interaction terms, displayed as 
follows, 
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If being bank dependence strengthens the effect of rollover risk on default risk, then the 
coefficient of the variable of ∆LTi,t-1 x BD_dummy, “β1” should have a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the regression. On the other hand, if PDD firm 
experience lower effect of rollover risk on default risk, the interaction variable of ∆LTi,t-1 x 
(1-BD_dummy), “β2
”
 would be non-significant, or significant but less important than β1. 
We notice that the distributions of ∆LT-1,i,t-1 are very different between BD and PDD 
firms; in that, the mean of ∆LT-1,i,t-1 is 0.0026 for BD and 0.0013 for PDD, and the standard 
deviation is 0.112 for BD and 0.042 for PDD. Thus, rather than comparing the estimated 
coefficients directly, we compute their economic impacts by using their respective means and 
standard deviations on BD and PDD firms. In the following, we assess whether being bank-
dependent drives the effect rollover risk effect by comparing economic impacts along with 
these two interaction variables.  
Column 3 and 4 of Table 14 show the results on running regression of Eq. (5). In 
Column 3, we find that the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1x BD_dummy is significant, while 
not significant for ∆LTi,t-1x (1-BD_dummy), though they both have positive sign. It indicates 
that firms experience a growth in their long-term debts maturing the coming year experience 
higher default rates, and this effect is stronger for BD firms, and seems weak for PDD firm. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis 2. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
∆LTi,t-1 will lead to a 0.0076 increase in EDF. Given a mean EDF of 0.124, the result 
indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in LT-1t-1 leads to a 6.1% increase in default 
rates. After controlling for other default risk factors, the rollover risk effect still holds; in that, 
for BD firms and is significant at 1% level. The rollover risk effect seems become a little bit 
stronger for PDD firms, where the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1x (1-BD_dummy) is now 
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significant at 10% level.  
Overall, our results suggest that the rollover risk effect is more pronounced for BD firms, 
which is again consistent with our hypothesis 2, even accounting for many relevant default 
risk factors. We consider that the above results merely provide low boundary of the effect of 
rollover risk on credit risk, because short-term debt (less one year maturity debts) also likely 
amplify this effect, and this is especially so in the case of BD firms because BD firms use 
more short-term debts compared with PDD firms.95  
4.4.3. Rollover Risk Effect Conditional on Credit Quality, Size, and Recession 
We consider rollover risk effect could be amplified through other factors as suggested in 
literature. In particular, we consider credit quality, size, and market economic situation 
(undergoing recession or not).96 We discuss the rationale of why choosing these factors in the 
following.  
First, we expect that the rollover risk effect on credit risk should be stronger for poor 
credit quality firms. The reason is that, poor-credit quality firms likely find it more difficult to 
lengthen maturity. Also, Diamond (1991) argues that low credit quality firms that face greater 
liquidity risk may demand longer-term debt to reduce this risk, but find no lenders willing to 
supply it at reasonable cost. Mian and Santos (2011) show that only credit-worthy firms are 
able to choose to refinance at a lower rate when cost of capital rises, whereas credit-poor 
firms less likely access to new capital at a reasonable cost which incurs substantial rollover 
losses.  
Second, as for size, on the one hand, large firms are more diversified and have longer-
term debt structure. Small firms have more cash reserves and lower debts. All these 
attributions can reduce the rollover risk effect. On the other hand, large firms rely more on 
                                                            
95 The reason that we do not use short-term debt is because of the potential endogenous problem that 
short-term debt is highly related to default risk as highlighted in the literature. 
96 Recession identifies the years classified by the NBER as recessionary. Those years are 1990, 1991, 
2001, 2002, 2008, and 2009. 
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debt financing, and small firms may face more problems in refinancing especially when debt 
market is in crunch. Taken together, we expect that rollover risk effect may be dependent on 
firm size. However there is no clear prediction on how size influences rollover risk effect, and 
we consider it as an empirical question. 
Third, He and Xiong’s (2012) theoretical model demonstrates that debt market friction is 
the key trigger to cause rollover risk effect. During recession, it is often to observe debt 
market friction. Also, Gopalan et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence showing that rollover 
risk effect exists both during recession and no recession periods, and especially so in the case 
of recession. Thus we expect that rollover risk effect exists all the time and may be stronger 
during weak economic times. 
To test whether rollover risk is driven by credit quality, we split the sample into two 
halves based on the sample median value of EDF, of which the high-EDF group is considered 
as bad credit quality group, whereas the low-EDF group is viewed as good credit quality 
group. We implement the baseline regression (Eq. (4)) on the two groups separately. The 
results are reported in Panel A of Table 15. We find that firms in the group that has poorer 
credit quality experience higher rollover risk effect because we find the estimated coefficient 
of ∆LTi,t-1 is only significantly positive at 1% level for bad-credit-quality group, but not for 
good-credit-quality group (see Column 1 and 2). This may imply that there are some 
unobservable variables that discriminate BD and PDD besides credit quality, because we find 
that even among credit-worse firms BD firms exposures higher rollover risk effect. 
To test whether size drives the rollover risk effect, similarly, we split the whole sample 
into two halves based on the sample median value of size: large-size group versus small-size 
group. Our results seem to indicate firms suffer rollover risk effect in a very significant way, 
irrespective of the scale of firms, because we find that the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 in 
two model specifications under item “Size” are positive and significant at 1% level (see 
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Column 3 and 4 of Panel A).  
As for testing the influence of market economic situation, we implement baseline 
regression for the subsample that covers recession years and the subsample that does not. We 
find that rollover risk effect exist, irrespective of undergoing recession, because the estimated 
coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 in all model specifications under item “Recession” are positive and 
significant at 1% level. Because we find that rollover risk effect exists, both during recession, 
and non recession, this finding suggests that the root of rollover risk is firm fundamental 
factors rather than credit market conditions. 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
We further examine whether the results we unveiled in the above is driven by being bank 
dependent firm or not. In doing so, we re-examine Panel A of Table 15 with alternative 
regression specification (Eq. (5)). The results are reported in Panel B of Table 15. We find 
financing sources indeed have impacts on the rollover risk effect in many cases. 
First, within the group that has bad credit quality (Column 2 of Panel B), the estimated 
coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is highly significant (at 1% level) for BD firms, but shows weak 
significance (10% level) for PDD firms. Second, within the group that has small size, the 
estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is only significant for BD firms, but not for PDD firms. 
Third, either during recession or not, the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is only significant at 
5% level (or better) only for BD firms, but not for PDD firms.  
Overall, our results suggest that rollover risk effect is dependent on being bank 
dependent firms or not. In particular, such effect is amplified solely for BD firms with poor 
credit quality, have small size, and operate during recession.  
4.4.4. Alternative Default Risk Measure: Distance-to-Default 
By construction, EDF is a non-linear function of DD (see the detail in Section 2.1.), and 
thus they are not perfectly correlated. For robustness, we use an alternative popular measure 
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of DD to see whether our hypotheses still hold. The DD is widely applied in literature as a 
measure of default risk (see e.g., Goyal and Wang (2013)). The DD is the number of standard 
deviations that a firm’s asset value is away from its default threshold at the forecasting 
horizon. Therefore it is inversely related to default risk and EDF measure as well. 
We replace EDF with DD and re-examine all regression specifications in Table 14 and 
Table 15. The results are reported in Table 16 and 17. In contrast to the case of using EDF as 
proxy of default risk, a negative estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 indicates that there is 
rollover risk effect on default risk. Generally speaking, the results are consistent with the 
results of using EDF as proxy of default risk, and comply with our Hypothesis 1. In particular, 
we find that the estimated coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is significantly negative at 5% level (or 
better), irrespective of including control variables or not (see Column 1 and 2 of Table 16). 
Also, control variables influence DD with their expected directions. We find that Cash, 
Market to book, Size, Tax, Profitability, and Interest coverage are significantly positively 
related to DD, and Idiosyncratic risk, R&D, and Leverage are significantly negatively related 
to DD. However, Tangibility does not seem to be strong default risk factor in our case. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
Column 3 and 4 o Table 16 show the results on running regression of Eq. (5) with DD as 
the dependent variable. In the regression without including control variables (Column 3), the 
coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is negatively significant at 5% level for BD firms, but it is weak 
significance for PDD firms, of which the coefficient of ∆LTi,t-1 is only significant at 10% 
level. After controlling for other default risk factors, the result still holds (see Column 4), 
where the ∆LTi,t-1 is significant at 1% level for BD firms, while 5% for PDD firms. Overall, 
this result is consistent with the result of using EDF as proxy of default risk, and consequently 
consistent with the Hypothesis 2. 
We also re-examine whether the rollover risk effect is conditional on credit quality, size, 
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and market economic situation as we discussed in Section 4.3 by using DD as the proxy of 
default risk. The results are reported in Table 17. In almost all of cases, the results are 
consistent with the analysis as we provided in Section 4.3; that is rollover risk effect is 
dependent on being bank dependent firms or not. In particular, such effect is amplified solely 
for BD firms with poor credit quality, have small size, and operate during recession.97  
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
4.4.5. Robustness Tests 
We conduct a battery of robustness checks. First, we use credit rating provided by rating 
agency as a proxy for default risk. Second, we use an alternative methodology in testing the 
influence of credit quality, size, and recession. Third, we sort firms based on terciles and 
quartiles, instead of medians as we used in the main analysis. 
 4.4.5.1. Using Credit Rating 
Following Gopalan et al. (2013), we use credit rating provided in rating agency as the 
proxy of default risk. The letter ratings are transformed into numerical equivalents, using an 
ordinal scale that ranges from 1 for the highest-rated firms (AAA) to 22 for the lowest-rated 
firms (D: Default). Note that the EDF (or DD) measure of default probability is available for 
all sample observations, whereas only 11,110 of the sample observations are for firms with 
credit ratings. 
We re-do the baseline regression (Eq.(4)), and the results are reported in Table 18. We 
find our Hypothesis 1 still holds, and is also consistent with the result of Gopalan et al. 
(2013).  
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
 4.4.5.2. Dummy Variables on Credit Quality, Size, and Recession 
We use an alternative methodology in test the influence of credit quality, size, and 
                                                            
97  We find only one exception that upon poor credit quality group, the rollover risk effect is 
indifferently significant between BD firms and PDD firms (See Column 2, Panel B of Table 17). 
97 
 
recession. That is, rather than dividing the entire sample into two groups, we create zero-one 
dummy variables on credit quality, size, and recession, and their interaction terms with 
rollover risk variable, and put them into our baseline regression one time-by-one time. We run 
regression on the entire sample with the new regression, and we find the results are still 
consistent with the main results. The results are reported in Table 19. 
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
 4.4.5.3. Alternative Identification on Separating Firms  
Unlike the main analysis of which using sample median value to identify firms’ type, we 
sort firms into terciles based on their credit qualities and size. When using EDF (DD) as proxy 
for default, firms included in the first tercile as those with good (bad) credit quality and small 
size, and firms included in the third tercile as those with bad (good) credit quality and large 
size. We also change terciles into quartiles, and re-do all model specifications in Table 15 and 
16 again. The results are reported in 20 to 23, and they are consistent with the arguments as 
we provided in the above based on using sample median.  
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
[Insert Table 21 Here] 
[Insert Table 22 Here] 
[Insert Table 23 Here] 
4.5. Conclusion 
We empirically examine the effect of rollover risk on default risk, and whether firm 
financing source drives this effect in the U.S. context over the period between 1986 and 2011.  
Recent theoretical literature argues that rollover risk could serve as an additional source 
of credit risk, because it exacerbates default risk. We refer to as rollover risk effect. From 
empirical viewpoint, extant studies only unveil some parts of this rollover risk effect due to 
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limitation of the sample they used. Their samples are restricted to firms that have credit 
ratings, bond spreads, or credit default swap spreads. To our best understanding, we provide 
the most comprehensive empirical study of understanding this rollover risk effect.  
Furthermore, we provide new empirical evidence on studying to what extent that 
financing sources drive the effect of rollover risk on default risk. Our results strongly suggest 
that being bank dependent magnifies the rollover risk effect. Furthermore, our results suggest 
that poor credit quality, small size, and operating during recession are not necessary of 
triggering rollover risk effect, and this effect is solely significant for bank dependent firms 
under these conditions. 
Gopalan et al. (2013) point out that “bond market investors seem to recognize the effect 
of rollover risk because bonds issued by firms with a larger amount of long-term debt (scaled 
by assets) payable within a year trade at higher yield spreads.” In this study, we only consider 
the rollover risk effect on a firm’s overall default probability. A worthwhile avenue for further 
research is to investigate whether banks recognize the rollover risk effect by charging 
different bank loan spreads among firms with heterogeneous rollover risk.
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Appendixes  
Variable Definitions 
 Cash is the ratio of book value of cash and marketable securities (Compustat item che) to 
the book value of total assets (Compustat item at). 
 Idiovol (Idiosyncratic volatility) is the standard deviation of daily excess returns relative 
to the CRSP value-weighted index for each firm's equity during a year. 
 Interest coverage is the ratio of operating income after depreciation (Compustat items 
oiadp+ xint) to the total interest expenditure (Compustat item xint). 
 Leverage: Total debt/Total assets is the ratio of total debt (Compustat items dlc + dltt) to 
the total assets 
 Market to book is the ratio of market value of total assets to the book value of total assets. 
We calculate the market value of total assets as the sum of book value of total assets and 
the market value of equity less the book value of equity. 
 Profitability is the ratio of operating income after depreciation (Compustat item oiadp) to 
total sales (Compustat item sale). 
 R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditure (Compustat item xrd) to book 
value of total assets (Compustat item at). We replace missing values of xrd as zero. 
 Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Compustat item at). 
 Tangibility is the ratio of book value of property plant and equipment (Compustat item 
ppent) to the book value of total assets (Compustat item at). 
 Tax is the ratio of tax expenditure (Compustat item txt) to book value of total assets 
(Compustat item at). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Final Remarks 
The 2007–2012 crisis highlights that understanding systemic risk is important to find a 
way of stabilizing the whole financial system. We contribute to this issue by proposing a new 
measure of quantifying systemic risk of which we include two crucial factors: common factor 
exposure and tail risk dependence. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the alternative 
financing sources (banks, debt markets) on the default risks of non-financial firms listed in the 
U.S. stock market during the crisis of 2007−2010. The results suggest that bank dependent 
firms experienced high default risk, which is consistent with bank supply shock theory. 
Finally we examine whether rollover risk exacerbates default risk, and whether financing 
sources drive this effect. We suggest that financing sources indeed drive this effect, and in 
particular our results strongly suggest that being bank dependent magnifies this effect.  
As a closing remark, there are still many questions that need to be uncovered beyond of 
the findings in this thesis. In particular, to what extent that financial markets affects real 
economy sectors in terms of firm default risk still largely unanswered, and we merely shed 
light on some parts of this issue in this work.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for several risk measures for each sector of the financial industry, 
from December 1996 to December 2011, for a total of 181 monthly observations. SIZE (in millions) is 
the logarithm of aggregated total assets for the ten biggest firms in each sector. The LVG is the quasi-
market value of assets divided by the market value of equity, with weighted averages based on the 
values of market equity. The RET is annual returns. DD, NoD, and PIR (scaled by multiplying them by 
106) are systemic risk measures. The subindex “ben” identifies measures computed from the 
benchmark model (without correlated jump terms).  
Sector Statistics SIZE LVG RET DD NoD PIR DDben NoDben PIRben 
Depositories Min 14.380  4.890  -0.530  -0.240  0.000  0.000 1.120 0.000 0.000 
 Max 15.800  34.040  1.760  16.230  8.030  69.255 16.730 3.860 9.475 
 Mean 15.140  7.940  0.090  6.310  0.790  4.503 8.000 0.260 0.343 
 Median 15.070  6.910  0.070  5.900  0.010  0.020 7.430 0.000 0.000 
  Std 0.440  3.400  0.260  3.930  1.720  11.765 4.030 0.650 1.123 
Broker-Dealers Min 13.760  6.240  -0.540  -0.660  0.000  0.005 0.020 0.000 0.000 
 Max 15.350  40.050  1.380  8.440  6.110  208.445 16.700 5.250 29.956 
 Mean 14.540  12.260  0.210  2.590  2.260  22.221 6.010 0.960 2.614 
 Median 14.470  10.960  0.160  1.980  2.140  6.334 5.140 0.790 0.693 
  Std 0.390  4.800  0.390  2.110  1.820  39.363 3.800 1.060 4.785 
Insurance  Min 13.450  4.140  -0.540  0.910  0.000  0.000 0.390 0.000 0.000 
 Max 15.020  82.960  2.200  21.230  5.390  41.335 26.290 3.220 22.541 
 Mean 14.460  11.930  0.120  10.990  0.360  3.757 12.180 0.230 1.421 
 Median 14.600  7.620  0.120  10.870  0.000  0.000 11.880 0.000 0.000 
  Std 0.470  14.160  0.340  4.570  1.010  10.084 5.380 0.580 4.281 
Others Min 13.450  4.310  -0.670  -0.780  0.000  0.001 -1.970 0.000 0.000 
 Max 15.390  173.300  1.900  7.390  8.900  288.020 11.260 6.770 211.190 
 Mean 14.810  11.220  0.110  3.450  2.380  39.902 5.510 1.420 15.074 
 Median 14.890  7.690  0.110  3.750  1.450  3.699 6.040 1.000 0.919 
  Std 0.490  16.920  0.340  2.170  2.400  78.679 3.150 1.730 39.273 
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Table 2. Estimation results: correlated jumps. 
This table presents the average values of λ, mu_coj, and std_coj for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
periods in Column 1, 3, 5, respectively. The pre-crisis period runs from July 2005 to June 2007, the 
crisis period from July 2007 to June 2009, and the post-crisis period is from July 2009 to June 2011. 
Each period consists of 24 observations. Columns 2 and 4 report the results of the independent samples 
t-test, for which the null hypothesis is that the means of the two groups are equal. For each parameter, 
Column 2 (4) reports the difference in the average values for crisis and pre-crisis (post-crisis) periods, 
with the p-values in brackets. Panel A refers to depositories, Panel B to broker-dealers, Panel C to 
insurance companies, and Panel D to others sectors.   
  Pre-Crisis 
(1) 
Crisis versus Pre-Crisis 
(2) 
Crisis 
(3) 
Crisis versus Post-Crisis 
(4) 
Post-Crisis 
(5) 
Panel A: Depositories             
λ 0.0394 0.0964  
*** 
0.1358 0.0828  
*** 
0.0530 
  (<0.0001) 
 
 (0.0015)  
 
 
mu_coj 0.0049 -0.0135  
*** 
-0.0086 -0.0078  
* 
-0.0008 
  (0.0007)  
 
 (0.1039)  
 
 
std_coj 0.0178 0.0653  
*** 
0.0831 0.0128  
 
0.0702 
  (<0.0001) 
 
 (0.3478)  
 
 
Panel B: Broker-Dealers           
λ 0.0347 0.0258  
** 
0.0606 0.0074  
 
0.0532 
  (0.0244)  
 
 (0.5427)  
 
 
mu_coj 0.0030 -0.0162  
** 
-0.0132 -0.0101  
 
-0.0031 
  (0.0476)  
 
 (0.2235)  
 
 
std_coj 0.0318 0.0535  
*** 
0.0853 0.0256  
*** 
0.0597 
  (<0.0001) 
 
 (0.0054)  
 
 
Panel C: Insurance Companies 
        
λ 0.0713 0.0561  
*** 
0.1274 0.0626  
*** 
0.0648 
  (0.0030)  
 
 (0.0011)  
 
 
mu_coj 0.0013 -0.0041  
*** 
-0.0028 -0.0024  
** 
-0.0004 
  (<0.0001) 
 
 (0.0177)  
 
 
std_coj 0.0206 0.0634  
*** 
0.0840 -0.0002  
 
0.0842 
  (<0.0001) 
 
 (0.9896)  
 
 
Panel C: Others           
λ 0.1003 0.0963  
*** 
0.1967 0.1026  
*** 
0.0941 
  (0.0015)  
 
 (0.0031)  
 
 
mu_coj -0.0008 -0.0222  
** 
-0.0230 -0.0234  
** 
0.0004 
  (0.0187)  
 
 (0.0160)  
 
 
std_coj 0.0273 0.1029  
*** 
0.1302 0.0483  
*** 
0.0820 
   (<0.0001)    (0.0081)     
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Table 3. Estimation results: structural-form parameters. 
This table reports the average values of the estimated parameters from our structural-form model and 
the benchmark model (notated “ben”). The sample period spans December 1996 to December 2011, 
with 181 observations. The reported numbers in μ, μ_ben, ξ, and ξ_ben are 10,000 times the raw values. 
The “diff.” indicates stands for the testing results of independent samples t-tests, for which the null 
hypothesis is that the means of the two groups are equal for each pair of parameters. Columns 3, 6, and 
9 report the differences of the average values of the estimated parameters, along with p-values in 
brackets.  
Sector 
μ 
(1) 
μ_ben 
(2) 
diff. 
(3)   
δ 
(4) 
δ_ben 
(5) 
diff. 
(6)   
ξ 
(7) 
ξ_ben 
(8) 
diff. 
(9) 
  
Depositories 0.9996  0.9247  0.0749   0.4486  0.5193  -0.0707  *** 0.2714  0.4960  -0.2246  *** 
   (0.8814)     (<0.0001)    (<0.0001) 
 
Broker-Dealers 2.8938  3.1188  -0.2250   0.5945  0.6326  -0.0381  *** 0.5957  1.0429  -0.4472  *** 
   (0.6611)     (0.0012)     (<0.0001) 
 
Insurance Companies -0.9960  -0.1626  -0.8334   0.7224  0.7842  -0.0618  *** 0.5299  1.5100  -0.9800  *** 
   (0.2683)     (0.0003)     (<0.0001) 
 
Others 2.7060  3.2008  -0.4948   0.3534  0.4157  -0.0622  *** 0.1897  0.8126  -0.6229  *** 
      (0.2911)        (<0.0001)       (<0.0001) 
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Table 4. Granger causality tests, 1996–2011. 
This table reports the results of Granger causality tests for full-model (FM) systemic risk indicators 
compared with benchmark-based ones and with the public financial stress index STLFSI. The sample 
contains 181 monthly observations from December 1996 to December 2011. Panel A refers to levels 
and Panel B includes the results for first differences. The tests for each risk indicator apply across 
industries. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) indicate if the systemic risk indicators Granger cause the 
benchmark-based measures (STLFSI), and their reverse direction. The Granger causality tests’ lag-
lengths are selected according to the Schwarz criterion; heteroskedastic and correlated errors corrected. 
For each test, the p-values appear in brackets, and the lag-length of VAR is reported for statistically 
significant cases.  
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
FM leads Benchmark Benchmark leads FM FM leads STLFSI STLFSI leads FM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure Sector  P-value   P-value   P-value   P-value   
Panel A: levels  
DD Depositories (0.009) *** lag(1) (0.695)  (0.015) ** lag(1) (0.105)   
 Broker-Dealers (0.001) *** lag(1) (0.305)  (0.001) *** lag(1) (0.588)  
 Insurance Com. (0.005) *** lag(1) (0.502)  (0.046) ** lag(2) (0.015) ** lag(2) 
 Others (0.000) *** lag(1) (0.218)  (0.094) * lag(1) (0.016) ** lag(1) 
NoD Depositories (0.001) *** lag(6) (0.000)***  lag(6) (0.912)  (0.005) *** lag(1) 
 Broker-Dealers (0.009) *** lag(1) (0.547)  (0.026) ** lag(2) (0.986)  
 Insurance Com. (0.000) *** lag(5) (0.188)   (0.014) ** lag(2) (0.039) ** lag(2) 
 Others (0.000) *** lag(1) (0.111)  (0.146)  (0.943)  
PIR Depositories (0.047) ** lag(2) (0.802)   (0.249)  (0.001) *** lag(2) 
 Broker-Dealers (0.000) *** lag(1) (0.216)  (0.366)  (0.325)  
 Insurance Com. (0.000) *** lag(2) (0.063) * lag(2) (0.017) ** lag(2) (0.104)  
 Others (0.000) *** lag(1) (0.249)  (0.718)  (0.167)  
Panel B: first differences 
DD Depositories (0.014) ** lag(1) (0.342)  (0.450)  (0.017) ** lag(1) 
 Broker-Dealers (0.013) ** lag(2) (0.119)  (0.006) *** lag(1) (0.909)  
 Insurance Com. (0.529)   (0.590)  (0.024) ** lag(1) (0.211)  
 Others (0.002) *** lag(2) (0.199)  (0.798)  (0.177)  
NoD Depositories (0.045) ** lag(2) (0.000)***  lag(2) (0.501)  (0.443)   
 Broker-Dealers (0.034) ** lag(1) (0.696)  (0.009) *** lag(1) (0.943)  
 Insurance Com. (0.000) *** lag(4) (0.088) * lag(4) (0.017) ** lag(4) (0.117)  
 Others (0.050) ** lag(1) (0.852)  (0.880)  (0.922)  
PIR Depositories (0.025) ** lag(1) (0.776)   (0.378)  (0.025) ** lag(1) 
 Broker-Dealers (0.000) *** lag(2) (0.289)  (0.239)  (0.344)  
 Insurance Com. (0.109)   (0.115)   (0.009) *** lag(1) (0.511)  
 Others (0.021) ** lag(3) (0.405)  (0.736)  (0.441)  
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Table 5. Predictive power. 
This table presents the results in comparing predictive ability for STLFSI, we first run a regression, in 
which the explanatory variables are the lagged terms of STLFSI and of the benchmark, as shown in 
Equation (25). Next we include the lagged terms of the full model to check for its incremental 
predictive ability, as shown in Equation (26). With an F-test (Equation (27)), we examine if the 
difference in R2 values across the two regressions differs significantly from 0. Bold font reveals cases 
where R2 is higher in Equation (26) than in Equation (25). 
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    R2 Eq. (25) R2 Eq. (26) F-statistics  P-value 
Panel A: levels       
DD Depositories 0.917 0.921 7.761 *** 0.006 
 Broker-Dealers 0.918 0.919 0.855  0.358 
 Insurance Companies 0.917 0.921 4.800 *** 0.009 
 Others 0.918 0.918 0.991  0.321 
NoD Depositories 0.922 0.923 1.963  0.163 
 Broker-Dealers 0.918 0.918 0.401  0.527 
 Insurance Companies 0.938 0.938 0.998  0.319 
 Others 0.917 0.920 6.755 ** 0.010 
PIR Depositories 0.917 0.917 0.000  1.000 
 Broker-Dealers 0.918 0.920 5.225 ** 0.024 
 Insurance Companies 0.919 0.923 9.125 *** 0.003 
 Others 0.917 0.918 2.227  0.137 
Panel B: first differences      
DD Depositories 0.060 0.063 0.530  0.467 
 Broker-Dealers 0.071 0.078 1.344  0.248 
 Insurance Companies 0.068 0.102 6.494 ** 0.012 
 Others 0.063 0.063 0.007  0.931 
NoD Depositories 0.083 0.110 5.281 ** 0.023 
 Broker-Dealers 0.070 0.092 4.176 ** 0.043 
 Insurance Companies 0.307 0.312 1.303  0.255 
 Others 0.062 0.062 0.010  0.922 
PIR Depositories 0.069 0.072 0.680  0.411 
 Broker-Dealers 0.060 0.113 10.453 *** 0.002 
 Insurance Companies 0.063 0.336 71.949 *** 0.000 
  Others 0.061 0.065 0.705  0.402 
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Table 6. DD Descriptive statistics and preliminary test. 
The table shows descriptive statistics and preliminary tests on distance-to-default measures before and during the crisis for subgroups of firms formed in the second quarter of 
2006. The sample consists of 113,409 firm-month observations from the third quarter of 2006 through the first quarter of 2010. The crisis period is divided into five time 
phases: (1) pre-crisis (2006Q3−2007Q2); (2) first year crisis (2007Q3−2008Q2); (3) pre-Lehman (2008Q3); (4) post-Lehman (2008Q4−2009Q1); (5) last year crisis 
(2009Q2−2010Q1). Moreover the sample of firms is separated into six subgroups for testing BSST, CSST, DST, and the substitution effect. Firms that have records in 
DealScan LPC database and/or have ratings are identified as credit-dependent firms (CDF), while those that have not are classified as non-credit-dependent firms (NCDF). 
Within the CDF group, firms are further divided into five subsets based on the intensity of bank relationships and whether the firm is rated or unrated. They are denoted as (1) 
SBPD when the subgroup contains rated firms with strong bank relationship; (2) SB when the subgroup contains unrated firms with strong bank relationship; (3) WBPD 
when the subgroup contains rated firms with weak bank relationship; (4) WB when the subgroup contains unrated firms with weak bank relationship; (5) PDD when the 
subgroup contains rated firms without bank relationship. P-values are reported by using Wilcoxon one-way sample t-test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
NCDF 
 
CDF 
 
SBPD 
 
SB 
 
WBPD 
 
WB 
 
PDD   
     {strong bank dependent firms} {weak bank dependent firms}   
Model  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
1. Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2) 7.7766  
 
8.2220  
 
9.1201  
 
8.3988  
 
7.8201  
 
8.3615  
 
5.6502   
2. First year (2007Q3-2008Q2) 6.6528  
 
6.8656  
 
7.4590  
 
6.4818  
 
6.3118  
 
7.2029  
 
5.3560   
3. Post-Lehman (2008Q4-2009Q1) 1.9855  
 
1.7805  
 
1.8172  
 
1.8640  
 
1.3239  
 
2.0097  
 
1.3474   
4. Last year (2009Q2-2010Q1) 3.9130  
 
3.9096  
 
4.0032  
 
3.8704  
 
3.6674  
 
4.1126  
 
3.3095   
               Diff 2-1 -1.1238  *** -1.3564  *** -1.6611  *** -1.9170  *** -1.5083  *** -1.1586  *** -0.2942   
P-value (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.3131)  
%Diff 2-1 -14.45  
 
-16.50  
 
-18.21  
 
-22.82  
 
-19.29  
 
-13.86  
 
-5.21  
               Diff 4-1 -3.8637  *** -4.3124  *** -5.1169  *** -4.5284  *** -4.1527  *** -4.2489  *** -2.3407  *** 
P-value (<.0001)  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  
% Diff 4-1 -49.68  
 
-52.45  
 
-56.10  
 
-53.91  
 
-53.10  
 
-50.81  
 
-41.42   
               
               Post-Lehman versus pre-Lehman 
2009Q1 1.8284  
 
1.5048  
 
1.5111  
 
1.6053  
 
1.1093  
 
1.7302  
 
1.0831   
2008Q4 2.0755  
 
2.0247  
 
2.1031  
 
2.1124  
 
1.5529  
 
2.2413  
 
1.5240   
2008Q3 (pre-Lehman) 4.2534  
 
4.6000  
 
4.9394  
 
4.3888  
 
4.2388  
 
4.7537  
 
3.7979   
Diff 2009Q1-2008Q3 -2.4250  *** -3.0952  *** -3.4283  *** -2.7835  *** -3.1295  *** -3.0235  *** -2.7148  *** 
P-value 2008Q3 = 2009Q1  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
%Diff 2009Q1-2008Q3 -57.01    -67.28    -69.40    -63.42    -73.82    -63.60    -71.48    
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Table 7. Analysis of default risk indicators. 
The table shows the cross-sectional variations of time-series changes in distance-to-default before and during the crisis for subgroups of firms formed in the second quarter of 
2006. The crisis period is divided into five time phases: (1) pre-crisis (2006Q3−2007Q2); (2) first year crisis (2007Q3−2008Q2); (3) pre-Lehman (2008Q3); (4) post-Lehman 
(2008Q4−2009Q1); (5) last year crisis (2009Q2−2010Q1). Moreover the sample of firms is separated into six subgroups for testing BSST, CSST, DST, and the substitution 
effect. Firms that have records in DealScan LPC database and/or have ratings are identified as credit-dependent firms (CDF), while those that have not are classified as non-
credit-dependent firms (NCDF). Within the CDF group, firms are further divided into five subsets based on the intensity of bank relationships and whether the firm is rated or 
unrated. They are denoted as (1) SBPD when the subgroup contains rated firms with strong bank relationship; (2) SB when the subgroup contains unrated firms with strong 
bank relationship; (3) WBPD when the subgroup contains rated firms with weak bank relationship; (4) WB when the subgroup contains unrated firms with weak bank 
relationship; (5) PDD when the subgroup contains rated firms without bank relationship. The “Time-series changes” in distance-to-default is computed by subtracting its pre-
crisis value from its value at all subsequent crisis periods. The “DID” is the traditional differences-in-differences estimator. In this case, DID is the cross-sectional difference 
of time-series changes, which is computed by subtracting the average value of the time-series change of NCDF from the corresponding value of CDF (or any subgroup of 
CDF). P-values are reported below DID, by using Wilcoxon one-way sample t-test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  NCDF CDF  SBPD  SB  WBPD  WB  PDD 
      {strong bank dependent firms} {weak bank dependent firms}   
Model  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Panel A: First year (2007Q3-2008Q2) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2) 
Time-series changes -0.8236 -1.3939  -1.7758  -1.8987  -1.5723  -1.0237  -0.5351 
 DID (model (2)-(7) versus NCDF)  -0.5702 *** -0.9522 *** -1.0751 *** -0.7487 *** -0.2001 ** 0.2886 * 
P-value  (<0.0001) 
 
(<0.0001) 
 
(<0.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.0375)  (0.0545) 
 Number of observations 906 1885  543  277  254  622  189 
 Panel B: Pre-Lehman (2008Q3) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2) 
Time-series changes -3.2198 -3.8272  -4.4096  -4.0529  -4.0721  -3.4381  -2.5170  
DID (model (2)-(7) versus NCDF)  -0.6074 *** -1.1898 *** -0.8331 *** -0.8523 *** -0.2183  0.7028 ** 
P-value  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0023)  (<0.0001)  (0.1714)  (0.0279) 
 Number of observations 738 1681  518  249  223  535  156  
Panel C: Post-Lehman (2008Q4-2009Q1) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2) 
Time-series changes -5.5677 -6.7279  -7.5508  -6.5896  -7.0787  -6.3535  -4.9872 
 DID (model (2)-(7) versus NCDF)  -1.1602 *** -1.9831 *** -1.0220 *** -1.5111 *** -0.7858 *** 0.5804  
P-value  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.1168)  
Number of observations 724 1665  515  242  215  542  151 
 Panel D: Last year (2009Q2-2010Q1) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2) 
Time-series changes -3.9309 -4.7205  -5.4452  -4.6827  -4.8748  -4.4938  -2.9674 
 DID (model (2)-(7) versus NCDF)  -0.7896 *** -1.5143 *** -0.7517 ** -0.9439 *** -0.5629 ** 0.9635 *** 
P-value  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0147)  (<0.0001)  (0.0178)  (0.0030)  
Number of observations 670 1600  496  235  206  511  152  
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Table 8. Control Variables: Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics of the control variables used in the Propensity Score Matching 
method. The sample contains levered non-financial firms in the US market, found in the intersection of 
the CRSP and Compustat databases without missing observation on the required data. We consider a set 
of firm characteristics that have previously documented as determinants of default risks, including (1) 
Size, (2) Leverage, (3) Volatility, (4) past one year stock return (Past-ret), (5) the ratio of cash to asset 
(Cash/Asset), and (6) the ratio of net income to asset (NI/Cash). The Size, Leverage, Cash/Asset, and 
NI/Asset are computed based on the information available on 2006Q2. Volatility and Past-Ret are 
obtained by using the data of daily equity returns from 2005Q3 to 2006Q2. In Panel A and B, we report 
results for NCDF and CDF firms respectively. We also provide results across subgroups of CDF in 
Panel C. They are (1) SBPD when the subgroup contains rated firms with strong bank relationship; (2) 
SB when the subgroup contains unrated firms with strong bank relationship; (3) WBPD when the 
subgroup contains rated firms with weak bank relationships; (4) WB when the subgroup contains 
unrated firms with weak bank relationship; (5) PDD when the subgroup contains rated firms without 
bank.  
    Size Leverage Volatility Past-Ret Cash/Asset NI/Asset 
Panel A: Non-credit-dependent firms (NCDF) (N=1069) 
    
 
Mean 4.88 0.19 0.55 0.15 0.30 -0.03 
 
25th pctl 3.52 0.02 0.38 -0.22 0.09 -0.06 
 
Median 4.63 0.12 0.50 0.05 0.22 0.00 
 
75th pctl 5.95 0.29 0.67 0.37 0.47 0.02 
 
Std. dev. 1.77 0.21 0.24 0.54 0.25 0.08 
Panel B: Credit-dependent firms (CDF) (N= 2100) 
    
 
Mean 6.93 0.27 0.38 0.18 0.12 0.01 
 
25th pctl 5.71 0.13 0.26 -0.11 0.02 0.00 
 
Median 6.86 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.07 0.01 
 
75th pctl 8.11 0.37 0.45 0.36 0.16 0.02 
 
Std. dev. 1.89 0.20 0.17 0.46 0.14 0.04 
Panel C: Subsets of the CDF 
    
Group 1: SBPD Mean 8.17 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.08 0.01 
Strong-Bank-Dependent 25th pctl 7.21 0.19 0.22 -0.09 0.02 0.00 
and Public-Debt-Dependent firms Median 8.01 0.28 0.29 0.09 0.05 0.01 
(N=572) 75th pctl 9.09 0.41 0.37 0.29 0.11 0.03 
 
Std. dev. 1.38 0.19 0.13 0.38 0.09 0.03 
Group 2: SB Mean 6.27 0.23 0.38 0.18 0.08 0.01 
Strong-Bank-Dependent firms 25th pctl 5.71 0.10 0.28 -0.12 0.02 0.00 
(N=301) Median 6.33 0.20 0.36 0.11 0.04 0.01 
 
75th pctl 6.93 0.32 0.44 0.37 0.10 0.02 
 
Std. dev. 1.01 0.17 0.13 0.44 0.09 0.03 
Group 3: WBPD Mean 7.70 0.33 0.35 0.19 0.11 0.00 
Weak-Bank-Dependent  25th pctl 6.77 0.18 0.26 -0.10 0.03 0.00 
and Public-Debt-Dependent firms Median 7.51 0.30 0.33 0.11 0.07 0.01 
(N=281) 75th pctl 8.55 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.17 0.02 
 
Std. dev. 1.38 0.20 0.15 0.47 0.12 0.05 
Group 4: WB Mean 5.39 0.20 0.47 0.18 0.17 0.00 
Weak-Bank-Dependent firms 25th pctl 4.47 0.04 0.33 -0.17 0.03 -0.01 
(N=730) Median 5.40 0.16 0.42 0.08 0.10 0.01 
 
75th pctl 6.39 0.29 0.55 0.39 0.24 0.02 
 
Std. dev. 1.37 0.19 0.20 0.54 0.19 0.05 
Group 5: PDD Mean 8.77 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.12 0.02 
Public-Debt-Dependent firms 25th pctl 7.59 0.17 0.24 0.01 0.05 0.01 
(N=216) Median 8.77 0.27 0.32 0.19 0.09 0.02 
 
75th pctl 9.95 0.38 0.38 0.47 0.16 0.03 
  Std. dev. 1.60 0.17 0.11 0.42 0.11 0.03 
 
 
115 
 
Table 9. Matching estimation results. 
The following table presents the results of a probit regression with identification to CDF group (or any 
subgroup of CDF) as the dependent variable. In Panel A, we use the full sample of firms in the 
intersection of CRSP-Compustat databases with non-missing observations on the required data, having 
non-zero leverage. In Panel B, we use Propensity Score Matching methods to find two matched groups 
along with similar scope on seven dimensions (Size, Leverage, Volatility, Past-Ret, Cash/Asset, 
NI/Asset, and Fama-French 38 industry classification) which are selected due to their importance in 
determining firms’ default risks. P-values are reported in brackets. Pseudo-R2 and the number of 
observations are reported in the last two rows.  
  CDF  SBPD  SB  WBPD  WB  PDD  
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Panel A: the estimation results on the full sample 
Size 0.2643 *** 0.5443 *** 0.1593 *** 0.4721 *** 0.0633 ** 0.5471 *** 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.0115) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
Leverage 0.6214 *** 1.8620 *** 0.0044 
 
1.7765 *** 0.1042 
 
1.4028 *** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.9882)  (<.0001)  (0.5521)  (0.0002)  
Volatility -0.5748 *** -1.1383 *** -1.5979 *** -0.6584 * -0.5203 *** -0.2204  
 (0.0007)  (0.0039)  (<.0001)  (0.0899)  (0.0050)  (0.6772)  
Past-Ret 0.0322  0.1908  0.0757  0.0644  0.0150  0.2144  
 
(0.5590) 
 
(0.1330) 
 
(0.4847) 
 
(0.5939) 
 
(0.8104) 
 
(0.1563) 
 
Cash/Asset -1.9995 *** -3.8729 *** -4.4760 *** -1.8242 *** -1.5624 *** -1.5756 *** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  
NI/Asset 1.3062 ** 2.1482  3.8475 *** -0.1125  1.6066 *** 2.6526  
 (0.0138)  (0.1283)  (0.0055)  (0.9215)  (0.0048)  (0.1470)  
constant -0.1949  -2.5744 ** 0.7519  -2.5867 ** -4.1877  -3.7322 *** 
 
(0.7793) 
 
(0.0497) 
 
(0.4459) 
 
(0.0292) 
 
(0.9741) 
 
(0.0096) 
 
Fixed effects FF industry 
 
FF industry 
 
FF industry 
 
FF industry 
 
FF industry 
 
FF industry 
 
Peseudo-R2 0.2948  0.6136  0.3611  0.4609  0.1211  0.5599  
N 3169  1641  1370  1350  1799  1285  
Panel B: the estimation results on the matched sample 
Size -0.0122  0.0244  -0.0067  -0.0406  -0.0118  -0.0846  
 (0.6520)  (0.6845)  (0.8913)  (0.5308)  (0.6921)  (0.3093)  
Leverage 0.2442  -0.2328  -0.0756  -0.0349  -0.0485  -0.9865 * 
 
(0.2053) 
 
(0.6100) 
 
(0.8425) 
 
(0.9298) 
 
(0.8196) 
 
(0.0935) 
 
Volatility 0.0442 
 
0.8758 
 
-0.0662 
 
0.2716 
 
0.1324 
 
0.4517 
 
 (0.8405)  (0.1611)  (0.8920)  (0.6395)  (0.5740)  (0.6169)  
Past-Ret 0.0028  0.0030  0.0295  -0.1343  -0.0477  -0.0408  
 (0.9694)  (0.9889)  (0.8479)  (0.4703)  (0.5276)  (0.8600)  
Cash/Asset 0.1664  0.6863  -0.0201  0.2876  -0.1033  -0.4429  
 
(0.4247) 
 
(0.3670) 
 
(0.9776) 
 
(0.6299) 
 
(0.6334) 
 
(0.5735) 
 
NI/Asset 0.4836 
 
-0.5082 
 
0.9797 
 
-0.5935 
 
0.5350 
 
1.7148 
 
 (0.4893)  (0.8165)  (0.6378)  (0.7353)  (0.4789)  (0.5531)  
constant -4.8726  -0.3408  0.1027  0.2880  0.0281  6.0029  
 (0.9807)  (0.5645)  (0.8128)  (0.6512)  (0.9110)  (0.9852)  
Fixed effects FF industry  FF industry  FF industry  FF industry  FF industry  FF industry  
Peseudo-R2 0.0120 
 
0.0384 
 
0.0120 
 
0.0408 
 
0.0082 
 
0.0521 
 
N 1246 
 
326 
 
418 
 
346 
 
1094 
 
230 
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Table 10. Matched sample analysis on default risk indicators. 
The table shows matched sample analysis on default risk indicators. The matched sample is constructed by implementing Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. In PSM, 
treated firms could be CDF or any subgroup within CDF (SBPD, SB, WBPD, WB, or PDD). Control firms are a subset of NCDF firms selected as the closest match to the 
treated firms based on the following set of firm characteristics: size, leverage, volatility of equity returns, past one year return, the ratio of cash to asset, and the ratio of net 
income to asset, and industry indicator variable (Fama-French 38 industry classifications). The number of observations is the number of observations on treated firms plus the 
number of observations on control firms. P-values are obtained by using Wilcoxon one-way sample t-test.***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. On testing bank supply shock theory and credit supply shock theory. Column 5 and 6, and Column 7 and 8 are designed to test substitution effect. 
Treated firms  CDF   Strong bank dependent firms Weak bank dependent firms PDD   SBPD   SB   WBPD   WB   
      (SB+SBPD) (WB+WBPD)                     
Model  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
Panel A: First year (2007Q3-2008Q2) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2)   
Treated firms 
               
First year 7.1097 
 
6.3846 
 
7.0153 
 
5.4076 
 
6.5149 
 
6.8384 
 
6.1274 
 
7.1713 
 
Time-series changes  -0.8239 
 
-1.6859 
 
-0.933 
 
-0.4899 
 
-1.4685 
 
-1.8357 
 
-1.2701 
 
-0.8883 
 
Control firms (NCDF) 
               
First year 6.5715 
 
6.305 
 
6.5861 
 
5.0964 
 
5.3749 
 
6.4158 
 
5.1478 
 
6.7078 
 Time-series changes -0.8511 
 
-0.9433 
 
-0.898 
 
-0.6492 
 
-0.6694 
 
-0.8641 
 
-0.7474 
 
-0.9195 
 
DID 0.0272 
 
-0.7426 ** -0.035 
 
0.1593 
 
-0.7991 ** -0.9716 ** -0.5228 
 
0.0311 
 
P-value (0.4074) 
 
(0.0277) 
 
(0.2242) 
 
(0.4373) 
 
(0.0294) 
 
(0.0258) 
 
(0.1297) 
 
(0.3871) 
 
Number of observations 1059 
 
483 
 
993 
 
206 
 
290 
 
370 
 
305 
 
921 
 
Panel B: Post-Lehman (2008Q4-2009Q1)versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2)     
Treated firms 
               
Post-Lehman 1.9076 
 
2.0482 
 
1.8907 
 
1.1452 
 
1.2356 
 
2.0814 
 
1.2318 
 
1.9944 
 
Time-series changes -6.3184 
 
-6.8463 
 
-6.3109 
 
-4.9874 
 
-6.7897 
 
-6.6691 
 
-6.6235 
 
-6.2229 
 
Control firms (NCDF) 
               
Post-Lehman 1.751 
 
1.6498 
 
1.7145 
 
1.1134 
 
1.2423 
 
1.756 
 
1.1871 
 
1.9004 
 Time-series changes -5.6164 
 
-5.8581 
 
-5.715 
 
-4.5442 
 
-5.0316 
 
-5.7046 
 
-4.8889 
 
-5.6898 
 
DID -0.702 ** -0.9883 *** -0.5959 ** -0.4433 
 
-1.7581 *** -0.9645 ** -1.7346 *** -0.5331 * 
P-value (0.0124) 
 
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0305) 
 
(0.2048) 
 
(<0.0001) 
 
(0.0300) 
 
(<0.0001) 
 
(0.0811) 
 
Number of observations 889 
 
423 
 
837 
 
177 
 
259 
 
323 
 
257 
 
779 
 
Panel C: Last year (2009Q2-2010Q1) versus Pre-crisis (2006Q3-2007Q2)    
Treated firms 
               
Last year 3.9973 
 
4.0252 
 
4.0177 
 
3.3119 
 
3.1504 
 
4.0709 
 
3.5616 
 
4.1376 
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Time-series changes -4.5163 
 
-5.0021 
 
-4.4258 
 
-2.7188 
 
-4.9345 
 
-4.8175 
 
-4.3497 
 
-4.367 
 
Control firms (NCDF) 
               
Last year 3.777 
 
3.6508 
 
3.5311 
 
3.1199 
 
3.2477 
 
3.8174 
 
2.9193 
 
3.7952 
 Time-series changes -3.9151 
 
-4.2184 
 
-4.1473 
 
-2.7621 
 
-3.3262 
 
-4.0808 
 
-3.3578 
 
-4.0781 
 
DID -0.6011 ** -0.7836 ** -0.2785 * 0.0434 
 
-1.6082 *** -0.7367 * -0.9919 *** -0.2889 
 
P-value (0.0203) 
 
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0861) 
 
(0.5000) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0805) 
 
(0.0061) 
 
(0.1229) 
 
Number of observations 833   397   793   170   240   307   239   729   
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Table 11. Testing the substitution effect. 
The table provides the testing results on the substitution effect, which asserts that a firm’s availability of switching financing resources between banks and public-debt 
markets is able to reduce the effect of financial crisis on its default risks. For that, we specifically choose two groups of firms, where both have strong bank relation, but only 
one of them is able to finance from public debt market. That is, we use DID in the pair of (SBPD and SB) or (WBPD and WB). Panel A and B are results based full sample 
and matched sample respectively. The matched sample is constructed by implementing Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. In PSM, treated firms are SBPD (WBPD) 
and control firms are SB (WB), and are matched based on the following set of firm characteristics: size, leverage, volatility of equity returns, past one year return, the ratio of 
cash to asset, and the ratio of net income to asset, and industry indicator variable (Fama-French 38 industry classifications). The number of observations is the number of 
observations on treated firms plus the number of observations on control firms. P-values are obtained by using Wilcoxon one-way sample t-test.***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
    SBPD versus SB WBPD versus WB 
Time phase   (strong-bank-dependent firms) (weak-bank-dependent firms) 
Panel A: full sample  
    
First-year crisis DID 0.1228 
 
-0.5486 ** 
 
P-value (0.4447 
 
(0.0243 
 
 
Number of observations 820 
 
876 
 
Pre-Lehman DID -0.3567 ** -0.634 *** 
 
P-value (0.0275) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
 
Number of observations 767 
 
758 
 
Post-Lehman DID -0.9612 *** -0.7252 *** 
 
P-value (0.0001) 
 
(<0.0001) 
 
 
Number of observations 757 
 
757 
 
Last-year crisis DID -0.7626 *** -0.381 *** 
 
P-value (0.0008) 
 
(0.0070) 
 
  Number of observations 731   717   
Panel B: matched sample       
First-year crisis DID -0.2449 
 
-0.1728 
 
 
P-value (0.2517) 
 
(0.4946) 
 
 
Number of observations 234 
 
234 
 
Pre-Lehman DID -0.0846 
 
-0.0143 
 
 
P-value (0.2465) 
 
(0.3841) 
 
 
Number of observations 224 
 
196 
 
Post-Lehman DID 0.1004 
 
-0.4705 * 
 
P-value (0.4011) 
 
(0.0612) 
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Number of observations 224 
 
194 
 
Last-year crisis DID -0.2172 
 
-0.7059 * 
 
P-value (0.2621) 
 
(0.0564) 
 
  Number of observations 217   190   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Table 12. Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics are for a sample of 45,565 firm-year observations from 1986 to 2011. Firms are identified either bank dependent (BD) or public debt dependent 
(PDD). BD firms are unrated firms and PDD firms are rated firm, where the rating information is extracted from COMPUSTAT with item SPLTICRM. The subsample that 
only contains BD (PDD) firms has 27,122 (18,443) firm-year observations. Interquartile is the difference between first and third quartiles. EDF is expected default probability 
and DD is distance-to-default, and they are measured based on Merton’s model. LT-1t-1 is defined as the amount of the firm i’s long-term debt outstanding at the end of year 
t-1 that is due for repayment in year t (i.e., COMPUSTAT item dd1 in year t-1) scaled by the current book value of total assets. We control for many relevant default risk 
factors in our default risk regression. They are: Cash, Market to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and Interest coverage. Details on the 
definition of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. The statistically significant differences between the characteristics of rated and nonrated firms are marked *** 
for 1% level. 
  Full sample  
 
Bank dependent firms (BD firms) 
 
Public debt dependent firms (PDD firms) 
   Variable Mean Median S.D. Interquartile range   Mean Median   Mean Median 
 
Diff. of Mean of BD and PDD 
EDF 0.105 0.001 0.216 0.079 
 
0.124 0.003 
 
0.076 0 
 
0.048 *** 
DD 4.821 4.251 3.956 5.029 
 
4.119 3.54 
 
5.854 5.358 
 
-1.734 *** 
LT-1t-1 0.028 0.011 0.087 0.026 
 
0.035 0.014 
 
0.018 0.007 
 
0.017 *** 
Cash 0.088 0.045 0.115 0.1 
 
0.096 0.046 
 
0.077 0.044 
 
0.019 *** 
Market to book 1.301 0.961 1.178 0.827 
 
1.329 0.937 
 
1.261 0.996 
 
0.069 *** 
Idiovol 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.025 
 
0.044 0.035 
 
0.026 0.021 
 
0.018 *** 
Tangibility 0.354 0.305 0.234 0.348 
 
0.341 0.29 
 
0.374 0.331 
 
-0.033 *** 
Size 6.038 6.045 2.232 3.167 
 
4.823 4.817 
 
7.825 7.729 
 
-3.002 *** 
R&D 0.022 0 0.051 0.021 
 
0.027 0 
 
0.015 0 
 
0.012 *** 
Tax 0.019 0.015 0.028 0.034 
 
0.017 0.012 
 
0.021 0.019 
 
-0.004 *** 
Profitability -0.015 0.066 0.661 0.098 
 
-0.083 0.05 
 
0.086 0.09 
 
-0.169 *** 
Leverage 0.33 0.298 0.191 0.237 
 
0.312 0.278 
 
0.357 0.322 
 
-0.045 *** 
Interest coverage 5.36 3.861 11.602 5.723   4.598 3.479   6.481 4.347   -1.883 *** 
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Table 13. Correlation matrix 
The correlations are for a sample of 45,565 Compustat firm-year observations from 1986 to 2011. EDF is expected default probability and DD is distance-to-default, and they 
are measured based on Merton’s model. LT-1t-1 is defined as the amount of the firm i’s long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due for repayment in year t 
(i.e., COMPUSTAT item dd1 in year t-1) scaled by the current book value of total assets. Other default risk factors used our default risk regression are: Cash, Market to book, 
Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and Interest coverage. The detail construction of these variables is provided in Appendix B. * Indicates 
correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level or higher. 
  EDF DD LT-1t-1 Cash Market to book Idiovol Tangibility Size R&D Tax Profitability Leverage 
DD -0.61*                        
LT-1t-1 0.19*  -0.15*  
          Cash -0.04*  0.05*  -0.01 
         Market to book -0.21*  0.33*  0.04*  0.23*  
        Idiovol 0.68*  -0.62*  0.18*  0.02*  -0.05*  
       Tangibility -0.01*  0 0 -0.25*  -0.08*  -0.05*  
      Size -0.18*  0.36*  -0.13*  -0.07*  -0.12*  -0.54*  0.10*  
     R&D -0.01 -0.01*  0.02*  0.41*  0.31*  0.12*  -0.24*  -0.15*  
    Tax -0.27*  0.42*  -0.08*  0.01*  0.20*  -0.31*  -0.03*  0.17*  -0.06*  
   Profitability -0.13*  0.14*  -0.08*  -0.26*  -0.18*  -0.24*  0.05*  0.21*  -0.34*  0.17*  
  Leverage 0.33*  -0.39*  0.16*  -0.14*  -0.01 0.23*  0.13*  -0.03*  -0.08*  -0.27*  -0.08*  
 Interest coverage -0.23*  0.39*  -0.09*  -0.03*  0.09*  -0.32*  -0.03*  0.25*  -0.18*  0.49*  0.37*  -0.27*  
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Table 14. Rollover risk effect on default risk 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding rollover risk effect on default 
probability. The dependent variable is ∆EDF, the year-on-year change in expected default frequency 
measured based on Merton’s model. The main independent variable is ∆LT-1t-1, the year-on-year 
change in long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due repayment in year t. Column 3 
and 4 present results of rollover risk effect on default risk dependent on financial sources (being bank 
dependent firms or not). BD_dummy is zero-one dummy variable, where it equals to one if the firm is 
identified as a BD firm, otherwise 0. We control for many relevant default risk factors in our default 
risk regression. They are: Cash, Market to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, 
Leverage, and Interest coverage. Details on the definition of these variables are provided in the 
Appendix B. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
  Effect of ∆LT-1t-1 on ∆EDF 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 0.067 *** 0.081 *** 
    
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.019) 
     ∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy 
   
0.066 *** 0.078 *** 
     
(0.023) 
 
(0.019) 
 ∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) 
   
0.075 
 
0.119 * 
     
(0.061) 
 
(0.062) 
 ∆Cash 
  
-0.025 * 
  
-0.025 * 
   
(0.013) 
   
-0.013 
 ∆Market to book 
 
-0.018 *** 
  
-0.018 *** 
   
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) 
 
∆Idiovol 
  
4.543 *** 
  
4.543 *** 
   
(0.110) 
   
(0.111) 
 
∆Tangibility 
 
0.015 
   
0.014 
 
   
(0.016) 
   
(0.016) 
 
∆Size 
  
0.001 
   
0.001 
 
   
(0.004) 
   
(0.004) 
 ∆R&D 
  
0.015 
   
0.015 
 
   
(0.039) 
   
(0.039) 
 ∆Tax 
  
-0.08 * 
  
-0.081 * 
  
` (0.040) 
   
(0.040) 
 ∆Profitability 
 
-0.005 ** 
  
-0.005 ** 
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.002) 
 
∆Leverage 
  
0.148 *** 
  
0.148 *** 
   
(0.011) 
   
(0.011) 
 ∆Interest coverage 
 
-0.0002 ** 
  
0 *** 
   
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
 Const. 0.023 *** -0.013 * 0.023 *** -0.013 * 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Obs. 45371   45371   45371   45371   
R2 0.077 
 
0.295 
 
0.077 
 
0.295 
 Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 15. Rollover risk effect on default risk conditional on credit quality, size, and recession 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding whether rollover risk effect is 
conditional on credit quality, size, and recession. The dependent variable is ∆EDF, the year-on-year 
change in expected default frequency measured based on Merton’s model. The main independent 
variable is ∆LT-1t-1, the year-on-year change in long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that 
is due repayment in year t. The whole sample is split into two halves based on the median value of EDF, 
where low-EDF (high-EDF) group is the one with good (bad) credit quality, (see Column 1 and 2), and 
the median value of size, where large-size group and small-size group are presented in Column 3 and 4 
respectively, and during recession or not (Column 5 and 6). Panel B present results of rollover risk 
effect on default risk dependent on financial sources (being bank dependent firms or not). BD_dummy 
is zero-one dummy variable, where it equals to one if the firm is identified as a BD firm, otherwise 0. 
We control for many relevant default risk factors in our default risk regression. They are: Cash, Market 
to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and Interest coverage. Details on 
the definition of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Recession 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
 
Yes No 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)     (5)   (6)   
∆LT-1t-1 0.046  
 
0.084  *** 
 
0.190  *** 0.069  *** 
 
0.079 *** 0.080 *** 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.019) 
  
(0.046) 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.023) 
 
(0.024) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 22682   22689     22738   22633     10785   34586   
R2 0.088  
 
0.347  
  
0.223  
 
0.365  
  
0.309  
 
0.275  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Recession 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
 
Yes No 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)     (5)   (6)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy 0.045  
 
0.081  *** 
 
0.206  *** 0.070  *** 
 
0.074 *** 0.077 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.019) 
  
(0.072) 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.020) 
 
(0.025) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) 0.049  
 
0.129  * 
 
0.175  ** 0.052  
  
0.146 
 
0.11 * 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.075) 
  
(0.069) 
 
(0.100) 
  
(0.128) 
 
(0.064) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 22682   22689     22738   22633     10785   34586   
R2 0.088  
 
0.347  
  
0.223  
 
0.365  
  
0.309  
 
0.275  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
 
 
124 
 
Table 16. Rollover risk effect on default risk measured by Distance-to-Default 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding rollover risk effect on default 
probability. The dependent variable is ∆DD, the year-on-year change in distance-to-default measured 
based on Merton’s model. The main independent variable is ∆LT-1t-1, the year-on-year change in long-
term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due repayment in year t. Column 3 and 4 present 
results of rollover risk effect on default risk dependent on financial sources (being bank dependent 
firms or not). BD_dummy is zero-one dummy variable, where it equals to one if the firm is identified 
as a BD firm, otherwise 0. We control for many relevant default risk factors in our default risk 
regression. They are: Cash, Market to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, 
Leverage, and Interest coverage. Details on the definition of these variables are provided in the 
Appendix B. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
  Effect of ∆LT-1t-1 on ∆DD 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 -0.453 ** -0.629 *** 
    
 (0.180)  (0.165)      
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy    -0.393 ** -0.551 *** 
     (0.160)  (0.150)  
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy)    -1.085 * -1.466 ** 
     (0.548)  (0.580)  
∆Cash   1.269 ***   1.262 *** 
   (0.195)    (0.195)  
∆Market to book  0.605 ***   0.605 *** 
   (0.037)    (0.037)  
∆Idiovol   -26.404 ***   -26.418 *** 
   (0.650)    (0.658)  
∆Tangibility  0.063    0.067  
   (0.227)    (0.227)  
∆Size   0.112 *   0.111 * 
   (0.059)    (0.059)  
∆R&D   -1.279 ***   -1.281 *** 
   (0.353)    (0.353)  
∆Tax   0.959 **   0.972  
   (0.686)    (0.686)  
∆Profitability  0.054    0.054 * 
   (0.025)    (0.025)  
∆Leverage   -2.787 ***   -2.79 *** 
   (0.167)    (0.167)  
∆Interest coverage  0.008 ***   0.008 *** 
   (0.002)    (0.002)  
Const. -0.94 *** -0.644 *** -0.94 *** -0.643 *** 
 (0.154)  (0.150)  (0.154)  (0.150)  
Obs. 45371   45371   45371   45371   
R2 0.257  0.346  0.257  0.346  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table17. Rollover risk effect on distance-to-default conditional on credit quality, size, and 
recession 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding whether rollover risk effect is 
conditional on credit quality, size, and recession. The dependent variable is ∆DD, the year-on-year 
change in distance-to-default measured based on Merton’s model. The main independent variable is 
∆LT-1t-1, the year-on-year change in long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due 
repayment in year t. The whole sample is split into two halves based on the median value of DD, where 
high-DD (low-DD) group is the one with good (bad) credit quality, (see Column 1 and 2), and the 
median value of size, where large-size group and small-size group are presented in Column 3 and 4 
respectively, and during recession or not (Column 5 and 6). Panel B present results of rollover risk 
effect on default risk dependent on financial sources (being bank dependent firms or not). BD_dummy 
is zero-one dummy variable, where it equals to one if the firm is identified as a BD firm, otherwise 0. 
We control for many relevant default risk factors in our default risk regression. They are: Cash, Market 
to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and Interest coverage. Details on 
the definition of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Recession 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
 
Yes No 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)     (5)   (6)   
∆LT-1t-1 -0.713  
 
-0.617  *** 
 
-1.721  *** -0.521  *** 
 
-0.850  *** -0.574  *** 
 
(0.775) 
 
(0.128) 
  
(0.611) 
 
(1.143) 
  
(0.167) 
 
(0.208) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes   Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 22698 
 
22673     22738   22633     10785   34586   
R2 0.421  
 
0.321  
  
0.370  
 
0.380  
  
0.343  
 
0.315  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Recession 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
 
Yes No 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)     (5)   (6)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy -0.745  
 
-0.541  *** 
 
-1.597  *** -0.512  *** 
 
-0.824  *** -0.472  ** 
 
(1.030) 
 
(0.116) 
  
(0.710) 
 
(0.133) 
  
(0.163) 
 
(0.185) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) -0.635  
 
-1.633  *** 
 
-1.846  ** -0.720  
  
-1.197  
 
-1.563  ** 
 
(0.954) 
 
(0.479) 
  
(0.745) 
 
(0.733) 
  
(0.833) 
 
(0.596) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 22698   22673     22738   22633     10785   34586   
R2 0.421  
 
0.321  
  
0.370  
 
0.380  
  
0.343  
 
0.315  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
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Table 18. Using rating as the proxy of default risk 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding rollover risk effect on default 
probability. The dependent variable is ∆rating, the year-on-year change in credit rating extracted from 
COMPUSTAT with item of “SPLTICRM”. The letter ratings are transformed into numerical 
equivalents, using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 for the highest-rated firms (AAA) to 22 for the 
lowest-rated firms (D: Default). The main independent variable is ∆LT-1t-1, the year-on-year change in 
long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t-1 that is due repayment in year t. Control variable are: 
Cash, Market to book, Idiovol, Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and Interest 
coverage. Details on the definition of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
  (1)   (2)   
∆LT-1t-1 0.481  ** 0.567  *** 
 
0.195  
 
0.185  
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Control Variables No 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 17540   17540   
R2 0.0272 
 
0.200  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes   
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Table 19. Rollover risk effect conditional on credit quality, size, recession. 
 
Effect of ∆LT-1t-1 on ∆EDF 
 
Effect of ∆LT-1t-1 on ∆DD 
  (1)   (2)   (3)     (4)   (5)   (6)   
∆LT-1t-1 x credit_dummy 0.085  *** 
     
-0.640  *** 
    
 
(0.020) 
      
(0.138) 
     
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-credit_dummy) 0.044  
      
-0.499  
     
 
(0.039) 
      
(0.796) 
     
∆LT-1t-1 x Large 
  
0.189  *** 
     
-1.707  *** 
  
   
(0.049) 
      
(0.555) 
   
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-Large) 
  
0.070  *** 
     
-0.514  *** 
  
   
(0.019) 
      
(0.151) 
   
∆LT-1t-1 x Recession 
    
0.083 *** 
     
-0.738 *** 
     
(0.023) 
      
(0.144) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-Recession) 
    
0.081 *** 
     
-0.583 *** 
     
(0.023) 
      
(0.205) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 45371   45371   45371     45371   45371   45371   
R2 0.2954 
 
0.2957 
 
0.295 
  
0.346 
 
0.3464 
 
0.346 
 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 20. Rollover risk effect conditional on credit quality, size, recession with tercile 
identification and using EDF as proxy for default risk. 
Dependent variable is ∆EDF. Unlike the main analysis of which using sample median value to identify 
firms’ type, we sort firms into terciles based on their EDF and size. We consider firms included in the 
first tercile as those with good credit quality and small size, and firms included in the third tercile as 
those with bad credit quality and large size.  
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 0.111  * 0.080  *** 
 
0.329  *** 0.054  *** 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.084) 
 
(0.017) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 15120   15114     15164   15081   
R2 0.038  
 
0.372  
  
0.185  
 
0.377  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy 0.132  
 
0.079  *** 
 
0.640  *** 0.054  *** 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.125) 
 
(0.017) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) 0.076  
 
0.089  
  
0.235  ** 0.031  
 
 
(0.060) 
 
0.085  
  
(0.095) 
 
(0.114) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 15120   15114     15164   15081   
R2 0.039  
 
0.372  
  
0.186  
 
0.377  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
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Table 21. Rollover risk effect conditional on credit quality, size, recession with tercile 
identification and using DD as proxy for default risk. 
Dependent variable is ∆EDF. Unlike the main analysis of which using sample median value to identify 
firms’ type, we sort firms into terciles based on their DD and size. We consider firms included in the 
first tercile as those with bad credit quality and small size, and firms included in the third tercile as 
those with good credit quality and large size.  
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 -1.942  
 
-0.577  *** 
 
-3.056  ** -0.390  *** 
 
(1.278) 
 
(0.117) 
  
(1.210) 
 
(0.126) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes   Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 15131 
 
15107     15164   15081   
R2 0.447  
 
0.295  
  
0.363  
 
0.379  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy -1.990  
 
-0.526  *** 
 
-5.514  *** -0.389  *** 
 
(1.917) 
 
(0.114) 
  
(1.905) 
 
(0.118) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) -1.868  
 
-1.376  *** 
 
-2.312  ** -0.477  
 
 
(1.183) 
 
(0.439) 
  
(1.097) 
 
(1.114) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 15131   15107     15164   15081   
R2 0.447  
 
0.295  
  
0.363  
 
0.379  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 22. Rollover risk effect conditional on credit quality, size, recession with quartile 
identification and using EDF as proxy for default risk. 
Dependent variable is ∆EDF. Unlike the main analysis of which using sample median value to identify 
firms’ type, we sort firms into quartiles based on their EDF and size. We consider firms included in the 
first quartile as those with good credit quality and small size, and firms included in the third quartile as 
those with bad credit quality and large size.  
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 0.153  
 
0.074  *** 
 
0.345  *** 0.049  *** 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.019) 
  
(0.081) 
 
(0.017) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 11340   11338     11376   11301   
R2 0.037  
 
0.380  
  
0.158  
 
0.384  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy 0.203  
 
0.073  *** 
 
1.065  *** 0.049  *** 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.186) 
 
(0.017) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) 0.091  
 
0.088  
  
0.175  ** 0.090  
 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.096) 
  
(0.082) 
 
(0.100) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 11340   11338     11376   11301   
R2 0.039  
 
0.380  
  
0.161  
 
0.384  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
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Table 23. Rollover risk effect conditional on credit quality, size, recession with quartile 
identification and using DD as proxy for default risk. 
Dependent variable is ∆EDF. Unlike the main analysis of which using sample median value to identify 
firms’ type, we sort firms into terciles based on their DD and size. We consider firms included in the 
first tercile as those with bad credit quality and small size, and firms included in the third tercile as 
those with good credit quality and large size.  
  Panel A: Rollover risk conditional on credit quality, size and recession 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 -2.276  
 
-0.566  *** 
 
-4.406  *** -0.354  *** 
 
(1.589) 
 
(0.117) 
  
(1.383) 
 
(0.130) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes   Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 11349 
 
11325     11376   11301   
R2 0.463  
 
0.275  
  
0.355  
 
0.379  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
  Panel B: Across BD and PDD firms 
 
Credit quality 
 
Size 
 
Good Bad 
 
Large Small 
  (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
∆LT-1t-1 x BD_dummy -2.245  
 
-0.511  *** 
 
-10.346  *** -0.351  *** 
 
(2.493) 
 
(0.111) 
  
(3.029) 
 
(0.122) 
 
∆LT-1t-1 x (1-BD_dummy) -2.317  
 
-1.525  *** 
 
-3.002  ** -0.692  
 
 
(1.458) 
 
(0.528) 
  
(1.382) 
 
(1.686) 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Intercept Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 11349   11325     11376   11301   
R2 0.463  
 
0.275  
  
0.355  
 
0.379  
 
Year FE Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
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Figure 1. Annual equity returns by sector. 
This figure presents the annual equity returns, calculated by summing daily returns over the past 
year at the end of every month, spanned December 1996 to December 2011 for each sector. The 
sector-level annual return ending at month t for sector k is calculated by 
10
, , , , ,1k t j k t j k tj
r w r
=
= ×∑ , 
where 
, ,j k t
r is firm j’s annual return, and 
, ,j k t
w is the weight, based on the market equity of firm j at 
the end of month t. The blue, red, green, and yellow lines represent Depositories, Broker-Dealers, 
Insurance Companies, and Others respectively. The black line represents the annual return on CRSP 
value-weighted index. 
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Figure 2. Jump process parameters. 
The figure presents the three time series obtained from the estimation of correlated jumps in each 
sector. The results are plotted at the end of each rolling window sample, with 181 monthly observations 
for each time series. The blue, red, and green lines represent λ (intensity of correlated jumps), mu_coj 
(average value of the means of jump size for 10 big financial institutions), and std_coj (average value 
of standard deviations of jump size for 10 big financial institutions), respectively.  
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Panel A: DD 
 
 
Panel B: NoD 
Figure 3. Systemic risk measures. 
This figure presents three alternative systemic risk measures, DD (distance-to-default, Panel A), NoD (number of joint defaults, Panel B), and PIR (price of insurance ratio, 
Panel C) during 1996–2011 by sector. The red and blue lines represent measures derived from our model and the benchmark, respectively.. (Conti. 
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Panel C: PIR 
Figure 3 (Conti.). Systemic risk measures. 
This figure presents an alternative systemic risk measure, PIR, during 1996-2011, by sector. The PIR (Panel C) is the ratio of the price of insurance against financial distress 
to the aggregate asset value (scaled by multiplying 106).  
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Figure 4. St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI). 
This figure presents monthly data of STLFSI, from December 1996 to December 2011. 
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Panel A: Public firms 
 
 
Panel B: All firms 
 
Figure 5. Bank loans from 2000Q3 to 2010Q1. 
This figure shows the total amount (the left-axis) and number (the right-axis) of new bank loans issues for each month 
over the period of 2003Q3−2010Q1. The black and gray lines represent the total amount of deals and the total number 
of deals for a given month respectively. Panel A reports the profile of bank loans for firms that are public and listed in 
Compustat database and Panel B shows it for all firms. 
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Figure 6. Distance-to-Default from 2006Q2 to 2010Q1. 
This figure shows the movements over time of distance-to-default for groups of CDF (solid line) and of NCDF (dotted 
line). The vertical lines separate five crisis periods. 
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Panel A: Size 
 
Panel B: Leverage 
 
Panel C: Volatility 
 
Panel D: Cash/Asset 
Figure 7. Distributions of key characteristics on firms’ defaults. 
The diagrams plot the kernel density functions of key characteristics related to firms’ default. Distribution for the entire 
sample (pre-match) is presented in the left-hand side and distribution for the matched sample is presented in the right-
hand side. Distributions of Size, Leverage, Volatility, and Cash/Asset are displayed in Panel A, B, C, and D respectively. 
The red (blue) line represents firms that have higher (lower) and lower dependence on external financing firms (CDF 
versus NCDF).  
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